I’m pleased to share my new
@IISS_org
analysis with
@jamescrabtree
on the state of US defence strategy, alliances and partners in the Indo-Pacific, launched at
#SLD22
.
It’s a sobering read. A🧵on why we’re so worried about the trajectory of US strategy. 1/
China threatens to stop Australian wine and beef imports in response to Canberra's bipartisan call for an independent inquiry into the origins of and response to
#COVID19
.
This speaks for itself really.
This is nonsense. The Quad is not about democracy promotion or pushing back against authoritarians the world over. It’s about maintaining regional order and providing practical, public goods in the Indo-Pacific. Punditry to make it about values only harms this strategic goal.
India’s refusal to call out Russia risks sparking tensions within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, writes
@MichaelKugelman
. The three other members—Australia, Japan, and the United States—announced sanctions earlier this week.
Let’s get something straight: The Quad is not about Ukraine. Period. It’s about maintaining order and providing public goods in the Indo-Pacific. Fixating on its — or its members — stance on Russia’s indefensible actions is not only missing the point; it weakens the Quad agenda.
A lot of breathless chatter about B-52s in Australia. For such an important bilateral force posture initiative, this isn't helpful for public understanding or debate. I given my own analysis to
@4corners
. But sensationalism is taking over. So a brief 🧵1/
Biden’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) is finally out. From an Indo-Pacific standpoint, it can be summed up as follows: China's the priority threat, the US can’t deter it alone, so much more is required from allies and partners. My initial thoughts: 1/
China’s use of coercive statecraft against Australia — disinformation, economic threats, covert foreign interference etc. — is and will remain the day to day reality of international affairs in our region. It’s not the product of a mishandled... 1/
Some news: After just 18mths at
@CarnegieEndow
, I’m moving on to take up an Assistant Secretary role in the Australian Dept. of Defence. It’s been an honour to work at this brilliant institution. I’m sad to be leaving my colleagues so soon, but very excited about my next step.
Excellent news. This can’t happen soon enough. Australia needs to be part of manufacturing and stockpiling missile systems like LRASM, JASSEM-ER, SM6, HIMARS, and Tomahawks. Pending US export control and tech transfer reforms will help us get there.
With all due respect for the critical issues raised in this letter, Biden’s failure to mention China or the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape in his justification of SECDEF pick Austin will be viewed with great concern by allies and partners in the region.
Russia’s war on Ukraine has reminded the West military power matters. Calls for a larger US security role in Europe are understandable.
But the military balance vs China is far more fragile. And US capacity hasn’t grown overnight. America must still prioritise the Indo-Pacific.
🎙Professional news: I’m delighted to join
@CarnegieEndow
as Senior Fellow for Indo-Pacific Security.
I’ll be heading up a new portfolio on regional strategy, defence and security dynamics, with a focus on allies and partners.
Can’t wait to collaborate w friends in DC + beyond.
1: Thread … I'm thrilled to welcome
@ashleytownshend
to
@CarnegieEndow
as Senior Fellow for Indo-Pacific Security. Ash will join us on May 31 to spearhead exciting new directions in our
#CarnegieAsia
research and programming on regional security, deterrence, and defense policy.
The
#AUKUS
Submarine Rotational Forces-West is the most important near-term contribution to bolstering deterrence in the Western Pacific in the entire AUKUS construct--and one of the most significant US and allied force posture steps in recent years. A short 🧵1/
My latest with
@jamescrabtree
for
@NYTOpinion
:
“The US must prioritize the China threat, reinforce its military strength in Asia, and provide Australia, Japan and India more sophisticated capabilities to bolster a strategy of collective defense.”
BIG NEWS: There's a force posture nugget in
#AUSMIN
presser.
Looks like new Australia-United States military bases are on the horizon, which will include a naval component for sustaining combined submarines and surface fleet.
“The ABC confirmed the President and Mr Morrison spoke at length about security challenges around the world, especially Iran.”
Australia should not be involved in US military action on Iran, which would be strategic folly. I hope Morrison made this clear.
This is what the end of US unipolarity and return of great power politics looks like: tragic, intensely dangerous, but a reality that can’t be wished away. There are hard limits on what the West can do in an era where military power reigns once more. I say this with only sadness.
The Biden admin’s National Security Strategy is finally out. It’s far too late to meaningfully set policy direction, serving instead as a fairly predictable strategic messaging exercise. Some initial takeaways from an Indo-Pacific security perspective🧵 1/
Q: How has China’s campaign of economic coercion impacted Australia’s foreign policy outlook?
A: It’s accelerated the near total collapse in public sentiment towards China, with trust falling from 54% in 2017 to 16% today.
This new
@LowyInstitute
poll chart speaks for itself.
Contrary to some bizarre speculation, there’s simply no chance Australia’s new Albanese govt ‘walks away’ from AUKUS. I’d expect a sharp focus on accelerating timelines and getting the T&Cs right on info/tech/IP sharing, industry policy, sovereign capability, safeguards etc.
There's nothing new about B-52s deploying to Australia. We've hosted US strategic bombers since at least 2006, when a B-2 (a more advanced bomber) came to RAAF Darwin for exercises. We've hosted B-52s/B-1Bs/B-2s on rotation since, regularly since 2018. 4/
As expected, the transfer of
#AUKUS
submarines to Australia has hit a snag in Congress. Not because anyone opposes the deal, but because of ongoing concerns about America’s strained sub industrial base—and its apparent inability to meet US and AUS needs without more investment 1/
SCOOP: Senate Republicans are stalling a key piece of Biden’s foreign policy agenda—the AUKUS security pact with Australia and the U.K. to share nuclear submarines. Led by Sen. Roger Wicker, it’s a bid to force the White House to boost defense $$$. 1/2
…
#AUKUS
update: The House passed its submarine transfer bill unanimously today, with Republicans splitting from their Senate counterparts.
On Pillar 2: House Republicans passed a bill to grant Australia and UK a blanket ITAR exemption, opposed by Dems.
This "unsafe" encounter in the
#SouthChinaSea
was a very close call that could have escalated. It is also a symptom of the broader deterioration in US-China strategic relations over the past 18 months. 1/
Australia's Defence Strategic Review is out. Much to analyse, but heartened to see it adopt two key points I've long advocated:
1) Australia must actively contribute to a strategy of collective defence to uphold the Indo-Pacific order in which our security is enmeshed. 1/
Extremely strong speech by Australian Defence Minister
@RichardMarlesMP
at
#SLD22
:
- Signals ambitious 🇦🇺 step-up in SE Asia and Pacific
- Condemns 🇨🇳 militarisation of SCS as intimidation
- Frames 🇦🇺 defence buildup as contrib to collective efforts to maintain balance of power
But the strategic significance of this has been missed. Australia will soon be one of the only places in the Indo-Pacific that can operate as a forward operating location for
@US_STRATCOM
Bomber Task Force (BTF) missions and strategic operations (w Hawaii, Guam, Diego Garcia). 7/
So why Australia? Strategic geography and alliance cred. We're a trusted ally, highly integrated, already part of the US extended deterrence complex, not far from Asian flashpoints, but far enough away from most of China's long-range missiles to make investment prudent. 10/
Its for this reason hosting B-52s/other US forces is in Australia's interests and the interests of our regional friends (Japan, ROK, Indonesia etc) who depend on a stable strategic balance. There are risks. But far from being provocative, this is collective defence in action. /16
My latest for
@WarOnTheRocks
on the Australia-China
#COVID
—19 standoff.
Key point: Beijing is using targeted disinformation and economic coercion to discredit Canberra, shape Australian policy and fan public opposition to the US-Australia alliance
Australia's agency should be central to
@4corners
story. Instead, it implies Washington is calling the shots and embroiling Australia in its warplans. This is wrong. The decision is bilateral, governed by a 2014 treaty, and supported by a working group. 3/
In short: China's missile threat is so severe that US needs more/safer places to operate. Australia is one such place. Dispersal here is part of efforts to bolster deterrence by making bombers more survivable/effective, incl by creating multiple targeting dilemmas for China. 11/
The story's headline is misleading. It’s not a US Air Force plan to deploy B-52s. It’s a joint Australia-US decision. Or, more accurately, a series of decisions Canberra has made with Washington since 2011. You can trace these on
@DefenceAust
's website: 2/
Canberra, Tokyo, New Delhi and key ASEAN capitals are growing worried about US distraction. To safeguard US credibility and strategic position in the Indo-Pacific, Biden must continue to act with restraint in Ukraine.
My latest for
@ForeignPolicy
“America’s increasing entanglement in European security, however, will open greater space for Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific, a region that will shape the new world order.” Strong piece from
@Chellaney
Whatever the outcome of this US election, it’s clear America’s political divisions are deepening. A polarised, inwardly-focused and democratically challenged US is not one that can effectively exercise int’l leadership. It’s in all our interests for its wounds to be healed.
Some
#AUKUS
hard truths: “The Cold War-era [export control and info-sharing] rules being enforced…are crippling the Biden administration’s efforts to modernise its alliance with Australia and back Canberra’s pursuit of more potent deterrence capabilities”
“The Australia-US alliance should invest more heavily in supporting regional partners against Chinese coercion and urgently divest itself from strategically wasteful military engagements in the Middle East.”
My latest
@FinancialReview
ahead of
#AUSMIN
2020
#auspol
So what's in it for Australia? Well it ain't all about Taiwan as
@4corners
implies. Australia's aim -- in all US posture initiatives -- is to contribute to a stable regional order by helping sustain the strongest possible forward US military presence. 13/
My take w
@BrendanTN_
on Hugh White’s new book:
“Instead of structuring our military for defence of Australia, Canberra should accelerate efforts to build a collective approach to deterring Chinese aggression at strategically pivotal flashpoints.”
This is Beijing’s playbook 101. When Australia pursues policy aims at odds with Chinese preferences, it is routinely accused of politicisation, being irresponsible and playing to America’s tune. These labels are designed to discredit. All are wrong here.
I’m disturbed by the way some have reacted to this. Russia’s attack on Ukraine is deplorable, inhumane and unjustifiable. I’d like all nations to condemn Putin in strongest terms. The Quad, however, isn’t a tool for this job. It must prioritise a cohesive focus on Indo-Pacific.
Let’s get something straight: The Quad is not about Ukraine. Period. It’s about maintaining order and providing public goods in the Indo-Pacific. Fixating on its — or its members — stance on Russia’s indefensible actions is not only missing the point; it weakens the Quad agenda.
What's new is the maturity of US investments in the infrastructure will support bomber operations from northern Australia. This has grown to $1b+ since 2017 to cover fuel/munitions stocks, airfield expansions and planned flight-line maintenance/squadron operations facilities. 5/
Based on scoops
#AUKUS
looks like:
1) UK/Aus designed AUKUS sub from late 2030s
2) Co-crewed US Virginias for Aus as stopgap in early 2030s under some kind of "lease now buy later" deal
3) Aus $ to boost capacity of US/Aus shipyards
4) Fwd-deployed US Virginias from late 2020s
“Likeminded nations need to transition from living under the protection of America’s security umbrella to contributing actively to a strategy of collective defence in which all play a role in deterring Chinese adventurism.”
My latest for
@AusForeign
here:
Thread on
#AUUKUS
: Extremely significant advanced defence tech sharing agreement. Optics perfect for trilateral initiative in Indo-Pacific. Building SSNs in Adelaide is critical given limits of US sub-building industrial base. Strategic and tech transfer wins for Aus. 1/
Briefly breaking my 🏖Twitter ban:
Australia should not take part in a US-Iran conflict. We should, with other US allies, oppose escalation by both sides. A new Middle East war would be strategic suicide for our need to focus resources on the Indo-Pacific
This "collective deterrence" mission is just starting and will involve more than B-52s at RAAF Tindal. Australia hosted 4x B-2s at RAAF Amberley in July as part of the first BTF mission in Australia. US-Australian navy/sub posture will likely be next. 12/
In this dangerous world, successive Aussie govts have made the following calculation: Australia's security is enmeshed with the region's strategic order, and order can only be upheld with a favourable balance of power that includes robust US presence. 15/
100% right. This isn’t the unipolar moment and Ukraine’s not a tea-cup war. A lot of commentators don’t seem to realise how dangerous escalation could be, or how easily we could find ourselves in a situation where NATO is on the brink of war with Russia.
Strong talk from Kishida at
#SLD22
on the need to ensure regional security and adherence to international law — in the South and East China Seas, in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula. He asks: will we uphold the rules based order, or will the strong coerce the weak?
Gen. Wei’s speech at
#SLD19
was an utterly unapologetic and factually dubious account of Beijing’s regional strategy from Taiwan to the South China Sea.
Bottom line: He called for acceptance of revisionist CCP interests as a quid pro quo for China’s promise to remain peaceful.
An Aussie billionaire helped a Chinese diplomat gatecrash a press conference w Australia’s health minister. The diplomat used it to present Beijing’s line on
#COVID19
It now turns out he’s a former coordinator of cyber affairs at China’s Foreign Ministry.
A Chinese warship has used a laser to dazzle an Australian P-8A aircraft just north of Australia. This is highly dangerous and provocative act.
As the PLA expands across the Indo-Pacific, its encounters with regional militaries must remain professional.
This is insanity, but not unexpected. It’s part of the bipartisan race to the bottom on Buy American provisions, which cuts directly against the US’ need to work more collaboratively with close allies and partners.
I’m at the max vaccination hub out in Homebush today. Absolutely no plan for people to safely social distance. Health workers doing their best to sort out the mess. People concerned they will get covid waiting for the jab. Not good enough
@GladysB
@NSWHealth
Update:
#AUSMIN
presser confirmed:
* AUS to begin producing GMLRS by 2025
* AUS to undertake maintenance, repair and overhaul for critical US-sourced munitions
* US working twds streamlined acquisition processes for priority munitions for AUS
Awaiting communiqué for more detail
Excellent news. This can’t happen soon enough. Australia needs to be part of manufacturing and stockpiling missile systems like LRASM, JASSEM-ER, SM6, HIMARS, and Tomahawks. Pending US export control and tech transfer reforms will help us get there.
Building on Australia's rejection of China's expansive claims in
#SouthChinaSea
, Canberra should further step-up direct operational and intelligence support of our Southeast Asian partners on the frontline of Chinese coercion. My
@USSC
policy brief here:
Major loss for the Pentagon and US Asia strategy more broadly. As one of the few appointees with deep regional expertise, Randy has been integral to keeping US policy in the Indo-Pacific on track at a tumultuous time. He will be missed across the region.
This is a new role for Australia and a big step up from simply hosting fly-in/out bombers. It involves dedicated facilities for rotationally basing bombers/tankers, US/Aus fighter escorts, ground crews, fuel/munitions stocks, combined mission planning, maintenance facilities. 8/
This is an absolutely terrible decision.
Australia has been at war in the Middle East for nearly 20 years and spent well over $10bn on operations. If we're serious about upholding order in the Indo-Pacific, we must stop wasting resources on ISIS and focus on our region
#auspol
#breaking
Australia will expand and extend its air support to the US-led coalition against ISIS in Iraq and Syria until late next year, Defence Minister
@lindareynoldswa
has just announced
More from me on
#AUKUS
: “It beggars belief that Australia and the US can be moving towards combined strategic bomber operations from new bases in Australia while the US remains…unwilling to [seamlessly] share with Australia what’s often legacy technology”
This is essential.
"Mass production of Type 12 land-to-ship guided missiles and hypersonic gliding missiles will begin this year," with air- and sea-launched variants ramping up in next five years. Range around 1000km with upgrade to 1500km on the cards.
I’m delighted to release
@USSC
special report Averting Crisis with co-authors
@BrendanTN_
and
@tillysteward
: a deep dive on America’s strategy-resource mismatch, the Indo-Pacific balance of power, and how Australia should contribute to collective defence.
This is deeply unhelpful posturing by Mike Pompeo — directed against an ally that has done more to defend against Chinese interference than most. Many of us have concerns about possible BRI projects in Aussie states, but this isn’t the way to advance them.
And that’s a wrap! After seven great years at
@USSC
I’m ready to write my next chapter at
@CarnegieEndow
. It’s bittersweet to leave my outstanding colleagues. But I’m deeply proud of what we’ve achieved in the Foreign Policy and Defence team and I know it reach new highs.
I’m pleased to share my last piece for
@CarnegieEndow
: “How to Manage the Risks and Requirements of US-Australia Force Posture Cooperation.”
With Prime Minister Albanese about to land in DC, it’s time to focus on how we’re operationalising the alliance 1/
This is a must read: “We don't like to sound dire. But to sound a siren of clinical, clear-eyed realism: U.S. officials say this confluence of crises poses epic concern and historic danger.”
And this list barely scratches what’s happening in Indo-Pacific.
If the US doesn’t help Ukraine against Russia, or it doesn’t help enough, then THAT would erode Indo-Pacific allies and partners’ trust in American security commitments far more than our withdrawal from Afghanistan ever did.
Biden must resist appeals like this to postpone the Asia pivot.
While the US has a key role to play deterring Russia, Ukraine is peripheral to its interests and int’l position. Washington cannot afford to prioritise strategic overreach in Europe ahead of core interests in Asia.
You know what they say about budgets and strategy. This list couldn’t make it clearer where America’s priorities are and are not right now. It will speak volumes in the Indo-Pacific where the goal is deterring a major war — and where the buck is always short. Truly unbelievable.
NEWS — White House asks Congress for $100 billion emergency national security funding package
$61.4 billion for Ukraine
$14.3 billion for Israel
$14.45 billion for southern border
$2 billion for Indo-Pacific
$10 billion for humanitarian aid (Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, border)
Great to see Senate Foreign Relations Committee come together w/ bipartisan support for this
#AUKUS
amendment — including what looks like a conditional ITAR exemption and FMS fast-track. Heartening that critical AUS/UK asks are being heard. Still a way to go but very positive.
Very significant steps being taken by Australia-US alliance towards operationalising collective defence and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Deepening combined air and sea integration for high-end conflict scenarios is where
@DeptDefence
@DeptofDefense
need to go.
Leveraging Australia's strategic geography to support a more robust US forward military position in the Indo-Pacific is important for ensuring a favourable balance of power in light of China's rising A2AD challenge. This
@USSC
map shows why.
This is about rules and double standards. China is allowed to perform military surveillance from outside our territorial waters.
While Australia and US accept this UNCLOS principle; China fights it in the
#SouthChinaSea
by chasing other militaries away.
...China relationship; it is the way Beijing seeks to advance its interests against countries, like Australia, that do not comply with its preferences and are active in defending their own. So we must approach this grey zone challenge in a bipartisan and whole of society way. 2/
This isn't news. It's been reported since 2020 that Australia was working with the US on posture upgrades so that strategic bombers can operate from the north. While last govt didn't mention B-52s per se, they spoke widely of US bombers after AUSMIN2021 6/
“Australia is ready and willing to share a larger piece of the Indo-Pacific security burden, but it will do so on its own terms.”
My latest with
@lindseywford
for
@BrookingsFP
on how Canberra is transforming the US-Australia alliance.
If it’s true we will get nuclear-powered subs via a joint US-UK program, this is a massive deal w big strategic payoffs for Australia.
Rotational US sub presence in WA also very important.
Q: how fast can US build them given industrial base constraints?
This mission has long been at the heart of Australian strategy. But it's become crucial in the last decade as China's massive military buildup has stoked instability and eroded US primacy, threatening US ports/airstrips to our north as far out as Guam. 14/
The "effect" this generates is also a big deal: strategic bomber ops are crucial for conventional and nuclear deterrence, high-end conflict, and reassuring allies and partners. The posture that supports this in Australia is the story here, not the presence of B-52s per se. 9/
Forthright. Direct. Unapologetic. Jovial. Immensely empowered.
China’s Defence Minister Gen Wei answers almost every question from the floor at
#SLD19
. A very effective performance — leaving the whole room enthralled, worried in equal measure.
Nothing new, but no compromise.
A very professional and measured response by
@DFAT
after China’s Ambassador to Australia Cheng Jingye, first, threatened economic coercion over Canberra’s call for a
#COVID19
inquiry, then, broke diplomatic protocol to disclose a private discussion with Secretary Frances Adamson.
The
@MFA_China
's accusation that Australia is being "disrespectful" and "dancing to the tune of a certain country" -- the United States -- when
@DFAT
calls for an independent review into
#COVID
ー19 is patently wrong. It's the right of all nations to learn from this tragedy.
This is a terrible idea. Asian allies need to stay focused on Asia and prod the US to invest more in this region. The hubris of a global security agenda is why we’re in such a serious mess in Asia today.
Nice to get a mention in this week’s
@TheEconomist
. The US can’t uphold a favourable balance of power in Asia by itself. It’s time to setup a small joint military command btw 🇺🇸🇦🇺🇯🇵 to coordinate our collective defence efforts. from
We're honoured
@SenatorWong
will join
@USSC
on Thurs 23 September to launch "Correcting the Course," our new report on Biden's regional strategy, and deliver an address on "Australia's contribution to American engagement in the Indo-Pacific." Register now:
“By framing the [US-China] relationship as a zero-sum contest, he is presenting [allies and partners] with a Manichean struggle btw democracy and autocracy, rather than the search for coexistence. Alas, in this he is overestimating America’s influence…”
Zhu Feng: “The international mood towards China has never been more unfriendly. It’s not just Americans, but Europeans and other peoples.” If China pushes too hard to reap short-term diplomatic gains during
#COVID
—19 it could be “disastrous.”
The Quad’s regional security agenda is its most important public good, but it’s the least prioritised. This must change. Defence coop doesn’t need to be all the Quad all the time — 2s and 3s, w partners will build capability. But prep for high-end balancing can’t be put off.
An increasingly common theme across Quad commentary: yes, the common goods agenda is great for the region. But when will the four countries step-up their defence cooperation proper?
In a new
@USSC
report, we argue Biden’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has lacked focus and urgency — harming America’s ability to compete with China and advance its regional position.
We call on the US to finally make the Indo-Pacific its top priority 1/
Yep. And when your bumper sticker is “democracies deliver” you better make sure domestic political fights don’t get in the way of an Asia strategy that (apparently) all parties agree on. The optics couldn’t be worse. Damage to US position will be far more than actually warranted.
Let's be 100% clear: If POTUS cancels portions of his Asia visit it will do real damage to the U.S. argument that we are a reliable partner.
Visits matter in Asia. Including cancelled ones. We can argue about whether that should be the case, but that's the reality.
This damning — but expected — GAO report on America’s inability to produce Virginia-class SSNs on time should worry Australia a lot. Given rising concern on Capital Hill about capacity to deliver AUKUS, it will politically as well as materially damaging.
This makes absolutely no sense from the perspective of Indo-Pacific allies and partners. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan — as heartbreaking as it is for Afghans — signals nothing about Washington’s commitment elsewhere. But it should help the US prioritise the Indo-Pacific.
From 2027, the US and UK will build a rotational force of 4 Virginias & 1 Astute at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. Assuming US subs come from CONUS -- rather than Guam -- and all 5 subs are present, this would double the number of allied SSNs west of the dateline by 2031 2/
The
#AUKUS
pact and new US force posture initiatives don’t signal a new direction in Australian strategic policy.
They’re an acceleration of our ongoing push to contribute more actively to a strategy of collective defence.
My essay for
@ASPI_org
.
We’re delighted to release the first edition of the
@USSC
@PerthUSAsia
annual report State of the United States: an Evolving Alliance Agenda.
We in the Foreign Policy and Defence Program explore how Australia and the US can bolster collective defence 1/