My book on China's coercion is officially out with
@CUP_PoliSci
in digital and hardcopy formats. It argues that China uses coercion to "kill the chicken to scare the monkey" but is also constrained by economic and geo costs. Econ interdependence constrains & enables China.
China's Gambit by Ketian Zhang
Theorizes China's coercion decisions with rich empirical evidence, connecting concepts in international political economy and security.
📚
Ridiculous that at the start of EVERY single semester, I have to do the extra to prove that I am a scholar qualified to teach and actually know stuff, simply because I am a female POC.
I'm happy to share my new article in the Journal of Contemporary China on Sino-Indian border disputes, which is part of a special issue on Sino-Indian relations.
***New episode*** of International Security's Off the Page podcast is now online!
"
#Chinese
Coercion in the
#SouthChinaSea
" features Ketian Zhang (
@VivianChang36
), Admiral Scott Swift, and Susan Thornton (
@suea_thornton
).
Listen, subscribe, & learn:
Come work with me!
@GeorgeMasonU
's
@ScharSchool
is hiring a tenure-track assistant prof in int'l and law. Those working at the intersection of IR, IS, law, and global governance, please apply! I'm on the committee and
@MichaelHunzeker
chairs. Link below and happy to chat!
I will be giving three book talks (on China's Gambits) in the next two weeks, all in person, but some of which will be streamed live or via Zoom. Links in comments.
1. Norte Dame (Feb 20, 4:30pm)
2. U Maryland (Feb 22, 12pm)
3. CATO (Mar 1, 12pm)
Happy to share my new article in the Journal of Strategic Studies (
@jststs
) on China's land reclamation decisions in the South China Sea.
@ScharSchool
.
@VivianChang36
argues that in the South China Sea, China is a cautious bully – using coercion only when it feels a high need to demonstrate its resolve, & when the economic & geopolitical costs are low.
It examines when, why, and how China coerces states over perceived threats to its national security. This book offers a new cost-balancing theory to explain coercion decisions while focusing the empirical cases on China's coercion over maritime disputes, Taiwan, and Tibet.
If you are currently a grad student in Polisci/History (esp. security/foreign policy/grand strategy), I'd strongly recommend you to apply to the NEW workshop. It bridges the gap between policy and academia. I benefited immensely when I was in grad school!
Applications for BtG's New Era Workshop are now open! This three day institute is designed to help PhD students approach policy engagement and shape dissertation projects, academic papers, and op-eds.
Please share widely in your network!
#NEW2020
Two photos I took during my fieldwork in Shanghai. Recruitment posters in Tongji University. "World is so large; I want to join the mil." "All your dreams will come true here."
Currently very conflicted about this, especially since I am 19 weeks pregnant, but at the same time feel that I have a moral obligation to go as discussants/chair on multiple panels.
Excited for the launch of the
@StimsonCenter
@stratlearning
online course "Deterrence in Southern Asia" on Tuesday! Enroll for free at to learn about the strategic chain of competition between India, Pakistan, China, and the US from me and other experts!
1. A family friend is a chief surgeon in Beijing and said they are beyond their capacity and working 24/7; 2. another family friend's father passed away due to COVID but the morgue doesn't report it as such.
God this screengrab – from the excellent China Diction newsletter – made me angry. Xining was the first city in China I knew well, back in 2007. I used to love going to the Dongguan mosque square for a slice of something different. Now it's Han-style pavilions and a red star flag
Given that many organizations have canceled/postponed their meetings (Facebook, Google, etc.), I wonder if
@isanet
should consider the same. Withdrawal makes sense, but it places a greater moral obligation on those who are chair/discussants.
New piece by Evan Medeiros at China Leadership Monitor. Interesting discussion re: period of strategic vs. historical opportunity. Note that both the latest govt work report and Xi's speech stick to "strategic opporunity" (战略机遇期):
Great advice! I'd add my two cents: practice your talk in front of family/non-academic friends/friends in different academic disciplines (I tried with my amazing engineer friends:P)
PSA & 💩 I wish I knew for folks going on the
#academic
job market: 1/N.
Take care of yourself. Eat well, exercise, take breaks, and for god's sake get a therapist. Nothing emotionally prepares you for the months/years of waiting.
#AcademicTwitter
#Academia
#phdlife
#phdchat
How do government officials "get things done" in Xi Jinping's China? China's Toilet Revolution, far from being a trivial matter, shows how enterprising cadres can turn their parochial initiatives into national priorities.
@neilthomas123
sheds light here.
I have a new piece out in the
@theasanforum
on changes, oscillations, and continuities regarding U.S. policies in Southeast Asia. I did not choose the title, so hopefully, it will not offend anyone.
@StanfordSAPARC
@sbmitche
Unfortunately, yes, Sara. It’s usually just one or two (fortunately). Some of the questions are like interrogations as if I should know every single study in IR/IS/IPE and the way the questions posed can be quite condescending. Then there’s literally comments with made up facts.
@JeffDColgan
@mchorowitz
@dmedelstein
I also think that it doesn't have to be either/or? Chinese/Japanese grand strategy has both econ and mil components. US needs to step up the coordination btw mil and econ statecraft, it seems?
Big news — the good folks from
@CASI_Research
have posted a complete and downloadable translation of an important Chinese military text, the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy (战略学). h/t
@CollinSLKoh
1/
The Korean War was not just about high international politics, it also impacted the life of generations of Chinese, willingly or unwillingly. My grandfather's boss in the army joined the war and got killed, which almost forced my grandpa to commit suicide later during the CR.
Really interesting article connecting IPE and IS, and has immediate policy relevance for debates on ZTE, 5g, and recent US announcement re: Iranian oil export.
Great discussion at
@BrookingsFP
with
@henryfarrell
&
@ANewman_forward
on their forthcoming
@Journal_IS
article “Weaponized Interdependence,” which shows how asymmetries in global financial & info networks are exploited for coercive purposes (1/x)
"巴方重申坚定奉行一个中国原则" in the 2023 Sino-Brazilian joint statement, and apparently, this has been the case for a long time (2004 jt statement). Anyone knows whether other countries are like Brazil (upholding the one-China principle, not the usual one-China policy )?
I contrast China's military coercion in Sino-Indian border disputes with its non-military coercion in the South China Sea and argue that this divergence is due to the low geopolitical backlash cost for China to use military coercion against India.
Some possible policy suggestions for the United States: making FONOPs more frequent and routine, drawing more clear redlines, and strengthening economic statecraft in Southeast Asia.
Scholars of China’s IR and China's domestic politics are largely two separate groups. But it is impossible to make sense of China’s IR/FP without understanding its domestic politics, and vice versa. Hopefully there will be more fruitful interactions in the future.
@mchorowitz
@shifrinson
@dmedelstein
@dandrezner
although I do think that prior works by Tom Christensen (e.g., posting problems w/o catching up) and Avery Goldstein (re: escalation) actually do tackle the latter. I also think that scaling down/accepting certain loss of interests might not help, and may embolden China more?
@sbmitche
And I was literally cut off mid sentences. When I ask the person to repeat pts that were not made clear, they refused, instead stating that I was confrontational.
Wonder, though, how effective this technological "ganchao" will be. As
@Mauro_Gilli
and
@aa_gilli
argue in their
@Journal_IS
article, it is difficult to engage in mil reverse engineering, including China.
A reminder that the Party picks its battles. This entrance to Asia’s largest housing estate, Tiantongyuan in Beijing, saw residents tear down a blue steel lockdown fence. Today, it’s open. Extra 大白around but calm and residents said free vegetables were distributed last night.
China rarely picks fights with states which have economic leverage over it and prefers to use non-military coercion when the geopolitical cost is high.