In my latest, for
@ussc
, I spotlight the shifting military balance in the Indian Ocean. China will soon be able to exercise sea denial - an unprecedented threat to India (& its partners, Aus & US). How is India responding? (1/4)
A famous
@TIME
cover story in 1989 declared India was "determinedly transforming itself into a regional superpower." Some really interesting nuggets on how the west saw India's rise then. A lot has changed. A lot hasn't. (1/n)
In my latest, I argue the US bet on India is fundamentally sound. Tellis was right: India won't fight alongside US in a Taiwan war. But there are other ways a US-India strategic partnership can contribute meaningfully to a free & open Indo-Pacific. (1/4)
"The great risk” Europe faces is getting "caught up in crises that are not ours," says Emmanuel Macron.
In an exclusive interview aboard his plane, the French president explained why he wants Europe to reduce its dependency on the US 👇
Very excited to soon teach a new course at Stanford, called "India in the Indo-Pacific." This course is the first on Indian foreign and defense policy offered at Stanford in some years. I developed it, & the draft syllabus is here - all feedback welcome.
Hope the Indian journalist profession, rather than cheering on official information operations, is learning how to critically appraise & hold accountable the natsec establishment.
Hope the Indian armed forces are observing the Israel Defence Forces spokespersons give interviews, shooting demos, making Insta reels and conveying their country’s point of view to the world. Each spokesperson seems like a trained video presenter and producer. Conflict isn’t
In a new paper for
@LowyInstitute
, I examine the long-term implications of the Ladakh crisis for India's defence policy & strategic competition w/China.
Paper is here:
Thread w/key points follows... (1/7)
At least as noteworthy, India in the 1980s had a very active military. In the article's recent past, Indian forces had seized Siachen, faced off vs China at Sumdorong Chu, muscled its way into Sri Lanka, and swiftly intervened in Maldives. (3/n)
In my latest essay, I assess the India-Pakistan conventional military balance. Despite India's much larger military, the balance of usable force in most contexts is in fact almost parity. Why? Thread w/key points follows. (1/7)
The article gives the last word to Steve Cohen: "an India that is a regional bully threatening China or Pakistan would not be in American interests."
So, yeah, some things do change - a lot.
Link to full text: (8/8)
This was written in the midst of Sundarji-era capability improvements. The trend-lines looked impressive: Army expansion, new Navy port, nuclear program, & world's biggest arms importer.
And this was *before* the mania of the post-liberalization econ boom. (2/n)
.
@SushantSin
reports 3 PLA incursions *in Galwan area* (not including elsewhere along LAC, like Pangong, Sikkim). Each incursion about 2-3km into Indian territory, and encamped. Delhi now sees this as “unprecedented.”
Did nuclear deterrence keep the Kargil war limited? In my latest research, I argue India was restrained for other reasons, and those reasons no longer apply. In the next conflict, India won't be as restrained, & deterrence will be really tested.
Most analysts agreed, "India has pulled well ahead of its archfoe [Pakistan]."
In fact, it looked like it had slid into its new role as "regional policeman."
The US welcomed this. Reagan called the Maldives intervention a "valuable contribution." (4/n)
My take: India must learn from Israel's strategic failure. The policy of periodically attriting enemies, while ignoring politics - the "cult of operational superiority" - has collapsed. Indian policy towards nuclear-armed Pakistan also currently ignores politics, to its peril.
Thrilled to announce my latest, from
@CarnegieIndia
: "Rethink doctrine or risk irrelevance."
BLUF: Indian Army's doctrine hasn't kept pace with major strategic changes, rendering Army less relevant as a tool of statecraft.
Key points follow: (1/7)
In a new op-ed for
@the_hindu
, I argue that China has in effect altered the LAC (for now) in large part because the Indian Army was not postured for new types of security threats. This applies the findings from my recent
@CarnegieIndia
paper... (1/4)
Interestingly, despite India's own threat perceptions, this article asserts China presented no real threat.
[Remember, this is April 1989, months before Tiananmen, when an erstwhile democracy movement was bubbling in Beijing.]
So even China wont stand in India's way. (5/n)
Excited to announce I have joined
@ASPI_org
as a non-resident senior fellow. Australia is stepping up with a more robust regional security role, & a more productive relationship w/India - and I’m honored to support that big evolution.
In today’s
@the_hindu
I lay out 5 benefits India would gain from publishing a National Security Strategy. Without one, Indian policy will remain reactive, disjointed, and unaccountable.
It’s true, India isn’t Sweden. But nor is America. The US record on liberal democratic values in recent decades has been dismal. Let’s stop pretending other countries have to meet American standards.
India is planning to build its biggest container port, which is planned to be among the world's top 10. Its current biggest, JNPT just outside Bombay, is only the 28th busiest in the world (7 of the top 10 are in China).
What can India do to help deter an attack on Taiwan? We can assume India won't fight, but in my latest for
@ASPI_org
, I argue it can still help convince Beijing to defer the military option. I offer 6 types of policy options for Delhi... (1/3)
In my latest for the Hindu, I argue its in India’s self-interest to help deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan. This is an extension of my research on Indian policy options (see below) - but rather than exploring HOW india can deter, today I argue WHY it should.
What can India do to help deter an attack on Taiwan? We can assume India won't fight, but in my latest for
@ASPI_org
, I argue it can still help convince Beijing to defer the military option. I offer 6 types of policy options for Delhi... (1/3)
Stoked to be starting at Stanford this coming Sept. An honor to join a group of such smart people working on the toughest problems in policy - & especially to help kickstart a new research effort on South Asia. Thanks to all who helped make this happen - you know who you are.
We're thrilled to share that Indo-Pacific security expert Arzan Tarapore
@arzandc
has been appointed a research scholar supporting APARC's renewed focus on South Asia, beginning this September. Welcome to APARC and
@FSIStanford
, Arzan!
So the key Q was, "What does India intend to do with all that power?"
Despite some remarkable defence coop'n w/US (engines avionics, other help for the fledgling... LCA program!), it remained deeply tied to Soviet military support.
Its strategic intentions were unclear. (6/n)
More specifically, would a more muscular India pose a threat in the Indian Ocean?
"India's growing military machine, meanwhile, has gained the uneasy attention of its neighbors along the rim of the Indian Ocean, like Australia and Indonesia." (7/n)
Saleh is not going quietly into the night: "Useless caveats are finished. JOIN THE RESISTANCE."
As the phrase goes, "Panjshir is the Afghanistan of Afghanistan."
I really don’t want Indians to die, or Indian interests to suffer, or India to be humiliated - especially at the hands of China. But I fear that’s the only thing that will shake the prideful and the unserious out of their stupor.
To be clear (since apparently I wasn’t), Cohen wasn’t castigating India. He also said India could be a welcome stabilizing force. The point is not that he was arguing one way or the other, but that there was great uncertainty about India's trajectory. Full quote here: (9/9)
These are the most elegant and easy to read maps of the Ladakh crisis that I’ve seen, & I’ve seen many. Made for my
@LowyInstitute
paper - maps not comprehensive but include key features mentioned in paper. Kudos & thanks
@__brodysmith
.
Latest map project. India’s disputed borders with China and Pakistan are a cartographers nightmare.
What I learned in the process; or a (ridiculously) brief history:
Canadian investigators are professional, & Trudeau’s made the allegations in parliament - so there is something to this. Suddenly adds a lot of credibility to the idea of a bold new dimension in India’s CT strategy - see also .
BREAKING: Canada expels top Indian diplomat as it investigates whether the Indian government is linked to the assassination of a Sikh activist on Canadian soil.
I'm not convinced India is a "swing state." India has long been a staunch competitor of China, & will remain so for structural reasons. It may or may not get closer to US (I hope it does); but it sure won't "swing" towards China. For more, see my piece: .
I'm flummoxed by this. I get that
@ForeignAffairs
sees policy & prestige value in hosting other govt perspectives, but at what point does it draw the line at misinformation? Doesnt it also have a responsibility to the public?
“Apart from the Afghan people, Pakistan has been the greatest victim of the wars in Afghanistan.” Read
@YusufMoeed
, Pakistan’s national security adviser, on why the international community must engage with the new Taliban government.
Fascinating. Arms exports have been a big priority for Modi, & its yielding results. The US is the biggest customer - as supply chains become enmeshed, US-India defense cooperation is gradually becoming irreversible.
Yes, India’s
#defence
exports are booming, but guess who’s the biggest importer
And guess who is the biggest exporter
Read to see if your guess is right
I agree a US-India alliance is a chimera.
But, devil's advocate, there's another way to see this: India already, some time back, picked "the US's" side in Indo-Pac competition. Things is, the "side" is not as coherent or as US-led as Cold War analogies suggest... (1/n)
This by
@ajaishukla
is one of the boldest, most original ideas I've seen re Ladakh crisis. No historical analogy is perfect, but one of the biggest discrepancies, I'd say, is that India's chances of tactical success are smaller than Egypt's were. (1/4)
What is the Quad doing, & how important is India's role? My latest article explains the Quad's strategic logic - what its trying to do, & how - and argues that India's recent strategic adjustment was the key to enabling that. Key points follow. (1/7)
Ashley Tellis, a key architect of US policy towards India, has doubts that India can summon the economic & military wherewithal to compete w/China.
He's even more pessimistic about the substance of the partnership w/US.
Find out why:
Indian Army occupies high-ground features, reportedly as bargaining leverage against China. Except, these features are on its *own* side of LAC.
Not an especially strong bargaining position when your offer is to retreat from your own territory. (1/2)
What's the strategic effect of the LAC crisis? Some say India/US will move closer; tho EAM Jaishankar said no to alliances.
I examine effect of LAC crisis on strategic competition w/China, in my latest
@east_asia_forum
, here: .
My key points...(1/5)
How should India respond to the next terrorist attack from Pakistan? A strategy focused on military punishment won’t work. India should rebalance its strategy, w/other lines of effort: denial, shaping, & resilience. See my latest, in
@the_hindu
(1/2)
Some analysts call for India to flex its muscles & punish China in the Indian Ocean. They're wrong.
My latest short piece argues that India & its partners should instead prioritise a denial strategy, to counter the growing risk of Chinese coercion.
What is this facile distinction? As if being a developing country means you cannot believe in freedom of navigation. What is the “free and open Indo Pacific” if not a set of congruent interests shared by US, Aus, Japan, and India together?
Tell me again Australia is on the fence.
New defence acquisitions to target China; supplied by and integrated with the US.
Not the actions of a hedging state.
In my latest piece, for
@ASPI_org
, I assess the risk of a China-India conflict. I argue one of its incidental victims could be the Quad.
Paper is here:
Precis is here:
Key points follow...
(1/6)
India to finally get its new stealth frigate ‘Tushil’ and in September
Indian Navy crew of about 200 carrying out acceptance trials in
#Russia
The next frigate to be delivered early next year
I’ve officially started work at Stanford (though, for now, from Sydney). It’s a huge honour and very exciting to be part of the impressive
@StanfordSAPARC
team. Let’s get to work!
We are thrilled to welcome Indo-Pacific security expert
@arzandc
as a research scholar at APARC! Read our Q&A to learn more about his insights into current U.S.-China-India relations and his goals for revamping APARC's South Asia research initiative ⬇️
India reminds Europe that its been facing a destabilizing revisionist for years.
Difference is, Asia's revisionist has not provoked the same unified resistance. Maybe that should change *before* Asian cities are razed.
„We‘ve been hearing a lot of arguments from 🇪🇺that 🇺🇦 should be wake-up call also for Asia since things like his could also happen in Asia. Guess what, things have been happening in Asia” & maybe 🇪🇺didn’t pay attention.
@DrSJaishankar
serving it right back.
#Raisina2022
“This is more tech transfer than the US has ever authorised. We are breaking through into new frontiers”
Detailed piece on the GE jet engine deal with India by
@prashantktm
where an anonymous source,
@Cold_Peace_
, and I are quoted. cc
@USIP
Simple but powerful idea. DC types often get frustrated with Indian policy because they see it as a quasi-ally, an adjunct, a member (or not) of the US camp. In fact Delhi sees itself as - and is - an independent pole, albeit w/many overlapping interests, in multipolar Asia.
From my
@the_hindu
piece "Indian policymakers inherently think of India as a pole in the international system. So those wishing to work with India must learn to deal with the ‘India pole’.
Don't ask India “whose side are you on?” but “what is your side?”.
The Establishment that scolds India for venality now is the same one that rejoiced after Galwan because India was apparently finally joining America's cold war. It isn't, & it wasn't. Take India on its own terms, as a power w/its own interests, not as an adjunct of US policy.
🧵 I get people saying they are upset/disappointed by India's approach to the Russia-Ukraine crisis.
What I don't get is people – esp those who claim to be India experts – saying they are surprised by it.
Here's how you might be less surprised about Indian foreign policy 1/
My latest publication is a labor of love - drafted 5yrs ago - on intelligence analysis tradecraft. It critiques the orthodoxy of keeping int & policy at arm's length, which I argue contributed to US int failure in 1979 Iranian revolution. Key points: (1/6)
Don't have enough to worry about? Check this out - on the vulnerability of submarine cables that carry the world's critical data. Also check out one of this piece's sources, the amazing interactive maps at . Here are the cables in the Indo-Pacific:
Menon urges India to adopt its own "hide & bide" strategy: “India should look inward, build capacity, build internal cohesion, avoid all external entanglements. All rising powers have kept their heads down,”
My core argument on AUKUS is out. Subs are good & imp, but the biggest story is radical integration of leading edge defence tech (even beyond nuc propulsion). This is a product of - & deepens - the FVEY int alliance. (1/3)
I would flip this. It’s hard to cultivate confidence when seniors rely on status rather than rigor; when they privilege their voice over mentoring; when there’s too much Ethos, not enough Logos.
One of the major reasons why Indian strategic thinking is often stale and not dynamic enough is because the younger generation is not confident of challenging the old guard.
In my latest piece
@warontherocks
, I look at the latest India-Pak crisis - specifically, how it will shape the next one. I welcome comments.
Key points are as follows:
Thrilled to announce my latest, in a bumper special issue of
@TWQgw
on the Indo-Pacific.
BLUF: US, India, & partners must craft a more focused & realistic strategy to manage risks of PLA expansion in Indian Ocean region.
Key points follow: (1/6)
Three ways I highlight in this piece: combined military posture in eastern IOR; niche mil capabilities for denial against PLA; and diplomatic coordination, esp in Global South. These affordable steps can add serious deterrent value. (2/4)
The most eyebrow-raising part is this strange juxtaposition. Aus/US pursue pro-India policies, just as Indian-origin people rise to influence? Is this some thinly veiled dual loyalty calumny? Why point out Tellis’ Indian origins?
Clinical take-down of bad history here. Biggest take-away: the simple storyline of “we turned to the Sovs because the west was flaky” is way too facile, not supported by the facts. Also good tip for young players: don’t rely on single sources, esp motivated ones.
Disappointing inaccuracies litter this entire thread (and by extension, Gundevia’s memoirs). Since it’s mil procurement and history, and I’m in limbo between flights, I’m going to wade in here…
We have a bunch of assumptions about the Indian Ocean region that need to be constantly revisited.
In
@NBRnews
Asia Policy journal, we have a roundtable that examines IOR strategic futures, to test those assumptions. Thread of key points follows...(1/8)
Pakistan Foreign Minister
@SMQureshiPTI
can’t seem to open his mouth without putting his foot in it. Admits on TV that “people over here” are in touch with leadership of proscribed terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed.
I have an explainer out in WaPo's
@monkeycageblog
on the latest phase of the LAC crisis. My key point: it'll be tough for India to avoid a negative outcome, with or without war. (1/2)
That's a wrap.
@StanfordSAPARC
South Asia initiative hosted 8 webinars in 2020-21, w/utterly stellar experts lending their insights. Here's a thread:
1. Most recently, fmr NSA
@ShivshankaMenon
's tour d'horizon on the US-India partnership:
The Quad is "ill-defined and lacks a clear mandate."
Yes, and that's a *strength,* not a weakness.
This piece misunderstands NATO, misunderstands the Quad, and misunderstands the nature of the China challenge.
"The Quad, an alliance between the U.S., Australia, Japan and India, is the centerpiece of President Biden's Asia play. But it is ill-defined and lacks a clear mandate," writes Debasish Roy Chowdhury
Great reporting here. India racing to plug holes in the defensive line in eastern sector of LAC. It’s reassigned 2x Divisions from COIN to border defence; & continues building roads & cell towers. But in RALP, foot patrols still take a week (!) to reach LAC.
After Tawang, Infra Construction Gathers Pace in Eastern Arunachal as Army Puts Full Focus on LAC and increasingly pulls out of CI duties in a reorientation in the north east.
So far, the focus has remained primarily on Tawang.
My report:
AUUKUS is a big deal - a step change deepening of the alliance. Its clear that emerging tech is a key field of competition w/China, & deepening coop among allies on this specifically is important. (1/9)
US strategy calculates a rising India will help counter-balance China. But how? Some ideas, like challenging China on their land border, won’t work. I argue in
@lawfareblog
that building strategic leverage in IOR is viable & complements US goals:
Right now, there are 12x replies to this tweet extolling a Quad get-together in Washington. They all -- every single one -- is expressing hostility towards the US for the reported withholding of vaccine raw materials.
Reasonable people say we (US, India, others) should pursue guardrails in relations w/China. Here’s why that won’t work.
China deliberately generates risk as a tool of policy. It’s not interested in guardrails. See article/thread below.
Richard Maude on excellent form explaining why China won’t engage on "guardrails" — and thus that "competition with guardrails" ain't going to work.
Says AUS + SEA nations et al to call China out on this.
It's behind the paywall. Some quotes 🧵
"And on Friday we've got the boss going to a bulldozer factory."
"Bulldozers? Are you sure, after the news this week?"
"Umm, yeah, nah, it'll be fine. Too late to change the itinerary now. Just make sure he doesn't climb into one."
We don't have such a picture in our history and won't ever have. Yes, yesterday I flinched for a friction of a second as a rocket flew above & landed few meters away. Dear Pak twitter attackers, Talibn & terrorism won't heal the trauma of this picture. Find other ways.
.
@CChristineFair
did some friggin cool fieldwork & came back w/this. Chabahar port & Rte 606 offer Afg a way to reduce dependence on Pak. Longer term, it offers India an opportunity to build on its latent influence in Central Asia. Really great reporting:
Why is there a distorted view in India of Australia’s strategic posture? Because of silly clickbait like this. No, Aus is emphatically not open to China being “in the Quad.” No one said that.
Australia is open to having China as a “partner” in the Quad and it is “not in the containment club” when it comes to dealing with Beijing, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison said Thursday.
I report
@ThePrintIndia
Is India losing? I spoke this week w/Ashley Tellis, on the India-China strategic competition. We examined the fundamentals of the rivalry, incl India's use of deterrence, its prospects for balancing China, & outlook for 2021. Check it out here:
India is being courted. By the US, as well as Japan, Aus, ...& China. Hopefully this moment is a pivot, allowing India scope to move away from dependence on Russia.
"Donald Lu and senior US diplomat Victoria Nuland... have over the past two days met Jaishankar and Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla with offers to replace practically everything that India sources from Russia."
India mulling letting Aus into Malabar - follows elevation of Quad to ministerial level. To what should we attribute India’s more forward-leaning approach? What Chinese moves have threatened it? Or what changed in Delhi?
India may invite Australia for the
#Malabar
exercise with US & Japan in the Bay of Bengal this year. If that happens, it will mark the first time the
#Quad
countries will come together for the high-voltage naval combat manoeuvers after a gap of 13 years!
Genuinely perplexed by this article. The reinforcements do not signal a shift to offensive posture - that's always been the doctrine, these reinforcements are largely defensive, & certainly machine guns do not constitute offensive capabilities!
"India has redirected at least 50,000 additional troops to its border with China in a historic shift toward an offensive military posture against the world’s second-biggest economy."
To be clear, this not a sanguine or celebratory take. India’s constraints are tight, & limits to the US-India partnership are real. I dont tackle values, trade, tech, etc. That’s why the recommendations are affordable & incremental, not transformational. (3/4)
The effects of the Taliban takeover will go beyond Afg's borders - what does it mean for the region? Learn from
@ahmadjavid
@CChristineFair
@PaliwalAvi
in
@StanfordSAPARC
South Asia Initiative's 1st event of the new academic year, next week. Register:
In this paper I argue that, as bad as the Ladakh crisis has been for India, what comes after will probably be worse.
Take a look, tell me what you think:
"As a result of the Ladakh crisis, India faces a new strategic reality in which China is a clear and abiding adversary."
@arzandc
writes the latest Lowy Institute Analysis.
In my recent
@LowyInstitute
paper I argued China got away w/relatively light costs from Ladakh. It’s biggest concern was threat of rupture in broader relations w/India (esp trade & investment)
...& this threat was largely not realized.
From today’s
@TheIndiaCable
:
The
@WhiteHouse
released an "Interim National Security Strategic Guidance" this week. After reading it, I'm sure international relations scholars will go.....hmmmmmm 🤔
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