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whitherapathy

@whitherapathy

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Using Oryx data to infer as much as possible, but not too much. Also, on occasion, things to do with research, data and analysis. 🇬🇧 🇺🇦

United Kingdom
Joined June 2023
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
8 months
In a change to usual programming, I am going to try to explain the meaning of those grey bands in my charts (such as the one below, of #Russia 's T-72 losses). It will be a long thread. I will try to make it as simple as possible. Apologies to non-native English speakers. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
10 months
With 2023 nearly over, we can now count the total #RussianArmy losses recorded in Oryx this year. I have split the data into three main vehicle types (IFVs, SPGs, Tanks) and sorted by total losses (only 'captured' or 'destroyed' are included). 1/n
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@whitherapathy
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@whitherapathy
8 months
@wartranslated Likely that most crew were alive on the way down. Which may have given them enough time to ask themselves why they voluntarily participated in an illegal war. Good.
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@whitherapathy
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@whitherapathy
19 days
This chart shows the composition of losses of Russian BMPs in Ukraine so far, based on Oryx data. There have clearly been some substantial changes over time. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
2 months
By becoming so involved in the details of what is and is not permissible the US actually makes itself more complicit. Just give a blanket 'yes' and leave Ukraine to it, and everyone wins.
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@whitherapathy
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@whitherapathy
2 months
#Russia is now pulling tanks deep from its reserves (AKA scraping the bottom of the barrel). The balance between tanks originating from the USSR rather than independent Russia is of interest. And here it is (based on Oryx data; tank origins as per the caption.) 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
6 months
There you go. It looks like direct conversion of T-80B into BVM, suggesting there might be no T-80BV left. If this is correct, in a couple of months the T-80BV might decline in loss data.
@AndreiBtvt
Andrei_bt
@AndreiBtvt
6 months
↑Также на кадрах визита Шойгу можно наблюдать, что танки Т-80БВ закончились – в Т-80БВМ начали перепиливать уже обычные Б-шки. Учитывая массовую утилизацию в 90-е и огромные потери в войне танки просто кончаются.
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@whitherapathy
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@whitherapathy
1 month
I said I would come up with a model of how many deployed tanks Russia has, and how this might change over time. And here are the results. Details in the caption (please read before complaining!) but I will go through it all now. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
2 months
Most of my posts simply report the facts about Russia's losses in Ukraine, as represented by Oryx data. But it's possible to do more than that. This is a 🧵of models predicting when Russia might run out of stuff. First: tanks. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
2 months
This ternary diagram shows the three-way balance over time between losses of Russian BMPs, BTRs and MT-LBs in Ukraine. This balance has not shifted appreciably over time, which in turn suggests that Russia still has freedom of choice with its IFVs. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
With even a minimum of effort Europe could help Ukraine produce 10 or even 20 of these per day. Imagine the consequences.
@Osinttechnical
OSINTtechnical
@Osinttechnical
4 months
Ukrainian drones attacked Mozdok Airbase this morning, home to a number of Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bombers. Seen here, a Ukrainian attack drone flies over North Ossetia, roughly 700km behind the front.
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@whitherapathy
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@whitherapathy
4 months
I've implemented a change to my data which will show in the next round of updates to the charts. @Rebel44CZ appends the dates of loss to the image URLs in the Oryx data, and I will bow use these as the date unless absent. Taster chart of Russian tank losses below. No big changes.
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@whitherapathy
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@whitherapathy
1 month
Kursk and Pokrovsk has absolutely turned into a question of who blinks first.
@wartranslated
WarTranslated (Dmitri)
@wartranslated
1 month
Russian soldiers with no body armour or gear running and getting hit in the Kursk direction. Khorne group, who posted this footage, said Russians are sending all kinds of unequipped tramps to bolster the defences, indicating issues with reserves.
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@whitherapathy
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@whitherapathy
10 months
I've updated the chart of 2023 losses of #RussianArmy IFVs, SPGs and tanks with today's data from Oryx (possibly the last 2023 update from them?) Note that the process of identifying dates of loss is complicated, imprecise and slightly biased towards more recent dates.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
This is a 🧵setting out what I think data on #Russian losses in #Ukraine can, and can't, tell us. Followers will have noticed that I quite enjoy sharing the results of my analysis, but why bother? 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
Sticking with SPGs for a bit, this chart shows the origin (Soviet, Russian) of lost #Russian vehicles over time. Oryx data, grouped in 4-week rolling windows. It oscillates between 75% and 100% Soviet stock. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
8 months
Just the one chart left: an estimate of when #Russia 's tank fleet might fall below viability (here defined as 500 tanks in service) based on loss rates derived from Oryx data, and some other assumptions. It's very unlikely that anything big will happen until late 2025. 1/2
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
5 months
To round off the charts, here is the overall tally of #Russian vehicle losses in #Ukraine in 2024 so far, based on Oryx data. The IFVs:tanks:SPGs ratio is about 11:4:1.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
2 months
With data up to 24 August, this is the composition of Russian tanks, by family, lost so far in Ukraine, based on Oryx data. The rise of the T-62 is now very obvious. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
For #Russia 's tanks, the future is inevitable. They will run out of stored hulls and, at some point, be left solely with new production. This ternary diagram shows the actual three-way balance of origins of tanks so far, and my projection of its future trajectory. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
14 days
This plot shows the balance of #Russian losses across the three main land vehicle categories: IFVs, SPGs and tanks. it's based on Oryx data. The most recent data point is shown with a solid circle. Take home message: the data is not anywhere it has not been before. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
First thing to note is that any model is only as good as its assumptions. And of course that... 2/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
3 months
What does Oryx data on #Russian losses in #Ukraine potentially allow us to say about the future? Based on a simple linear model and some assumptions (see the plot's caption) this shows a possible date by which Russia runs out of tanks. Viability gone (<500 tanks) in 2027? 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
3 months
To round off this set of charts, here are the results of a model which attempts to predict when #Russia might run out of tanks in #Ukraine . Details are in the caption. Mid 2027 perhaps, but it depends on many things, including what viability looks like. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
19 days
Maybe it will be something like this? I suspect first increasing % BMP-2 as direct use of BMP-1 reduces and the old hulls are consumed in supporting BMP-2. And then inevitably, as old stocks run out, Russia can only field newly-built BMPs: the BMP-3. End.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
10 months
But even at these rates #Ukraine needs more help from liberal democracies to win without continuing to suffer terrible losses, military and civilian. But win they will, as they can't be allowed to lose, and they are too brave and determined to do anything else. End.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
3 months
These are total losses in 2024 of #Russian equipment, by type, in #Ukraine up until the middle of July or thereabouts, based on Oryx data. It's quite a variety, and the chart excludes less common vehicles. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
26 days
I said I'd do a chart of composition of losses of Russian T-62 tanks in Ukraine so far. Having done so it's clear that it's perhaps a bit early, as loss numbers are low. 1/2
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
14 days
Is it a false impression on my part, or does Russia seem to be attacking with larger forces more frequently recently?
@wartranslated
WarTranslated (Dmitri)
@wartranslated
14 days
Today in Vovchansk, Russians attempted an assault using armored vehicles and infantry. They report the involvement of 17 MT-LBs, 3 tanks and more than 100 Russian paratroopers, of which 16 MT-LBs were destroyed and 1 tank was hit.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
7 months
@hubertlepicki @wartranslated Yes, ideally you would not be able to see through a ship from the outside. My father was a seaman, and he taught me all the technicalities like that...
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
25 days
Remember the speech Hitler gave promising to multiply the weight of British bombs dropped on Berlin by 10x? Seem familiar?
@NOELreports
NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦
@NOELreports
25 days
Putin announced that in 2023, 140,000 drones of various types were delivered to Russian forces, with plans to increase that number tenfold in 2024. He also stated that the range of drone systems in Russia is expanding.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
5 months
@Osinttechnical I've watched this about 10 times now and still don't get bored. It's somehow symbolic of Russia's inevitable defeat.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
7 months
Modelling a possible date at which #Russia 's SPG fleet could become unviable is difficult due to the question of how barrel wear and replacement might play out. If we assume low barrel availability, high wear and that hull counts > barrel counts, we might get this. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
Interesting thread on the T-90. Presumably new builds will deviate from the ideal spec more and more over time.
@QX98XD
Tymoteusz G
@QX98XD
1 month
T-90M. Yea its been a while since I said I will do that thread (like 4 months if I recall correctly :)))))). But well, the most modern Russian MBT, which is either extremely underestimated or extremely overestimated. How is it actually? Well, allow me to show you.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
I have shown my assumptions in the caption (that you just read, of course.) I use the recent RUSI @Jack_Watling estimate of 2060 deployed tanks at the start of the year. And my own estimate of ~4000 potentially salvageable hulls remaining at that time. 3/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
7 months
Following the recent update of Oryx data, we can start a new round of charts. First: #Russia 's tank losses so far, by tank family and with data grouped in 4-week rolling windows. Very recently, and for the first time, seven (!) different families have been reported lost. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
5 months
Across all types and variants, this is the balance ( #Russian , #Soviet ) of #Russia 's tank losses in #Ukraine over time based on Oryx data. The origin reflects the most recent upgrade or variant introduced, not the base hull type (otherwise they would almost all be Soviet.) 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
8 months
What is happening?! to #Russia 's Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) in Ukraine? Answer: they are being destroyed, in varying proportions and at a huge rate. Here I have grouped into 11 families to make the data and chart slightly more manageable. It's still complicated though. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
11 months
#RussianArmy Infantry Fighting Vehicle losses by type, based on Oryx data. There are a lot of types, and a lot of losses. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
3 months
I have a chart showing interest rate, inflation and USD-RUB rate over time. Will post at some point. Things like interest rates are much more important indicators than stuff like km2 of land lost.
@wartranslated
WarTranslated (Dmitri)
@wartranslated
3 months
The Bank of Russia raised the interest rate by 2%, from 16% to 18%, in an attempt to control inflation, which is much higher than the previous April forecast. According to the regulator, “Inflation has accelerated and is significantly higher than the April forecast of the Bank
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
8 months
It feels like we are at the peak of the second phase of Russian equipment use. 1st phase: moderate use of selected equipment, in anticipation of quick victory. 2nd: use literally anything in desperation. 3rd: constrained options, equipment types severely limited.
@NOELreports
NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦
@NOELreports
8 months
Remains of a Russian Kh-35 anti-ship missile landed in Novoshcherbinovskaya, Krasnodar Kraj in Russia.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
6 months
A direct appeal to @AndreiBtvt and @Pion_2S7 (and any other Russian armour experts out there): to help produce a reliable summary of the capability of tanks lost in Ukraine, can you improve this scoring (1 to 10) of each variant?
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
With new Oryx data, up to 12 September, here is the composition of Russian tank losses in Ukraine so far. Data grouped in 4-week wide rolling windows, incrementing forward one week at a time. The squeeze put on T-72s is really clear. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
19 days
Most notably, we are past the 'hump' of increased prevalence of BMP-1 that was apparent for much of 2023. BMP-1 is now below its expected range (based on the average of all the data, shown in grey) while BMP-3 is (just) above it. 2/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling To work out the rate at which new tanks are added you need two rates: a genuine new-build rate (15 per month) and the rate at which old hulls are refurbished (60 per month). New build rate stays the same forever, but refurbishment stops when the stockpile runs out. 4/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling To work out the rate at which tanks are lost, I use the average Oryx loss rate over the last 6 months, adjusted for a factor to reflect the % of all losses that Oryx actually records (which I assume to be 80%.) 5/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
@AndrewPerpetua Only some of the vehicles that Russia is using are still in production. In the long run (or 'in the limit' if you want to be technical) it must be the case that the composition of losses will slowly show only those vehicles in production: tanks, only T-90s, BMPs only BMP-3. 9/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
6 months
What Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) has #Russia been losing in #Ukraine , and in what proportions? This chart of Oryx data summarises the big picture. Even with substantial grouping of variant types, it's very complicated - which is good, as their logistics will also be😭. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling Russia is very much doing a Wile E. Coyote act at the moment, inflating its numbers with unsustainable levels of refurbished hulls. When the stockpile goes, that stops. 11/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
What about composition of losses? Charts like this one do not tell us how much stuff (in this case tanks) Russia has lost, but they do tell us how Russia is fighting, and they may show points of change (as @AndrewPerpetua emphasised the importance of.) 7/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
This ternary diagram shows the balance of #Russian losses recorded in Oryx data across the three main sorts in use: IFVs (in which I include APCs and IMVs), SPGs and tanks. 1/2
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
5 months
These are #Russia 's losses of T-80s in Ukraine, based on Oryx data. Recent losses include only T-80BV/BVM and their Obr. 2022's. No sign yet of those T-80UD's that have been taken out of storage. 1/2
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
For example, if we know that Russia has access to 2k (or whatever) SPGs, and we can confirm that they have currently lost 1k (or whatever - figures are illustrative) we know that the fighting is in some sense 'halfway' to its conclusion. 5/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
New round of Oryx data, including #Russian losses in #Ukraine up until 6 June 2024. This is the composition of tank losses by family. Since the start of 2024, the T-62 has formed an appreciable, though still quite variable, % of all losses. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
These are the total recorded losses of various types of Russian military vehicles in Ukraine in 2024 so far, based on Oryx data. The SPG loss rate is, IMO, far in excess of any production/refurb rate Russia can sustain, no matter what stocks they have. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling Before I get bombarded with 'but that's too high/low': yes, I know, but you have to have an estimate. To incorporate the uncertainty, I allow these estimates to vary around the central estimate. For example, the new production rate may sometimes be 11 per month, or 20. or 16. 6/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
Although it describes what has already happened, Oryx data can also be used to predict what might happen in future. With a model specification as shown in the caption, this is when Russia might expect to run out of tanks. Middle of 2027? 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
To sum up. More data is better. All the great work people like @HighMarsed , @waffentraeger or @Jonpy99 do looking at storage informs the picture immensely. It helps understand when Russia will run out of specific systems. 19/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
8 months
What is the origin (Soviet, Russian) of the IFVs #Russia has been losing in #Ukraine ? A certain amount of vagueness around upgrades makes it hard to say for sure, but in general it looks like this. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
7 months
This is really interesting. I think it's this subtle, multidimensional attrition of Russian capability that is actually what will win the war for Ukraine. I'm as partial to a sunken ship as the next man, but in the end this is what matters the most.
@keepitwiel
Giel van de Wiel
@keepitwiel
7 months
@whitherapathy @ArkanLopez I analyzed the average range of SPGs in storage - it’s now 96% of pre-war range. (numbers based on @HighMarsed et al). The shorter range, the less effective an SPG, which requires more at the front, which requires more drawdown. Image below:
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling For a model run, the central estimates are used to generate either a reasonable starting estimate (in the case of the initial stockpile and count of fielded tanks) or monthly estimates (for new builds, refurbs and losses.) 7/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling Each model is different (in random ways): different estimates give different net change and so different counts of fielded tanks. But there's no point having one, arbitrary, model. So I do that 5,000 times. 8/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
That gives a sense of Ukrainian progress, which is good analytically speaking. But new production of vehicles means that, in a very real sense, there is no such thing as a halfway point. Numbers are dynamic. It's not a closed system. We can't only count Ukrainian progress. 6/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
8 months
#Russia 's tank threat will degrade faster than will the numbers, as they haul older types out, and the quality of refurbs declines. I have a similar chart of SPG loss rates, but I need to re-do in light of @bentanmy 's excellent work on artillery losses.
@ben334268
Ben
@ben334268
8 months
A few weeks ago @CovertCabal and @HighMarsed published the most detailed publicly available count of RU artillery units in storage. The count offers a very compelling low-end estimate of what's left in storage. Let's try and make some adjustments. A long thread.
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@whitherapathy
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@whitherapathy
19 days
I steadfastly maintain that a ternary diagram is the best way to look at three-way compositional data like this. So here it is. Currently (solid circle) the data is in a new happy zone. What will happen next is difficult to guess, but... 3/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
These two analyses tell us different things. But crucially neither tells us the thing that perhaps we're all most interested in: when will the fighting stop, because Russia can no longer fight. Both provide clues and indications of this though. 3/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
Broadly, analysis of loss data comes in two forms: analysis of actual counts and rates of losses (that is, how many vehicles have been lost and over what period) and analysis of composition of losses (that is, what % does each vehicle type contribute to the whole.) 2/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
2 months
@HighMarsed Here the picture for Ukraine is more positive: some time towards the back end of next year, Russia may lack sufficient SPGs for them to... do the sorts of things that SPGs enable (I'm not an expert.) More likely that tactics will change than that fighting will stop. 5/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
Loss counts and rates can, if combined with reliable information on how many vehicles are available, indicate how far Ukraine has progressed on its necessary tasks of destruction. That's an important thing, but it's not the whole story. 4/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling So that's it then. I am genuinely interested to hear alternative estimates for each of the model variables, with evidence for why they are better. @whitherapathy runs an on-demand modelling service for those with sensible suggestions 😀. End.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling I then take the central estimate from those models, and also the ranges of values produced across all 5,000 of them. This is what creates the pink bands. They are ranges within which 99%, 95% and 50% of the model outcomes lie. You knew that ofc: you have read the caption 😉 9/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
9 months
While Oryx data doesn't capture every one of #Russia 's vehicle losses (personally, I think it's ~80% of them) we can still infer useful things from the rate at which losses are recorded there. These are losses of tanks in 4-week rolling periods (÷ by 28 to get daily rates). 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling If the number of refurbs in the model is too low, decline is closer, but Russia has more tanks in the short term. It, like everything in the real world, is a trade off. 13/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling Anticipating complaints from those who want me to say that Russia will run out of tanks tomorrow, note that there is a trade off. If the number of refurbs per month is too high, that stockpile will last longer and the decline comes later. 12/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
6 months
A thread on Oryx-reported #Russian T-72 and T-80 losses. These are the T-72's, grouped as indicated in the legend at the bottom and in 4-week rolling windows of data. While there were five types at the start of the invasion, #Russia is now regularly losing eight. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
2 months
As per @highmarsed Russia probably had about 7k tanks potentially available (active and recoverable in storage) before they started. We can use Oryx-derived loss rates and a simple linear model to predict when they get below viability (500 tanks.) 2/n
@HighMarsed
Highmarsed
@HighMarsed
3 months
17/ Conclusions: I: Russia had at least 7000-7500 full tank hulls at the storage bases and BTRZs in 2021. II: There is physical space for 3000 tanks in garages, but the number is likely much lower (<2000), since some garages had IFVs, ARVs, trucks and other vehicles.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
3 months
A couple of more niche charts. First, #Russian artillery losses by barrel family (h/t @verekerrichard1 for the classification of families). Relevant to the debate about whether barrels or shells are the limiting factor in artillery perhaps? 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
In the absence of that, I think we need to look mostly at the composition data, to see how far along the path to losses being of new production only we are. It's pretty clear that we are a long way off that point. I think this may not be a welcome fact, but it is a fact. 18/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
2 months
@HighMarsed Looking at artillery more broadly, the question is what is the limiting factor: shells or barrels? Based on a very simple estimate of the potential number of rounds that Russia can fire, it looks like it's the rounds that matter most. 6/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
29 days
What if Russia is not exaggerating the rate at which it builds new tanks and refurbishes old ones? The claim is ~150 per month. According to @RUSI_org this is ~20% new build. Based on that, this is what the count of fielded tanks might look like over time. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
7 months
For looking at the (very basic) model of potential fade-to-zero of #Russian SPGs some of you may prefer this version. It shows the quantiles of the points, rather than the regression lines themselves. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
1 month
@Jack_Watling the only way that is not true is if the refurb rate is low, AND the stockpile is smaller than I assume here. To my eyes, there does not appear to be any way in which Russia runs out of tanks for years to come. Their force may become unviable though. 14/n
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@whitherapathy
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@whitherapathy
4 months
The quicker that Russia gets to its maximum production level, the higher the number of vehicles it can field in its equilibrium state. In that state, counting losses stops telling you much about Ukrainian progress (though changes will shift the equilibrium.) 14/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
10 months
At the other end of the charts there are some unusual types, many with just 1 loss. These include the recently released 2S34 Khosta. There are more Terminator movies than there are destroyed BMPT 'Terminators'. 3/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
3 months
Same, but for SPGs. This suggests the middle of next year. Sounds about right. End.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
10 months
Overall pop pickers, the most common #Russian loss was the T-72, just ahead of the BMP-2 (I have checked, and Alan Freeman is among the few 60's and 70's BBC radio DJ's not plausibly accused of sexual assaults, so I can post his image here.) 2/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
@AndrewPerpetua They show strain on Russia's military. They also, as I have pointed out, show progress also, on the path to inevitable end points. What do I mean by that? 8/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
@AndrewPerpetua The issue we have is the new production. The logic is that the number of vehicles of a specified type that Russia can field will reach a minimum when, and only when, new production is equal to the rate of loss. This is the 'one in, one out' position. 11/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
With that in mind, the importance of good estimates of Russian production is very obvious. it determines much about their fighting capability. And of course as newer stuff is usually better, the higher the % of deployed vehicles 'in production' the more capable the army is. 15/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
@AndrewPerpetua If we track changes in composition we can also see how close we are to this logical end point. That too is nice, but it too is limited as an approach, because if the composition changes but the rate of loss is low, it doesn't matter much militarily. 10/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
@AndrewPerpetua But this could happen at any time. For tanks, it might happen today, or in a year, or it may have happened some time ago. It's the balance between new production and losses that determines when the size of the Russian fleet will stop changing. 12/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
2 months
Genuinely don't know how @Rebel44CZ would report it if Ukraine captured a military museum in Russia. Are they exhibits, or are they war materiel?
@NOELreports
NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦
@NOELreports
2 months
Ukraine captured a T-62M tank in the Kursk region.
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
7 months
Updating the code used for my charts. Had the honour of adding a line to record T-54's. Should I do the T-34 line while I'm here?
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
3 months
With Oryx data up until 9 July 2024, time for a new round of charts of #Russian vehicle losses in #Ukraine . All data smoothed in 4-week rolling windows BTW. First: tanks by family. Jan 2024 shows something of a sea change in the composition of destroyed or captured tanks. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
5 months
When a proper, full history of this war if written, the chapter on the Krynky fighting will be fascinating. Why can't or won't Russia gather together enough force for a one-off operation to end it? Why decide to allow your forces to be bled so successfully? Absolutely bizarre.
@naalsio26
Naalsio
@naalsio26
5 months
Battle of #Krynky equipment loss numbers as of 03 May 2024. In summary: 57 Ukrainian 🇺🇦 losses vs. 244 Russian 🇷🇺 losses Spreadsheet showing the losses in detail:
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
This chart shows the composition of #Russian losses of Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs, but I include APCs and IMVs here also as the distinction is now rather blurred) in #Ukraine so far, based on Oryx data. Losses are grouped in 4-week rolling windows to smooth them a bit. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
@AndrewPerpetua And, importantly, it might happen at any number: 100, 1000, 5000 tanks. We don't know, and we can't count down to an end point of zero capability, only to the point of fixed capability. All we know is that the balance of losses must shift to show only in-production losses. 13/n
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@whitherapathy
2 months
BMPs are the largest family of Russian IFVs. This plot shows the composition of BMP losses over time, in 4-week wide windows of data incrementing forward by one week. I don't look at variants of BMPs, but @verekerrichard1 does if you want that detail. 1/n
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
3 months
This is the composition of losses of #Russian T-80 tanks in #Ukraine so far, based on Oryx data. Of the six possible types and variants, only four have been lost recently: the BV and BVM, and their Obr. 2022's. 1/2
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@whitherapathy
whitherapathy
@whitherapathy
4 months
When might we expect #Russia to run out of tanks? A simple model (explained in the caption to this plot) suggests that it probably won't be before autumn 2027 if current loss rates continue. There's about a 1 in 4 chance of it happening before the start of 2027. 1/n
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