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Hal Brands Profile
Hal Brands

@HalBrands

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JHU, AEI, Bloomberg Opinion. Author of new book, The Eurasian Century,

Bethesda, MD
Joined December 2018
Don't wanna be here? Send us removal request.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 months
My new book has a cover! The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World is about the great struggles that shaped the modern era, and how they help explain the challenges we face today. @AEI @KissingerCenter
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
If Russia's battlefield situation in Ukraine is as bad as it seems, it will create serious dilemmas for China. A thread:
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
This, by the way, was why America's best option for sticking it to China right now has always been to ensure that Russia loses in Ukraine--it leaves Xi in a place where we have no good options.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Either way, what is happening in Ukraine is not at all good for China--and it shows how the distinctions we sometimes try to draw between theaters can be a bit artificial. END
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
b) that invasion has already created strategic blowback for Beijing (more US/democratic concern about Taiwan, increased defense spending in Indo-Pacific, explicit threats of sanctions if China comes to Russia's rescue);
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
My view has long been that: a) Xi Jinping is probably dismayed that Putin launched such a ham-handed, incompetent invasion of Ukraine so soon after signing the "no limits" declaration; in part because
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
but c) Beijing cannot calmly sit by and see Russia defeated in Ukraine, because that will lead (at a minimum) to a severely weakened Russia that is a less useful ally and less able to distract Washington, and (at a maximum) could create political instability in Moscow.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
You can bet that, as Russia's position deteriorates, Putin will look for increased Chinese support. If Beijing doesn't find a way of providing some such support, we could see greater strains in the Sino-Russian partnership sooner than many analysts imagined.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
At an extreme, of course, political instability in Moscow could create instability within the "strategic partnership" in which Xi has invested so much.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
We will soon see whether this judgment about China's role in the Ukraine crisis is correct.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
The math of this war is unforgiving for Putin. Every time he escalates, the US—thanks to incredible commitment and bravery of Ukrainians—can counter at a fraction of the price.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
All the hubbub surrounding Pelosi's potential trip to Taiwan is making one thing very clear: We are, alas, probably overdue for a major political-military crisis in US-China relations.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
A bit of light reading arrived in the mail today…available May 3. Thanks to ⁦ @KoriSchake ⁩ ⁦ @LawDavF ⁩ ⁦ @wrmead ⁩ ⁦ @MatthewKroenig ⁩ ⁦ @CharlesEdel ⁩ ⁦ @DrRadchenko ⁩ ⁦ @PriyaSatia ⁩ ⁦ @LizEconomy ⁩ ⁦ @RidT ⁩ and many other contributors
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Having been thrashed on battlefield, Putin is getting thrashed at conference table, too. Doesn't take much clairvoyance to see that Xi, Modi, and others are deeply annoyed by fallout from Russia's war in Ukraine. Stunning erosion of Russia's--and Putin's--diplomatic position.
@tanvi_madan
Tanvi Madan
2 years
Putin to Modi: "I know about your position on the conflict in Ukraine and I know about your concerns. I know that you share these concerns and we want all of this to end as soon as possible..." 1/
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
Forget about the Thucydides Trap. It’s the “peaking power trap” we ought to worry about. There is a long historical record of revisionist states getting nasty when their power peaks and starts to fade. That’s where China will be sooner than most think.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
With only modest exaggeration, we might call past 100 years or so the Ukrainian century, because Ukraine has been near the center of every global clash of the modern era. @opinion @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
One of the biggest geopolitical stories of the past 2 years has been the quiet decline of Huawei. Just recently, it looked set to dominate 5G. Now it is fighting to survive. I have a long piece in @bopinion explaining what happened and what it means.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
The thrill of actually having your new book in hand never gets old. The dread certainty that someone will find a typo in it, on the other hand…
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Want to know why China won't become the world's leading power? And why that makes it MORE dangerous right now? Any why conventional wisdom about what causes great-power war is wrong? Check out my new book, The Danger Zone, co-written with Mike Beckley.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
6 months
Some cool news: I have a new edited volume out on the Ukraine war at the 2-year mark. The contributors are a real cast of all stars. And best of all, it is available open-access--that is, totally free--online, here:
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
5 years
Why is clash of civilizations such a bad way of framing US-China rivalry? Because it excuses China’s police state, weakens our coalition, and plays into “Asia for Asians.” In other words, it supports China’s strategy—and is lethal to ours. @bopinion
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
7 months
The great crisis of US foreign policy isn’t something that will happen only in 2025, if Trump is elected. It’s happening right now, in the U.S. failure to move Ukraine aid. ⁦ @opinion ⁩ ⁦ @AEIfdp ⁩ ⁦ @KissingerCenter
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
TFW when your new book is either going to be exceptionally well timed or totally overtaken by events…
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
8 months
Think America is a declining power? Think again. US economic lead over China is expanding in several areas. If US pulls back from global leadership, it wouldn't be a pragmatic concession to necessity but a disastrous retreat of choice. @opinion @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
The greatest geopolitical catastrophes occur at the intersection of ambition and desperation. Xi’s China may soon be driven by both. An excerpt in ⁦ @ForeignPolicy ⁩ from our new book, Danger Zone, on what China wants and why it may not get it.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Whether or not Pelosi goes to Taiwan, we've learned one thing: America's China rhetoric has outrun its China policy. A test of strength is coming in the strait, perhaps sooner rather than later, and US is not prepared. @AEIfdp @KissingerCenter @opinion
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
7 months
Our world looks more like the 1930s than we might like to admit—from the aggressive revisionist powers, to the interlocking regional conflicts, to the threats to democracy at home and abroad, to the calls for “America First.” My latest ⁦ @opinion
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
4 years
Can we pay the Chinese Communist Party the compliment of acknowledging that it means what it says and knows what it wants? My contribution to the "China intentions debate," drawing on work by many who know the issue far better than I do.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
11 months
Chinese coercion of Taiwan isn't invade-or-don't invade binary. A long, ungated piece on the 5 strategies Xi could use; why all are riddled with problems; and why US and allies must prepare for the one that would be most dangerous of all. @opinion @AEI
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
Putin is, or ought to be, learning a fundamental truth of geopolitics: depriving your enemies of their complacency can be a big mistake.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
The US isn’t the only country worried about war in the Taiwan Strait. See the first of four dispatches from key countries grappling with choices about to confront a conflict.
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Bloomberg
2 years
Japan is beefing up its military because its leaders view war over Taiwan as an existential crisis, reports @HalBrands from Tokyo via @opinion
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
6 months
Houthis are sinking ships and killing sailors. China is turning South China Sea into Lake Beijing. Russia is claiming Arctic waters as its own. US naval dominance is fading. Welcome to the post-freedom of navigation world. ⁦ @opinion ⁩ ⁦ @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
1 year
In Western Pacific, US is racing to deter a war it hopes never to fight. On five key pillars of deterrence, US and allies are making real—even historic—progress. And on nearly every key issue, it isn’t nearly enough. ⁦ @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Big news in the study of strategery! The New Makers of Modern Strategy will be out in May. The contributors are a who's who of the field's all-stars. Princeton University Press has made the TOC and my introductory essay available here:
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
4 years
This is competitive self-harm. Losing foreign students hurts US universities, which are national strategic assets in any geopolitical rivalry. And it deprives US of one of its best geopolitical weapons--opportunity to influence the rising elite in foreign countries.
@RothmanAndy
andy rothman
4 years
State reports its issuance of student (F-1) visas to Chinese applicants declined by 29% in FY19 compared to FY16. And it wasn't only Chinese students who decided to go elsewhere: over the same period, F-1 visas for Indian students fell 30%, and total F-1 visas declined 23%.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
1 year
Your weekly reminder that China isn’t interested in “healthy competition”
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
1 month
I’m just back from South Korea, where the nuclear debate is picking up. Bottom line: the non-proliferation regime isn’t in imminent danger of collapsing. But if it does break, it could break in lot of places at once. @opinion @AEI @SAISHopkins
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Imagine a scenario in which, a year or two or three from now, the world is convulsed by conflict from Europe to the Pacific. It isn't as absurd as you may think. A short thread based on my long weekend piece for @opinion
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
Mearsheimer Made Me Do It, or Why the Blame-NATO-Enlargement Explanation for the Ukraine War is (almost) Totally Wrong A long Sunday read in @bopinion
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
6 years
Trump clearly misjudged politics on Syria. He thought it would play to his base, but it has instead alarmed the one constituency he just can not afford to lose—Hill Republicans.
@DefenseBaron
Kevin Baron
6 years
JUST IN: Extraordinary joint statement by House Armed Services Committee GOP chairman and Democratic ranking minority member - “We are concerned that it would be a strategic error to remove U.S. forces precipitously from #Syria ...”
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
6 months
The ties among US adversaries--Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea--may not look much like America's own alliances. But they are plenty dangerous nonetheless: @ForeignAffairs @AEIfdp @KissingerCenter
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
A few thoughts about the significance and implications of Ukraine's recent breakthroughs. THREAD
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
In the world wars, conquering Ukraine was central to German plans for creating a Eurasian empire. In the Cold War, Ukrainian independence helped seal fate of the USSR. Today, Ukraine is on the front lines of a new defining global struggle, between democracy and authoritarianism.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
6 years
Irony alert: "Some American officials were taken aback by the Kurdish announcement, voicing frustration and anger to their Kurdish counterparts, according to a senior American official. There was no consultation or coordination, the official said."
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
4 years
COVID-19 and World Order, a book I co-edited with Frank Gavin, now officially exists...thanks to @JHUPress , which turned a manuscript into a book in the unheard-of period of 6 weeks.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
How the war ends will determine whether aggressive autocracies are seen as preeminent or pathetic, balance of power in Eastern Europe, strength and cohesion of Russo-Chinese axis, and more. Once again, Ukraine has key role in a struggle that will shape contours of global order.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
This crisis is only the beginning. US is running out of time to prevent an aggressive, insecure China from starting a cataclysmic war in the Western Pacific. A ⁦ @WSJ ⁩ long weekend essay adapted from Danger Zone, my new book with Mike Beckley.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Such a crisis will also reveal whether the US can manage more than one major global security crisis at a given time. In sum: We are entering what is likely to be a very fraught period in the U.S.-China relationship. I doubt, unfortunately, that it will end anytime soon.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
1 year
Putin hasn’t used nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but Russian—and US—nuclear weapons are profoundly shaping the conflict nonetheless. Ukraine shows how contests in nuclear coercion are central to great power rivalries that define our age. @opinion @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
Amid the escalating crisis with Russia, @ForeignPolicy has published an excerpt from my new book, covering the nature of long-term competition, the threats that Beijing and Moscow pose, and importance of learning from the past:
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
US is reviving one of best traditions of Cold War statecraft—federally funded effort, uniting government and academia, to understand its competitor. It’s a small down payment on the vast intellectual investment US will need to win a new twilight struggle.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
4 years
Why does Taiwan matter? A free Taiwan is a natural barrier to projecting Chinese air and sea power into the Pacific. A PRC-dominated Taiwan is stepping stone to regional hegemony. Defending Taiwan is thus critical--but will be very hard/dangerous.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
My book, Twilight Struggle, available for pre-order. Goal is to see what Cold War teaches about great power rivalry today. Yes, things are different. But Cold War is only time America has really done great power rivalry…
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
5 years
Viktor Orban has no business visiting the White House next week. He is not only strangling democracy in Hungary, but also threatening to open a Pandora's box of territorial revisionism in Europe. My piece with @RobBerschinski @washingtonpost
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
The next Taiwan crisis is coming, but it may not look like you'd expect. Why China may use graduated coercion--rather than a huge show of force--to put the island and the United States in a difficult spot. @opinion @AEIfdp @KissingerCenter
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
6 years
The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order (co-written with Charlie Edel) will be out in February. I promise: the book is less depressing than the title.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
What do the history of World War II and the war in Ukraine have in common? They both indicate the US military isn't nearly ready for a major war with China in the Western Pacific. A thread based on my long weekend piece for @opinion
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
US is entering new nuclear age—an era of tripolar nuclear rivalry with Russia and China. It has only begun to grapple, strategically and intellectually, with what that means. A long Sunday piece in @bopinion , drawing on my new book, The Twilight Struggle.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
8 months
Global wars don't always start as global wars. A piece on how today's interlocking regional conflicts could ultimately produce a global security meltdown--not entirely unlike what happened before World War II. @AEIfdp @KissingerCenter
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Conventional wisdom on WWI is shaped by three myths: --that nation accidentally stumble into war --that the war was merely a pointless, amoral, imperial land-grab --that the Versailles peace failed because it was too harsh. All three distort our view of foreign policy today
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
1 year
Japan is likely to be to America in this century what Britain was in the last—the single most important ally, whose cooperation is indispensable in the rivalries that matter most. My latest, based on a recent trip. @opinion @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
1 month
The key question for US isn’t Europe vs Asia. It is whether to pay rising cost of global influence or risk becoming a regional power in a disordered world. My latest for ⁦ @opinion ⁩ on what the Asia First movement gets right and wrong ⁦ @AEI
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
It will reveal a lot about the competition: How the two sides perceive their relative strength or weakness, how willing they are to take risks, how capable they are of managing and de-escalating potentially dangerous tensions. Crises tend to be both terrifying and clarifying.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
4 years
Competition with China could be a 100-year marathon...or it could be a decade-long sprint. Michael Beckley and I explain why the next decade will be the era of peak peril in US-China relations, and outline a danger-zone strategy for navigating it.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
6 years
Why are history enrollments collapsing? Because the profession has been committing slow-motion suicide by retreating from public square and turning away from military, political, and diplomatic history. See @WarOnTheRocks piece with Frank Gavin.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
A US-China cold war is already underway. The question is whether America can deter a hot one. In @TheAtlantic Mike Beckley and I examine what China's history suggests about how and where a Sino-American war might begin.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
For the last 100 years, globally ambitious autocrats have made two fatal mistakes: Uniting rivals through their own bellicosity and underestimating the tremendous resilience of the United States. Xi’s China is now making both errors at once. Buckle up.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
4 years
Bad news: A U.S.-China war is getting more likely. Good news: It won't happen by accident. We worry a lot about war breaking out even though neither side wants it. But that almost never happens. The real danger is a war China chooses to wage on purpose.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Not a crisis over trade, or COVID, or someone else's war (as in case of Ukraine), but crisis that brings two sides face to face in an area where both have highly important, perhaps vital, security interests.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
Great irony of the withdrawal from Afghanistan is that the United States had, after much costly trial and error, arrived at a counterterrorism strategy that delivered reasonable security at a reasonable price. With @MichaelEOHanlon in @ForeignAffairs
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
And whether that happens over Pelosi's visit or something else, Taiwan is likely focal point, because it is where the two sides' security interests most directly conflict. It is also where Beijing feels that its military leverage is increasing...
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
But worries that its political leverage is decreasing, due to changes in Taiwanese public opinion and Taipei's tightening relations with Washington and other countries. That is a recipe for assertive behavior. If and when the crisis comes...
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
We often think of modern era as age of American power. In reality, we're living in a long, violent Eurasian century. A new series on the history of great-power rivalry in the 20th century--and how it explains the US-China contest today.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
1 year
We don’t know how things will turn out in Russia, but one thing already becoming clear: there’s very little upside for China. Another way in which Putin’s war has become a huge strategic headache for Beijing. @opinion @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Biden’s new chip limits on China show US is embracing a strategy of technological containment. No longer enough simply to run faster—US also trying to slow China down. ⁦ @opinion ⁩ ⁦ @KissingerCenter ⁩ ⁦ @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
1 year
US support for Ukraine hasn’t collapsed, but it’s in danger. If it goes, the consequences—for Ukraine, for the West, for the world—won’t be pretty. @opinion @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
9 months
Why geopolitics remains as relevant as ever--and what we can learn from the insights of Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman today. @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
This is an old story in world affairs--some of most devastating wars in history were caused by revisionist powers that had peaked and begun to decline. And as China faces profound economic, political, demographic, and strategic headwinds, it risks repeating this fatal pattern.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
First, this shows just how devastatingly effective the cooperation between the US and committed partner can be. It seems clear from reporting that US officials were deeply involved in planning this op--and steering Kiev away from lower-percentage, higher-risk play in southeast.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
The book is a counterintuitive addition to the "let's hyperventilate about China" genre. The danger of war will be very high in coming years. But that's because China is peaking economically and strategically--so it will be tempted to use force to grab what it can, while it can.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Great empires take a long time to unravel. The Ukraine was isn't the first war of the Soviet succession--and it probably won't be the last. @AEIfdp @KissingerCenter @opinion
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
When you have a motivated, battle-tested army that can draw on weapons, money, and some of the best intel support available from US and other leading democracies, it can accomplish some remarkable things. Still, I wish US officials wouldn't do so much semi-public ball-spiking.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
This offensive was about shaping intl perceptions of the war as much as it was about shaping the battlefield. Ukraine needed to show proof of concept that it could retake swaths of its own territory--so it has a good case to make when it goes back to supporters for more arms. aid
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
3 years
Putin has wrecked the democratic world’s most optimistic illusions about the progression of history—and in doing so, he has done America and its allies an enormous favor. ⁦ @bopinion ⁩ ⁦ @KissingerCenter ⁩ ⁦ @AEI
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
5 years
Coronavirus has shown extent of China's influence in WHO. But that influence is part of larger strategy of protecting and projecting: using China's role in intl organizations to protect CCP rule and project influence abroad.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
What’s the foreign policy takeaway from Party Congress? US now faces a hyper-empowered leader who can go fast and break things—and will only become more prone to the type of strategic errors isolated autocrats often make. ⁦ @opinion ⁩ ⁦ @AEI
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
The argument of the book is NOT that we should get warm fuzzies from the Cold War because it all turned out fine. The whole point is to revisit how difficult and uncertain the Cold War was, how everything DIDN’T have to turn out OK...
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
1 year
It kinda seems significant that calls for US to ditch Ukraine and focus on Asia aren't getting much traction in....Asia itself. Maybe we should ask why? My latest for @opinion @AEIfdp
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Second, this offensive probably insulates Ukraine against what had been a looming danger in the next few months--cracks in the coalition supporting it and a lessening of foreign support.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 years
Perhaps a good time to announce that Beckley and I have a book coming out about this in six weeks...on why China is rapidly becoming the most dangerous type of revisionist power, and why we should expect a Taiwan crisis sooner rather than later.
@tshugart3
Tom Shugart
2 years
Glad to see that influential folks are starting to get the threat of a surprise attack by the PLA, here @HalBrands and Michael Beckley in their contribution to @AEI 's new "Defending Taiwan" report.
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
2 months
Jude Blanchette and I have a new Marshall Paper out on four short-of-outright invasion scenarios China could use to try to shift the status quo on Taiwan, though ⁦ @CSIS ⁩ ⁦ @AEI ⁩ ⁦ @KissingerCenter
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@HalBrands
Hal Brands
4 years
China is displaying superpower's ambition, but has two distinct paths to global power. One runs directly through America's position in East Asia; the other tries to outflank that position through a broader global offensive.
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