What should a U.S. defense budget optimized for the strategy of denial look like?
I am pleased to share my report for The Marathon Initiative, "Resourcing the Strategy of Denial." 1/11
In
@TheNatlInterest
, I demonstrate in concrete terms the choice US strategists face: continue arming Ukraine at the present rate, or husband scarce resources to forestall the manifest danger of Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific. We can't do both. 1/
Manifestly unsustainable munitions expenditures in the Red Sea, with no military solution in sight:
"IKECSG warships launched 155 standard missiles, and 135 TLAMs from their vertical launch system across self-defense and pre-planned strikes." 1/
Does the US have a strategy for war termination? A credible theory of victory?
Or will we supply wpns ad infinitum while vetoing peace talks to continue weakening RUS & simply *hope*—despite POTUS’ calls for regime change—RUS doesn’t go nuclear.
Status quo is unsustainable.
We need a serious strategy to deal with Putin's very real and pretty credible threats of nuclear escalation. Right now I see a lot of bravado and hand waving. The stakes are *way* too high for that. 1/
"Carrier is dead" proponents try to paint the picture of a PLARF DF-21 against the USS Gerald Ford alone and unafraid in WestPac, but this is far from reality.
While ASBMs/ASCMs present a credible threat, they're not the panacea they're made out to be.
Thread 1/
@ElbridgeColby
You have yet to offer an evaluation of the effectiveness of China's 2,000 surface-to-ship missiles, which may turn a lot of what you want to deploy into junk. We're at risk of repeating the blunders of the 1930's Battleship Lobby.
While I’m pleased to see more US-PRC wargaming efforts in the unclassified space, analysts ought to be cautious what insights they draw from this series.
Thread based on my experience gaming & analyzing US-PRC conflict & crisis scenarios 1/
CSIS wargamed a Chinese invasion of Taiwan 24 times and found that a democratic, independent Taiwan endures in most scenarios. But the costs are enormous, write
@csis_isp
expert Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham.
Read the report:
For TLAMs, it's even worse. DoD procured 55 in FY23, and ZERO in 24 or 25 (request). So we expended almost 250% of our TLAM procurement over the last 3 years.
Insane and unsustainable. But this has all been clear for some time 👇 3/
It's deeply unclear what the US military is accomplishing in the Red Sea right now a priori, and certainly when considering the cost in materiel.
To wit, Vice Chairman of
@thejointstaff
: "the solution [in the Red Sea] is not a military solution". 1/
DoD procured 125 SMs of all types at the rate of 125/yr for the last few years. We just expended over year's worth in one deployment. These are munitions that would be useful air and missile defense (& in case of SM-6, for strike) esp in INDOPACOM. 2/
This is exactly what I’ve been warning about:
“US government & congressional officials fear the conflict in Ukraine is exacerbating a nearly $19B backlog of weapons bound for Taiwan, further delaying efforts to arm the island as tensions w/China escalate.” 1/
New from us just now: the backlog of arms deliveries to Taiwan is now nearly $19 billion, and Javelins and Stingers ordered in 2015 still haven’t arrived at a time when the US is pumping arms to Ukraine. Me and
@dougcameron
and
@nancyayoussef
The Senate passed the national security supplemental over the objections of the majority of Senate Republicans.
This bill, if passed, will *gravely and materially* weaken our ability to deny Chinese aggression in the Pacific over the coming years.
The House would be prudent
☀️ SENATE KICKS AID BILL TO THE HOUSE INCINERATOR
The Senate passed the Ukraine-Israel-Taiwan aid bill 70-29.
If you were betting, smart money is that this bill dies in the House.
Johnson has effectively said the bill is dead. The House is in this week, out next and then
What is the status of the US-China military balance?
A straightforward question that does not have a straightforward answer. Assessing military balances is a complex practice that occupies innumerable analysts in and out of government.
A thread: 1/
Hi
@austinjdahmer
: are you saying that the military balance is unfavorable in the Strait atm? I am not convinced. What is the evidence for this? Could you point me to the most compelling argument for that case? I also asked
@Alex_agvg
. But he hasn't given me a straight answer.
A great pleasure to share that I am now Defense Policy Advisor to U.S. Senator Josh Hawley
@HawleyMO
. I am profoundly honored to be taking on this new role and excited to get to work!
The Biden admin has been unique in the extent to which it pays lip service to the Indo-Pacific while allocating the lion’s share of its finite resources to Europe, esp in Ukraine. But resources—US arms and attention—are much scarcer than this profligacy would imply. 2/
This is a flawed, pernicious analogy.
In 1940, US GDP was greater than all of the Axis *combined.* In 2022, PRC GDP is >75% of US in real terms & ~120% of US in PPP.
US also no longer possesses the industrial base it had in WW2 due to globalization. Prioritization is a must.
It is telling that almost every major backer of this bill and of continued US aid to Ukraine makes some variation of the argument that aiding Ukraine will deter China. 8/
Btw, this new line that we must fight in Ukraine to defeat China sounds an awful lot like what heard about Iraq for years - they have WMD; wait no, it’s about the terrorists; wait no, it’s about global democracy … a new rationale every month for 20 years
This is an important & welcome shift from Japan in the context of the emerging anti-hegemonic/balancing coalition against China.
Short thread on Japan's new national security & defense strategies 1/
We can't “walk & chew gum” against both PRC & Russia. 2018 & 2022 NDS's have a 1-major war force planning construct. We *have to choose* & to be blunt: denying PRC hegemony in Asia is more important to Americans’ concrete interests than Ukraine. 14/
This is illogical. If Russia has been so degraded in Ukraine, then it poses much less of a threat to NATO than before. Shouldn’t the US be *reducing* its force posture in EUCOM, esp when its stated priority is in INDOPACOM? 13/
Russia presents nowhere near the type of hegemonic threat to Europe that China presents to Asia. Not only is Asia a *far* more important interest to Americans, but our European allies are *far* more capable of deterring Russia w/o the US than frontline Asian allies are of
Strategists ought to reckon with reality o scarcity, and the prioritization scarcity impels. Washington must make hard choices now while there is still time. Let’s dig in: 3/
Many of these (HIMARS, Javs, Patriot, new PrSM, etc) are manufactured at a
@LockheedMartin
facility in Arkansas. Added production to backfill what's been given to UKR will have outsized opportunity costs: there's only so much production capacity. 10/
Calls for a multi-theater defense strategy--like the one Tom Mahnken of
@CSBAdc
offers today in
@ForeignAffairs
--are strategically unnecessary, politically unrealistic, and fiscally irresponsible.
In short, this is bad strategy. 1/
“The United States needs to formulate better military strategies for fighting alongside its partners. Otherwise, it risks being overwhelmed by its increasingly capable and intertwined enemies.”
This is because there is broad agreement that China is our top threat.
But as Napoleon said, "If you want to take Vienna, take Vienna."
If we want to deter China, let's deter China. 9/
Policymakers & strategists who believe bank shots like “saving Ukraine will save Taiwan” are deluding themselves. Attempting to degrade RUS in Europe & execute an elegant pivot to Asia not only courts disaster but may even facilitate the conditions for PRC hegemony in Asia. 4/5
Other officials like
@CIA
,
@ODNIgov
,
@INDOPACOM
, &
@StateDept
are warning of the Chinese invasion threat w/increasing urgency: it’s “manifest,” “acute,” on a “much faster timeline,” or they're “fearing” an invasion as early as 2023. 6/
HIMARS, GMLRS, Javs, an eye-watering amount of 155mm, Stingers, as well as NASAMS, MLRS, ATACMS, anti-ship missiles, radars, manned/unmanned vessels, unmanned aircraft, & many other systems that would have a high degree of utility in US-China scenarios. 9/
We do that by bolstering our defense posture *in the Indo-Pacific*, where China will make its bid to dominate Asia. China is not fighting in Ukraine. 10/
It’s just not true that the fate of Taiwan will be settled in Ukraine. How do we know? China’s own behavior.
I lay out why.
If we want to defend Taiwan, be straightforward and focus on defending Taiwan. Don’t engage in tortured, triple-bank shot logic.
That’s the rhetoric, now for the reality:
Despite this rhetoric, the extent of material support for UKR is producing opportunity costs & limiting the US’ ability to maintain the capability/capacity to deter or deny Chinese aggression in Asia. I’ve got receipts: 7/
And expanding capacity doesn’t happen overnight—it will take years. The
@USArmy
&
@USMC
are already on tight timelines to optimize their forces for the Pacific fight. Given the urgency of official warnings about China, this is time we no longer have. 11/
3) Stockpile, stockpile, stockpile. The US defense industrial base is anemic, and as I discuss more in detail earlier in the piece, we can’t even surge capacity for dumb munitions like 155. Here’s the beginnings of a shopping list for the congressional staffers out there: 19/
What the US has provided to UKR which also has considerable utility in US-China defense planning scenarios, and of which US stocks are now limited or not at the level to go into combat (there is more detail in the actual piece, read it!): 8/
The fundamental reality is the US has a 1-war force which is postured thinly across 3 theaters.
We are directly engaged in one and heavily supporting in another while trying to deter our first peer superpower in ~150 years in the third. This is concretely a strategy of bluff.
The international system appears to be primed for another world war. Regional security equilibria in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia all depend on the US being able to intervene decisively to deter or defeat aggression. 1/
@RANDCorporation
team led by the superb David Ochmanek out with an indictment of US defense strategy and force planning.
“US defense strategy and posture have become insolvent.”
Thread 1/
First, the rhetoric:
The recently released top-level strategy docs overwhelmingly focus on Asia: both the NSS and the NDS both clearly prioritize China over Russia. 4/
Rep. Gallagher: "If we're going to talk about integrated deterrence, what we should integrate is the State Department moving heaven and earth to negotiate basing agreements with key allies so we can deploy teams of marines and soldiers in order to deny a PLA invasion of Taiwan."
How is US military aid to Ukraine affecting critical munitions stockpiles? How does this affect US military preparedness for its priority defense planning scenario, a PRC invasion of Taiwan?
A thread based on my analysis and some important work from
@CSIS
1/
Are U.S. weapons inventories getting too low because of transfers to Ukraine? Although most inventories are acceptable, some key munitions will take many years to replace, writes
@csis_isp
expert Mark F. Cancian.
Learn more:
False
Sending arms to *Taiwan* is essential to the defense of Taiwan.
And ensuring the US military is resourced, designed, developed, postured, and employed for denial defense along First Island Chain is the single most important step to deter China. 1/5
@austinjdahmer
@CSIS
Sending arms to
#Ukraine
is essential to the defense of
#Taiwan
. The way to prevent a two front war is to eliminate the Russian army now.
Deserting Ukraine would force us to send 500,000 men to Europe after Ukraine falls. We would then be unable to contain
#China
.
Senior GO/FOs’ (general/flag officers) statements and testimony are important indicators for anyone assessing changing military balances. Here’s a thread of a few recent GO/FO comments on the state of the US-PRC military balance 1/
Thanks for posting it,
@alexbward
.
I have to say that I don't think the remarks are out of context. He said what I quoted and it's consistent with the general point. He's not comfortable because he doesn't know what the Chinese might do, inter alia. 1/
But this national security supplemental puts these most consequential interests last.
It doesn't even attempt to secure the border, which was always a fig leaf for most hawks.
And it has another $60+ billion to prioritize Europe and Ukraine before securing our own border and
The National Defense Strategy Commission's diagnosis is basically correct: the US faces dangerous foreign threats and our military power has sharply atrophied relative to them.
But its prescriptions are unrealistic, inadequate, or in some cases actually counterproductive. 1/
In its new report, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy warns of mounting security threats, stresses innovation, and recommends strengthening the DoD as part of an "all elements of national power" approach to security.
1) Any further mil aid to UKR should exclude materiel that has utility in US-PRC defense planning scenarios, incl anti-air & anti-ship missiles, long range precision fires, Javelins, & 155mm. Europe needs to take up the burden of UKR mil aid. 16/
While there are some useful takeaways about these
@CSIS
games, this
@WSJ
piece portrays an unwarranted and counterproductive sanguinity about the US-China military balance. Thread 1/
A 7-hour war game, played out late last week at a Washington think tank, illustrated what a daunting task it would be for China to launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, even with its military advances of recent years
POV: the business end of scarcity.
"..level of 155mm combat rounds in US mil storage has become 'uncomfortably low...It is not at the level we would like to go into combat.'"
Any defense strategy that doesn't reckon w/scarcity is fundamentally unserious
Proponents of continued high level of UKR mil aid think US can take care of RUS as geopolitical problem & then focus on PRC.
Given eye-watering level of munitions consumption, it’s not unreasonable to turn this around & see this as PRC exhausting US.
America faces no shortage of national security threats, not least that our own borders are wide open. This has real, direct implications for Americans' security and prosperity, but also erodes our own sovereignty. Foreign policy starts at home. 2/
Further, the US has increased its own force posture in EUCOM to the tune of 20K add'l troops. Military resources are zero-sum: ships, aircraft, & missiles critical to the delicate military balance in the Indo-Pacific cannot be in two places at once. 12/
The idea that we *wouldn’t* use HIMARS against China is what is absurd.
HIMARS is a launcher, and along w/similar platforms like ROGUE Fires or MLRS, can shoot a variety of munitions. Some of which, like PrSM and NSM, are anti-ship missiles. 1/
The ides that we will have the opportunity to use HIMARS or Javins vs China is absurd. THAAD is useless. The existential issue is China's 2,000 land based surface to ship and surface to surface missiles.
China is also undertaking a historic peacetime military buildup and is very capable relative to the US military in the defense planning scenarios that matter. The military balance in the decisive theater has *sharply* eroded. 5/
China's military is increasingly formidable. As a result, there’s a good chance we won’t be able to deter China for the rest of the 2020s—and that US forces will be defeated if deterrence fails.
I lay out why in my latest for
@TheNatlInterest
. 1/15
It appears we’re pursuing a bluffing strategy at this point, relying on the prestige of our military for deterrence rather than actual capability & capacity in a play for time.
Thread 1/11
2)
@DeptofDefense
needs to reverse the nonsensical force posture expansion in EUCOM, now totaling 100K+ troops. Esp important to shift to INDOPACOM are 5th-gen fighters, naval forces, and certain ground combat power. 18/
"Geopolitical bank run" is a good analogy.
A strategy of bluff is another term for what we're experiencing. Or a "Lippmann Gap" between resources and commitments. 1/
Additionally, the
@USNavy
needs to figure it out w/respect to shipbuilding. Current plan assumes risk precisely during the “decisive decade” of the 20’s in order to prepare for the 30’s. We must arrest the Fleet’s plummeting capacity vis-à-vis the flourishing PLAN. 20/
This is right, and the Allies' economic advantage over the Axis was enormous. The US alone was economically mightier than the Axis combined, ~40% of US GDP.
USSR at peak c1980 was ~40% of US GDP, too.
Today, China is ~75% of US GDP and ~120% in PPP.
Abroad, China is *by far* the most consequential threat to Americans' interests. They explicitly want to dominate the world's largest economic area and displace the US as a global power. We cannot allow that to happen. 3/
Today, Sen. Hawley sent a letter to
@SecDef
and
@SecBlinken
on the Biden administration's prioritization of Ukraine for more air and missile defenses, even at the expense of the US military's own forces and other allies and partners. 1/
It's deeply unclear what the US military is accomplishing in the Red Sea right now a priori, and certainly when considering the cost in materiel.
To wit, Vice Chairman of
@thejointstaff
: "the solution [in the Red Sea] is not a military solution". 1/
This
@QuincyInst
report takes many sound ideas from the 2018 NDS and 2022 NDS and simply rebrands them as their own, but it also contains several recommendations that are unsound or entirely illogical.
A thread: (1/12)
There are other things that can be done, like airfield & fuel storage hardening, dedicating an SFAB to train TWN forces, prioritizing TWN in FMS regime, passing the Arm Taiwan Act, and funding the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. 21/
Also, a logical counterpoint to "carrier is dead": if the Chinese were themselves convinced of US CVN vulnerability to their own missiles, why are they building massive CVs of their own? They clearly believe that even in medium- to long-term CVs possess enduring utility. 13/
The fact is that the US does not possess a multi-theater force. We have a 1-war force (& have difficulty resourcing that!). This includes munitions stocks (not just force structure) which by extension implicates security assistance efforts incl for Taiwan, Israel, & Ukraine. 1/
As I said, there is more detail in the actual piece, but that is essentially the gap between our rhetoric and the reality of the situation.
So what is to be done? I offer a few concrete recommendations to alter course: 15/
To those arguing the supplemental really goes to US jobs and is not “sent to Ukraine”:
You’re either disingenuous or ignorant of reality. Appropriations for PDA backfill greenlight DoD sending all those existing arms to Ukraine, then it takes *years* for DoD to get the
Ought to be kept front of mind when considering the presently fashionable argument for more Ukraine aid: that the money actually goes to the DIB and not directly to Ukraine.
...to find & target our CVNs in the 1st place, incl CAPs to tgt PLA airborne ISR (eg maritime patrol A/C), ASW, & even counterspace to degrade PRC space-based ISR. This is the first layer of CVN defense: if they can't find them, they can't kill them. 3/
A USN CSG possesses an array of capabilities that could frustrate missiles but there are also capabilities external to the CSG that would contribute as well.
1) In high-end conflict, US would employ multi-domain capabilities to frustrate PLA ISR assets that PRC would need... 2/
3) Importance of Taiwan resistance—If the Taiwans don’t present a determined resistance to PLA that’s pretty much ballgame *even if the US intervenes.* 7/
My friend
@DAlexBlumenthal
et al contends the US is overly focusing on a PLA invasion at the expense of countering coercion short of war.
Not only do grey zone strategies lack a credible theory of victory, but countering them is actually *counterproductive* for DC & Taipei. 1/
JUST-RELEASED REPORT:
Research from AEI's
@DAlexBlumenthal
and
@CriticalThreats
' Fred Kagan indicates that a plausible pathway exists for China to take Taiwan without invasion.
Too little attention is being dedicated to the PRC’s coercion capabilities.
This isn't just a bureaucracy problem or question of raising def spending across the board, either. This is directly tied to econ globalization and de-industrialization of US. We don't possess the ability to execute a WW2-style mil-industrial buildup. Must make hard choices NOW.
The Biden administration needs to accelerate the trickle of weapons to Ukraine to let Ukrainians wage a proper long-range, high-precision campaign against Russian supply and logistics lines. Yes, more ATACMs, and JASSMs too. My latest in
@nypost
.
“Game changer”? Laughable if it weren’t so pathetic.
Arresting the eroding military balance in the Pacific is nothing but an afterthought in this supplemental. Now the Biden admin and the uniparty foreign policy establishment are trying to run cover. 1/
The U.S. may finally have the tool that it needs to help Taiwan turn itself into a “porcupine” to deter China: the national security supplemental.
While the $2B national security aid package doesn’t legislate what weapons will be heading over, here are 3 ways how it might be a
First, some insights I think this series/report gets at least partially right:
1) Casualties—Any major power war would almost certainly be incredibly bloody. The report rightly acknowledges this, and the limitations of their game here: 2/
This has important implications for American re-industrialization particularly for the defense and maritime industrial base, as well as stockpiling munitions of many types *now.* 6/
2) Materiel—Similarly, losses of platforms/equipment, & consumption of munitions, would be orders of magnitude higher than recent US conflicts. RUS-UKR is a preview of this, but US-PRC war would be even greater scale still. 5/
We shouldn’t take comfort in common refrain: the US military is experienced & PLA hasn’t fought since ‘79
US has not fought a *major power* war since WW2. COIN, CT raids, strikes in uncontested airspace, etc not the kind of experience that will count
Both mils mostly untested
3) We need to be careful about exaggerating the readiness of U.S. and allied forces for a major war with a peer adversary. Bear in mind that the US military has not fought such a war since WWII. 3/
US had ~7k KIA in the entirety of the GWOT. In a major power war like this, US could very well experience that many *in a single day.* This is the grim reality w/which we must reckon. 3/
The notion that reducing or halting US aid to Ukraine (based on the truism that the US has finite resources) to aid Taiwan & bolster US military posture in Asia would impugn our credibility in Asia is ridiculous on its face. 1/
Asia is more important theater than Europe. Asia is approaching 50% of global GDP and growing, whereas Europe is only about 15% and shrinking.
Whatever your preferred method of measuring national power, PRC is enormously more powerful than Russia. 6/
Re: Guam many don't realize that it is considered US homeland. This has important implications for US & PRC strategy in limiting war but also in freedom to strike China homeland, all but essential for a successful denial defense. 10/
Third, David dismisses the possibility of a limited war. Of course a major war with China would be dangerous. No dispute there. But what’s clear is that both the governments of the US and China believe a limited war is possible. 17/
Separately, wanted to call out other recent remarks by USD(A&S). LaPlante: '
@USArmy
increasing 155mm artillery round production rate, from current ~14.4k/mo to ~36k/mo by 2025. ~800k rds provided to UKR to date. US bought ~250k rds intl'ly.' 8/
US defense establishment broadly defined should be doing everything in its power to prepare for this scenario, precisely in order to adequately prepare and thereby deter it from ever happening. 4/
There’s a very real chance of a major war with China in the coming years. Everyone with influence should be asking themselves: Did I do *everything* I could to deter it? And make it less costly for Americans if it does happen? 1/
Given the frailties of our global posture and military readiness, if this bill passes it may very well weaken our defense posture in the Pacific *almost indelibly*.
There are some serious defense analysts beginning to discuss what US strategy ought to be after Taiwan falls. The
This is the "everything, everywhere, all at once" strategy.
Feasible in the 90s and early 2000s (see, e.g., Krepinevich and Vickers, "Strategy for Staying Ahead" 1999), but exceedingly unrealistic in 2023. 1/
🧵I've made this point already, but it's worth repeating: Any US strategy that disconnects the Atlantic theater from the Pacific theater will hurt US credibility and ultimately fail. The argument that we should focus on
#Asia
at the expense of
#Europe
is strategic myopia. 1/6
5) Resupply of Taiwan—Bc of geographic reality, US et al cannot rely on UKR model of resupply once hostilities begin. TWN would be largely isolated & at minimum would require a huge amount of military isolation from US side to infiltrate supplies—not feasible at scale. 11/
Reckoning with these realities impels a choice:
The Biden administration's strategy of bluff, spreading our 1-war military across 3 theaters; or
Focus our military power on defending the homeland, deterring China, & relying on allies to lead defense in other theaters. 7/
1) Again, damage control. Soviet Navy was never the pride of its military, & Russian Navy has fallen into further disrepair. RUS DC simply doesn't compare to USN.
2) According to OSINT, UKR needed US intel to tgt Moskva. Likely wouldn't have been able to w/o US assistance. 11/
...by IJN subs while being towed and defenseless.
In 2005, a decomm'ed CV USS America was tgt of SINKEX. Detailed results are still classified & were used to improve designs of current Ford class. Fact that America took *4 weeks* of ordnance w/ *NO* DC crew aboard, &... 9/
This is basically a classic Lippmann Gap, where US foreign policy commitments outpace the resources allocated to address them. The solutions: increase resources, prune commitments, or assume risk. 2/
2) US could tgt other PLA assets (other than ISR) used in ASM kill chain *before* they could be brought to bear against US assets--so-called "left of launch" efforts. Submarine-, ship-, ground-, or air-launched missiles to tgt PLA C2 nodes, known fwd launch areas, or... 4/
The Republican-led House gave Biden & the Democrat-led Senate everything they asked for—everything for Ukraine & all that entails, “humanitarian” aid to Gaza/Hamas, & NOTHING for the border.
When people talk about the uniparty foreign policy consensus, this is what they mean.
The Senate passed the national security supplemental over the objections of the majority of Senate Republicans.
This bill, if passed, will *gravely and materially* weaken our ability to deny Chinese aggression in the Pacific over the coming years.
The House would be prudent
Javelin stocks are dangerously depleted, likely ~55-60% of what they were pre-2022. This is exactly the type of system US should be providing Taiwan.
Further, they’d be useful in *any* US defense planning scenario. Man-portable, utility against a variety of targets. Critical. 2/
PRC would assume directorship over half of the global economy & exert a soft imperial control over the world’s most important region. Americans’ material interests of security, prosperity, and liberty would be in jeopardy. H/t
@ElbridgeColby
13/
4)Guam & Japan—Almost every game I’ve participated in as a player/facilitator/etc, PRC targets Guam & Japan early in a conflict.
Esp given trends in Japan foreign policy WRT Taiwan but also just sheer amount of US forces in Japan...8/
It's also fundamentally out of step with American interests.
The US military is for defending America First. At a time when the US' ability to defend the homeland & deter our greatest adversary China is profoundly unclear, meeting foreign needs ahead of our own is shameful. 4/
This is an incredibly close call.
If Houthi/Iranian-made ASCMs can get that close, this goes to show how much respect our surface fleet has for the PLA.
U.S. defense officials confirmed to CBS News' David Martin that on Tuesday a Houthi cruise missile came within a mile of an American destroyer before it was shot down. In previous incidents, Houthi missiles have been intercepted at ranges of 8-10 miles, but in the Tuesday
...compartmentalized design, & expert DC parties. It was repaired in time to see action <1mo later at Midway & was hit again by both bombs & torpedoes. Even after being struck, it stayed in action again thru DC, & only finally sunk 3 days later when it was again torpedoed... 8/
The answer is not in diffusing US military power too thinly across 3 theaters & subsidizing allies’ lassitude. The answer lies in burden sharing in lower priority theaters while the US tackles the unprecedented challenge of denying China. 10/
What should a U.S. defense budget optimized for the strategy of denial look like?
I am pleased to share my report for The Marathon Initiative, "Resourcing the Strategy of Denial." 1/11
The US truly faces a dangerous world, but our resources are far more constrained and our military far more challenged than the Commission admits.
Securing our interests requires a sobriety, realism, and temporal urgency they unfortunately failed to exhibit. 8/