Pleased to share my new
@ForeignAffairs
essay with
@BonnieGlaser
and Tom Christensen on why credible assurance is critical to strengthening deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: 🧵
Kudos to the US and PRC for pulling off such a constructive meeting in Bali. Dare we hope that the Biden-Xi meeting marks the first signs of an inflection point that begins to decelerate the spiral towards conflict and makes room for tackling common challenges? A short thread:
Speculation that China might invade Taiwan to distract from mounting domestic challenges - or because Chinese leaders imagine that their window of opportunity to seize the island is closing - is not just wrong, but dangerous. Here's why: THREAD
Honored to join
@StateDept
as a senior advisor to the Secretary’s policy planning staff, thanks to a
@CFR_org
fellowship for tenured IR scholars while on sabbatical from
@cornellgov
. Grateful to be able to contribute in these important and difficult times.
I spoke with People's Republic of China State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi about our efforts to support the safe passage and freedom to travel for Afghans and foreign nationals.
Some quick reactions to the US decision to close the Chinese consulate in Houston: 1. Unless more evidence is forthcoming, this looks like a stepped up effort to use China as the bogeyman and distract U.S. voters from the Trump administration's disastrous response to the pandemic
U.S.-China competition risks becoming an end unto itself, fueling overextension abroad and undermining democracy at home. It's not too late for Xi and Biden to find a way back from the brink. Here's how.
I hope this essay can contribute to a broad effort to rebuild a domestic consensus around how the United States relates to the world, on terms defined less by beating China than strengthening ourselves. 8/
In
@ForeignAffairs
,
@TomPepinsky
and I write that the true sources of China’s foreign policy influence are transactional and coercive, not ideological. A thread: 1/
.
@POTUS
' comments are dangerous, even if not an official change in policy (per
@WhiteHouse
clarification). More explicit here than in previous gaffes is the suggestion that the US would send troops to fight for Taiwan, regardless of what Taiwan does. 1/
More: “We agree with what we signed onto a long time ago. And that there's one China policy, and Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence. We are not moving-- we're not encouraging their being independent. We're not-- that-- that's their decision,” he said.
Delighted that
@jerometenk
and I have a new paper, "Domestic Politics, China's Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order," coming out in
@IntOrgJournal
, pre-print here: 1/
Since late Jan, there was enough information to indicate that COVID-19 could become a devastating pandemic. Other prudent governments, S. Korea & Taiwan, acted swiftly. Blaming China won't change the reality that the US did not. My op-ed with
@jerometenk
Pleased to share that my paper, "Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China" with
@AllanDafoe
is now available online from International Studies Quarterly (paywall free here: )
“The primary conflict between democracy and authoritarianism, however, is taking place not between countries but within them—including in the United States."
These are dangerous times at home and abroad. Here’s how we can put a floor under US-China tensions and renew our dynamism and leadership in a changing world. Some personal reflections: a thread
Come work with me!
@cornellgov
seeks a tenure-track assistant prof. with international, global, or transnational interests, esp. scholars who share our commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion in the research and teaching of international relations:
"Instead of playing a game of whack-a-mole against a rotating cast of Chinese tech companies, the U.S. would be wise to spend more time developing legislation and standards for how all companies, regardless of country of origin, protect online privacy and secure data."
At home and abroad, the CCP is fighting a defensive ideological battle against liberal norms of democracy and human rights, but so far at least, it is not engaged in a determined effort to spread autocracy. My essay in
@ForeignAffairs
, paywall-free:
Two pieces in this morning's
@monkeycage
blog refute State Dept Policy Planning director's remarks.
@Steven_m_ward
notes that calling China the first non-'Caucasian' competitor is wrong & dangerous. Elevating race helped fuel Japan's aggression in WWII 1/
My essay in the NYT: "The government has helped shore up public approval by reminding citizens of the nation’s long struggle and emphasizing that China will ultimately prevail by biding its time for future success.
Yet this strategy has costs."
Devastated to learn that
@NunoPMonteiro1
has passed. Nuno was a warm and generous colleague and friend. I’ll always remember the moment he brought out a special port to toast some really good news I shared with him and
@AllanDafoe
, here in 2015. What a loss.
2. If the consulate has been engaged in "massive illegal spying and influence operations,” why was the announcement so thin on detail? Why did we not learn that the consulate had been warned previously to stop, and when they did not, this was the punishment meted out?
Excellent op-ed from
@ryanl_hass
on why treating Taiwan as a strategic US asset “acts as an accelerant to conflict by positioning Taiwan as a prize to be fought over by the United States and China”.
3. Xi also gave assurances that would do much to reduce US concerns, if honored: “China has never sought to change the existing international order, does not interfere in the internal affairs of the United States, and has no intention to challenge or replace the United States”
2. Also encouraging to see shared opposition to nuclear use or threats in Ukraine and common acknowledgment that the world expects the United States and China to do more to work together on global challenges, e.g. climate, debt, health, food insecurity.
Thanks to those who've shared & said nice things about my article. Some thoughts: Before tenure, a well-meaning senior colleague advised me not to publish anything in an area studies journal that wasn't "something descriptive written over the weekend". 1/
4. Because the United States has less access in China than China has to the United States, reciprocity can hurt the United States more than China. Now, more than ever, U.S. policymakers and voters must be wary of a "pyrrhic victory"
1. It's encouraging that both sides agreed to empower senior officials (including an agreement for
@SecBlinken
to visit China) to develop principles to manage the relationship and working groups to make progress on specific issues.
Not supporting Taiwan independence is longstanding US policy. But this new combo (a pledge to send troops + decisions about independence are Taiwan's) suggests an unconditional commitment, one that will strengthen perceptions that the U.S. is issuing Taiwan a blank check. 2/
Whether in China or in the United States, nationalism is more likely to repel than attract—whether it comes in the form of wolf warrior diplomacy or “America first” rhetoric. My essay in
@ForeignAffairs
:
We're very pleased to announce that Professor
@jessicacweiss
of Cornell University has joined The Monkey Cage editorial team. Her particular focus will be reviewing and expanding our coverage of East Asia. Welcome, Jessica!
The United States should let China's chauvinistic strategy bump into its natural limitations, without tit-for-tat measures of America’s own. My essay for
@nytopinion
with
@Ali_Wyne
In
@nytopinion
,
@Ali_Wyne
and I argue for an asymmetric approach to China's increasingly nationalist, authoritarian strategy: revitalizing the relationships that have long anchored U.S. diplomacy and reaffirming the US' democratic values and institutions.
The U.S. is no longer the world's oldest, continuous democracy, according to Polity index. The U.S. has dropped below their democracy threshold and is now considered an "anocracy" (from +6 to +5) h/t Page Fortna
4. Whether the meeting marks an inflection point will depend on whether the two sides prioritize mutual efforts to lower the temperature in the coming weeks - and to what extent unilateral actions & developments continue to fuel the escalatory dynamic. /end
Such comments reduce Taiwan's incentives to undertake badly needed defense reforms, while encouraging those who seek to change the status quo by pursuing formal independence and US diplomatic recognition for Taiwan. 3/
Even more than previous misstatements, these comments undercut the "dual deterrence" at the heart of strategic ambiguity--deterring a Chinese attack not only through military might but also by deterring unilateral moves by Taiwan toward independence. /fin
As
@SecPompeo
takes aim at the Chinese Communist Party, distinguishing between the people and the party, I invited Prof. Bruce Dickson to share his research on who joins the CCP, how its ideology has changed over time, and how broad popular support for the CCP really is in China.
The hard but crucial task is to thread the needle between deterrence and provocation. Unconditional commitments to defend Taiwan and pledges to surge U.S. military power to the region could provoke the very conflict U.S. policymakers seek to deter. /end
Powerful words from
@yuenyuenang
: “The narratives we choose shape the realities we experience. The ‘clash of civilizations’ implies that the U.S. and China are culturally — or worse, racially — destined to fight each other, and everyone else must choose one side…
10 years ago
@AmberWichowsky
and I teamed up to study whether China campaign ads were cheap talk or a harbinger of policy action. Today, the second paper in our project is out in
@LSQjournal
Claims that Beijing is looking for opportunities to start a war for domestic political purposes are dangerous because they imply that U.S. actions have no bearing on China’s calculus and that the only way to deter from diversionary aggression is to deny it the ability to prevail.
Historically, Chinese leaders have not started wars to divert attention from domestic challenges, and they continue to favor using measures short of conflict to achieve their objectives. See research by
@fravel
@zhubochubo
, among many others
New piece by
@HarvardHBS
Meg Rithmire: Though govt $ extends well beyond the state sector, not all firms are faithful agents. "Reading every action of a Chinese firm as part of Beijing’s plan leads us to misunderstand, and potentially overreact to, China’s motives and power."
“The parallels between 19th-century America & post-1978 China are striking. Both share a dramatic story of renewal after devastation & prosperity amid decadence.” from the always insightful
@yuenyuenang
“The proximate goal of US strategy is not to deny Taiwan to China or to treat Taiwan as an instrument for inflicting strategic pain on China. In addition to denying agency to the Taiwan people, such approaches would only accelerate the United States and China toward a conflict…
Playing the China card to gain bipartisan support for domestic spending is unlikely to work in the current US political environment, where the Republican leadership is focused on denying the Biden administration any wins. Excellent piece from
@ryanl_hass
Sharing a piece for
@NoemaMag
that wrestles with how Biden administration can balance politics and policy on China.
Insulating policy from politics is not an option, and allowing politics to drive policy carries risks. A thoughtful balance is needed.
“When the Chinese economy falters, the danger is not diversionary war. Instead, the danger is that China’s leaders will feel weak and become more sensitive to external challenges, potentially lashing out to show strength.”
US-PRC relations are off track. Risks of conflict are rising, while benefits from the relationship for American and Chinese citizens are receding. Ideological arguments don't carry answers. Evidence-based, interest-driven thinking is needed.
3. How will the Chinese government react to what it has already called an "unprecedented" "political provocation"? So far, China has responded in kind to each of the Trump administration's actions with a tit-for-tat response, so we are likely to see a continued race to the bottom
TBH, it's been hard to move much of my own research forward in the last couple weeks. But I'm proud to have solicited and edited a lot of top-notch content on the coronavirus for the Monkey Cage. Here's a short-roundup of our coverage
Although the logic of diversionary aggression has an intuitive appeal, cross-national studies in political science have found little consistent evidence of world leaders starting military hostilities to whip up domestic support.
The public conversation and politics around US-China competition has built pressure on policymakers to counter every move China makes, fueling a reactive tendency that risks crowding out the affirmative American interests and values that should guide U.S. foreign policy. 6/
Important piece by
@SusanShirk1
: “many Americans have concluded that China is bent on supplanting the United States as the world’s number one power and that negotiating would be fruitless.
There are two reasons to reject that conclusion. First, American primacy is the wrong goal
4. The U.S. instead of overreacting to China's overreach, should not give up on diplomacy that can test whether we can induce the Xi regime to moderate its policies. 6/7
The United States has a strategic interest in the peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, not in Taiwan’s permanent separation or independence. Thanks
@ewong
@johnismay
for including my thoughts here:
A World Safe for Autocracy: The Domestic Politics of China's Foreign Policy
@jessicacweiss
speaks Wednesday @ 12:30pm, part of our Critical Issues Confronting China lecture series
Actually,
@TomCottonAR
, Chinese students aren’t returning to China: “For each year between 2005 and 2018, only about 10 percent of Chinese PhD graduates in computer science report plans to leave the country.” See this important analysis by
@r_zwetsloot
"If Chinese students want to come here and study Shakespeare & the Federalist Papers, that's what they need to learn from America. They don't need to learn quantum computing" -- Sen. Tom Cotton proposes restricting Chinese students from studying science & tech at US universities
When
@Ali_Wyne
and I wrote that the United States should not try to out-China China, we hadn't figured on such stark echoes of Beijing's patriotic education campaign:
"For all the negativity, U.S. voters, by a 28-point margin, favor working with China to respond to the coronavirus instead of confronting the country aggressively." Anti-China sentiment is on the rise via
@politico
But Skinner's remarks went beyond race, describing a new 'clash of civilizations' and calling China an ideological rival. My take on why that's wrong, in three ways: 2/
“If the U.S. is really worried about variants and the spread of Covid through travel, it should require negative tests for all travelers, no matter where they come from, and reinstate the mask mandate for public transportation”
Delighted that my paper with
@kaciemiura
on campaign rhetoric and Chinese reactions to new leaders is finally out! Thanks to Asian Security for making the first 50 downloads free. Email me if you run into a paywall.
No matter how carefully the administration differentiates between the Chinese government and people of Chinese ethnicity, this good-versus-evil rhetoric creates a permissive environment for xenophobia, anti-Asian racism, and violence against anyone perceived as foreign. 6/
[US-China] competition should not be over who trips and outruns the other, but rather who fixes their own problems first. Competition can be a force for self-renewal instead of mutual destruction.”
Of course, there's also the appalling hypocrisy that many of the loudest voices calling for a hardline approach on China are simultaneously contributing to undermining American democracy in ways that play to Beijing's advantage. I see disturbing parallels between the GOP and CCP.
Trying to process why relief is still not at hand, and why this has felt like anything but victory—cautious optimism tempered by a strong dose of ongoing anxiety...
Important coda to the NBA story: Chinese government once again steps in to prevent nationalist mobilization (including physical protests) from getting out of control, urges rational patriotism, generates resentment at heavy-handed manipulation and repression.
Amid the firestorm of online anger at the NBA in China last week, one nationalist made a banner reading “HK belongs to China forever” to the Lakers game in Shenzhen. But police stopped him, confiscating the banner, before he even got to the stadium.