Professor of Defence and Security Studies, Director Strategy and Security Institute, University of Exeter. Author ‘Urban Warfare in The Twenty-First Century’.
1/Following, the infamous Hamas attack of 7 October, the IDF are poised for a major ground offensive into Gaza. The Battle of Gaza approaches.
@johnspencer
, David Kilcullen,
@Shashj
have already posted some analysis. Perhaps, it would be useful to add my thoughts 🧵
1/16 This is a fascinating, provocative, perceptive article. I would encourage everyone interested in command
@LawDavF
@almurray
@WarintheFuture
to read it. Thanks
@Beags_Beagle
for your and your team's work on this. I offer a few initial thoughts.
As the situation in
#Ukraine
worsens, it’s notable that people are no longer talking about the grey zone or claiming that tanks or armoured vehicles have been rendered obsolete by UAVs. War unfortunately has a way of concentrating the mind on reality.
With the loss of Lyman and a possible collapse of the Luhansk sector, which we all applaud, I’d offer an unpopular thought: Beware the intoxication of military victory. Often, it distorts good strategic sense.
Exeter University have appointed me Director of the Strategy and Security Institute at Exeter University
@SSI_Exeter
. We are re-launching our Master in Strategy (MStrat) for September 2024, and reinvigorating our research and engagement programmes. Please get in touch with us!
A crucial moment for Army. The Army’s role, uncertain since 2013, is now clear. Conventional deterrence/defence of Europe in order to support Nato allies and maximise the attention which US can give to Indo-Pacific theatre.
⚡️The new head of the British army, Patrick Sanders, has called for an army capable of defeating Russia.
""There is an urgent need to create an army capable of fighting with our allies and defeating Russia in battle,"" - the Independent quoted him as saying.
Failing to support Ukraine will be the west's worse strategic mistake in the early 21st century. Its folly will dwarf the decision to invade Iraq and the campaign in Afghanistan. We have to supply Ukraine.
#UkraineRussianWar
Russian commanders in Donbas have repeated the error of the German Army at Stalingrad. They have focused only on reducing a series of urban strongholds in Slovyansk salient, leaving their northern flank open by failing to build their own defensive hubs in Izyum surrounding towns.
A new🗺️from
@TheStudyofWar
and
@criticalthreats
depicts total liberated Ukrainian territory as of September 11, 2022.
#Ukraine
has liberated over 60,000 square km of territory since the Russians began retreating from around Kyiv in early April. Quick🧵below.
Wow. This is massive. And whatever Brexit has done to Anglo-french relations, post Lancaster House military cooperation runs deep. Good luck BG Laurentin. And well good General Charlie and good luck in your next appointment.
Brigadier General Jean Laurentin of the French Army has today assumed command of 1st (United Kingdom) Division 🇫🇷 🇬🇧
Stepping up from his role as Deputy Commander, he will cover the post until September.
Read more:
@armeedeterre
@1UKDivision
7. Information operations will recruit and address diasporas, supporters, audiences and agents across the global urban archipelago. The battle of Kyiv will resonate across European cities.
'Their use of how to fight in built-up areas'. Absolutely
@BWallaceMP
. Prioritising fortified urban defences and using them as pivots from which to mount deep strikes. The War in Ukraine is likely to be as doctrinally important as the Yom Kippur War.
7/ Hamas force size is also difficult to determine: between 10,000 and 30,000 fighters? Force ratios might be 10:1 in the IDF’s favour; more likely closer to 3:1. Urban ops usually require a force ratio of 10:1. Therefore, the fighting will be slow, hard, and bloody.
One lesson I’d like to see coming out of the sad story of the
#Afghanistan
campaign is that senior generals stop talking about ‘winning the narrative’ and other faux-intellectualised bureaucratese. One fights a war to win it. Not to talk about winning it.
1/ 🧵So I finally watch the
@netflix
#AllQuietOnTheWesternFront
. The cinematography was striking in places. The costumes were remarkable. Some of the battle scenes were disturbing. The minimalist music, especially a recurring metallic chord, disconcerted.
2. The urban battle will concentrate into localised inner-urban micro-sieges around fortified positions. Defensive walls will be crucial, marking out the battlelines.
6. Because of the lack of forces, the combatants will draw on partnered, proxy, foreign fighters to increase their mass. The fight will be politically complex.
8/The operation echoes the recent Battles of Fallujah, Mosul, Aleppo, and Marawi, when state forces cleared non-state militias from an urban area. In each of these cases, the state force trying to clear the city enjoyed better combat ratios than Israel.
25/It is possible that demonstrations could escalate from protest into ethnic and political violence in other cities. The national and international political implications of such a proliferation be very serious indeed.
1/ I’m hoping that they will revise the Integrated Review next year.
Most of its premises have been exploded in last three days:
1. The grey zone is not that important.
On the basis of the Battle of
#Mariupol
- which shows just how effective urban defence is - I would predict
#Russia
will fail to seize the Sloviansk pocket.
@SpencerGuard
’s urban mini-manual is rather prescient.
1/
@JohnSpencer
and
@LiamSCollins
keenly expected book came out last month. Given my own interests in urban warfare, I was very much looking forward to it. In the light of the Ukraine War, it is highly pertinent. Having just read it, I thought I would do a short review.
1/UK Military doctrine emphasises the cognitive dimension of warfare. Avoiding attrition, the enemy's mind is the target. The contrast with current discussions of the
#counteroffensive
is marked. Like the FWW, it is all about re-taking terrain and settlements liberated.
2/
2. Persistent engagement of small packets of light infantry not that useful.
3. The Indo-pacific tilt is not as important as European security for U.K.
4. Heavy forces fully configured for land warfare remain crucial.
9/The Law: Civilians suffer terribly in urban fighting. Israel has already been accused of breaching LOAC and IHL. The Israelis claim the right to self-defence; and that their strikes have been consistent with the LOAC (necessity, humanity, proportion, discrimination) and IHL.
1/The destruction of the
#KakhovkaDam
has rightly been deplored on humanitarian grounds. But what is its military significance, especially for understanding the Russian military and therefore the Ukrainian
#counteroffensive
?
🧵
After nearly eight happy years at
@uniofwarwick
with great colleagues in
@PAIS
, I have just started a new job at
@UniofExeter
in
@SSI_Exeter
. We are re-launching our MA in Strategy and other programmes. If you would like to contact me this is my new email: a.c.king2
@exeter
.ac.uk.
1/17 I have known
@SpencerGuard
for nearly a decade. We first interacted over my book The Combat Soldier. We initially shared an interest small unit cohesion and now are both focused on urban warfare. I was therefore delighted to see the publication of Connected Soldiers.
2/In my book on Urban Warfare, I argued described the 21c urban battlescape. Because forces were much small than 20c, they can no longer hold dense fronts in the field. They converge on urban areas where the decisive strategic, operational, and tactical objectives are located.
Jeremy Hunt questions the increase of defence spending to 3 per cent. He is entitled to do so. But I don’t see how the U.K. can fulfil its commitments to NATO and its IR ambitions in Indo-Pacific without more resources. You can’t have your cake and eat it.
17/Even if they decide for targeted raids, the IDF will have to breach and clear objectives. This will require a heavy mechanised thrust, with bulldozers and armour, supported firepower. If Mosul or Marawi are any guide, it seems impossible to avoid massive collateral damage
The fact that RUS have decided not to storm the Azovstal steelworks is deeply significant for the Donbas. There, they face three cities of 100,000 (Sloviank, Severodonetsk and Kramatorsk) and many other smaller towns. Each might be a potential Mariupol.
2/
@Beags_Beagle
and his co-authors are surely correct to argue that the bloated divisional and brigade HQs of the 9/11 Wars are obsolete. They are far too vulnerable. At a UK divisional exercise in 2016, the commander observed that his static, tented CP was 'not an act of war'
4/ But even as, the fighting condenses into micro-sieges, the urban battle resonates out across a global urban archipelago via digital communications and social media. Diasporas are recruited into the fighting to support their combatants. The urban battle transnationalises.
11/ The environment: Gaza is a complex urban area. It is densely populated. It has a population of 2.2 million in a 365 km square area: over 6000 people per square km. It also comprises a vast subterranean network of tunnels, ammunition dumps, headquarters, barracks, workshops.
20/The Battle of Gaza is likely to descend into a series of sieges, fought above and below ground, supported where possible from the air and from artillery.
18/Subsurface: Hamas has a massive subterranean system. Reducing Hamas tunnels will be a gargantuan task. Simply blocking tunnels is not enough. The IDF’s specialist tunnel units are adept but too small. A large infantry force – paratroops? – are required for this task.
24/ The Battle of Gaza has already globalised across religious and ethnic diasporas, in some cases, polarising Jews and Israeli supporters, against Palestinians and their supporters. This polarisation will intensify as the battle starts.
10/Their opponents have rejected these claims. The legal debate claims will become more strident as Palestinians civilians are harmed. Israel must operate with the Law. But that may be difficult.
20/Conclusion: A full re-integration of Ukraine is unlikely. That is deplorable. But if this war ends in 2025, with most of Ukraine intact as a thriving republic, a NATO, and eventually EU, member state, that is no defeat – especially when we think back to the 24 February 2022.
23/Israel and Hamas have already sought to mobilise supporters across the Middle East and beyond. While its method may be deplorable, Hamas has leveraged widespread support for the Palestinian cause. There have been major demonstrations in cities across the world.
5/ How does this urban battlescape apply to Gaza and the IDF? By contemporary standards, the IDF remains a large citizen force; 169,000 strong but expanding with the reserve call up to about 500,000. Does this mean that the IDF will fight differently to smaller 21c forces?
And my Conclusion:
26/ The Battle of Gaza will be a terrible struggle: a brutal and intense localised and transnationalised siege. It is difficult to be optimistic about its outcome.
1/Following, the infamous Hamas attack of 7 October, the IDF are poised for a major ground offensive into Gaza. The Battle of Gaza approaches.
@johnspencer
, David Kilcullen,
@Shashj
have already posted some analysis. Perhaps, it would be useful to add my thoughts 🧵
3/ Consequently,
@Beags_Beagle
et al. argue that CPs must consist of 3 or 4 armd vehicles which are mobile, dispersed, with low signatures. However, because they draw on a cloud, are data-centric, AI-enabled, it will be possible to bespoke the situational picture for each node.
5/It is imperative that Ukraine win this war. Russian aggression has to be resisted and repelled. Recently, President
#Zelensky
still defined winning as retaking all Ukraine’s stolen territory including the Donbas and Crimea.
12/ Urban defence: Hamas will prepare defences, fortifying buildings, emplacing IEDs, using SVIEDs, SIEDs, weaponizing the civilian population. They will use drones, rockets and missiles to contest the air space above the city. Israeli hostages complicate the situation.
19/Maritime. The maritime element of urban warfare is often neglected but in Gaza it will be crucial. The US Navy has deployed ships to augment Israel’s missile defence system. Israeli ships may play an important role in this operation, acquiring targets and striking from the sea
9/ So should Ukraine and the West therefore just give up and admit defeat? NOT AT ALL. This war can and has to be won. A realistic assessment that another Ukrainian counter-offensive cannot succeed, recommends only a refinement of strategy – not an admission of failure.
3/ There, they engage in ‘inner-urban micro-sieges’. In 21st century, smaller forces concentrate on key objectives inside urban areas. Bitter attritional fighting follows; objectives are attacked and reduced in sequence.
16/Surface: The IDF has started to probe into Gaza already. Eventually, they will either conduct a full clearance operation, or targeted clears: Hamas headquarters and leaders, hostages, weapons caches, strongpoints etc. The options here are not ideal.
6/ This seems unlikely. Although large, the IDF is already committed to the north – where the armoured corps has been mobilised - and to the West Bank. It is difficult to be precise: might have 100,000 combat troops for the operation? It could be less .
21/ Information and Psychological Operations. Info and Psy Ops will be a key part of the IDF campaign. Hamas have already been engaged in an intense info operation. The IDF has specialists cyber outfits, like Unit 8200. They will address Hamas leaders, and Palestinian civilians
15/ At low altitude, small UAV, attack helicopters. Above them, winged aircraft and larger UAV. At the highest altitude about 65,000 ft, the Israeli’s are likely to deploy strategic intelligence aircraft. And beyond that, the IDF will draw on satellite imagery to target Hamas.
19/ Political:
(5) Agree to admit Ukraine to NATO, on the day after the war is over. The west has a duty to do this. Even more important, NATO membership is the only way to guarantee Ukrainian security in the long term.
14/Air/Space: the IDF enjoy total air superiority, though Hamas will try to contest this where they can. Consequently, the IDF will need an elaborate air plan for the attack: a layered air operation, assigning platforms to conduct distinctive missions at different altitudes.
22/ The Information Campaign in Gaza is significant, but the wider regional and global information war will be decisive for Israel, the IDF – and Hamas.
5) The article also suggests that in the near future, commanders will be able to operate from virtual CPs. And will be able to be virtually present in any node they choose.
2/Ukraine’s counter-offensive of 2023 failed. Frankly, it was never likely to succeed, as much as its proponents claimed. UAF were trying to breach heavily fortified, prepared Russian positions, without air superiority, or favorable combat ratios.
6/Ukraine has the right to its land. A full re-integration of Ukraine would be just. But is it realistic? Is it the basis of a coherent strategy for 2024? I do not think it is. Indeed, a maximalist Ukrainian strategy may be counter-productive, discouraging Western support.
1/4 If
#counteroffensive
reports are accurate:
#Ukrainian
AF are attacking on three main axes - and striking in the deep against Russian Forces. Russian Forces meanwhile are fighting a close defensive battle supported by close air - and engaging in strategic interdiction.
🧵
1/2⚡️The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation officially announced a pause in the fighting, and measures are being taken in the units "to replenish combat capabilities."
8/This is totally logical. Yet, Ukraine may illustrate something different. Land warfare is likely to be attritional and positional (see
@AmosFox6
); defense is likely to be primary. So even tactical CPs may not need to move so much; it may be difficult to do so.
3/ Even if UAF had breached the Surovikin Line it seems probable the offensive would have culminated in an urban battle around Tokmak, Melitopol, or Mariupol. They just didn’t have the combat power.
16/Ukraine cannot execute this strategy alone. Increased western support throughout 2024 and into 2025 is imperative here. Without it, Ukraine’s victory may descend into a defeat.
What should the West do?
14/
(2) Massive artillery and rocket strikes to repel any Russian incursions against those citadels.
(3) Strike Russian forces, C2 nodes, logistics hubs deep in Russian-held territory in Ukraine.
10/Perhaps rather than thinking about tactical CPs being mobile. We could emphasise that they need to be fortified, subterranean, in urban areas, where they can hide their signatures even more. Especially since operations may be more static.
This excellent piece on
@TheGreenBeret
@40commando
's recent experiences with
@USMC
on Exercise Green Dagger rightly punctures some of the media hyperbole. Against Simon Akam's assertion, the British personnel I know respect and admire the US armed forces.
4/ Can we never talk about information manoeuvre or the ‘narrative’ any longer?
Instead might we return to the language of policy, strategy, objectives and centres or gravity?
This is an appalling mistake. And yet the
@BBCNews
is so careful not to call Hamas terrorists and to describe their Israeli hostages as being ‘detained’.
@JohnSimpsonNews
The
@bbcnews
prejudice wld be farcical if the circumstances were not so tragic & the bias so poisonous.
Israel brings in Arab speaking medical teams & equipment to care for Palestinian patients.
BBC reports Israel was targeting Arab-speaking medical teams.
Watch the apology
The shaping phase is over. The
#Kherson
counter-offensive begins: UA’s first. Crucial phase of the war. Combat ratios favourable to UA. But two key questions: how depleted are RU forces after attrition and isolation? Will RU forces fight in and from Kherson?
18/ Weapons:
(2) Increase the production and supply of artillery shells.
(3) Increase the supply of advanced missile, rocket and artillery systems (ACATMS etc).
(4) Increase the supply of air defence systems and fighter aircraft
12/ A strategy of aggressive defence is required. Russia may continue to hold the terrain it illegally invaded. But the prize of any further aggression against the Republic of Ukraine must be catastrophic. It must be impossible for Russia to encroach upon Ukrainian terrain.
15/
(4) Major artillery/rocket/UAV bombardments of Crimea supported by naval attacks and blockade against Sevastopol
5) Continue kinetic and cyber attacks against CNI in Russia.
16/ Training:
(1) Expand the training of Ukrainian troops. It should accelerate the training and education of staff officers to generate brigade, divisional and corps level HQs capable of conducting combined arms operations – not just tactical missions.
7/ Yet we can make some inferences. The
@Beags_Beagle
article proposes that the model for the future CP is a mobile one. Since manoeuvre will remain central to land operations, the movement of CP will be critical to execute command.
6/ Maybe I could make a few comments aimed at divisional level - and maybe corps. In developing a data-centric divisional CP, the UAF's experiences will be useful; not definitive but useful. At this point, their C2 structure has rightly remained classified.
That will prove to be a historically important speech by
@ArmyCGS
: 'We must be unequivocally prepared to fight for NATO'. The next 24 months will be crucial for
@BritishArmy
. Operation Mobilise must succeed.
@RUSI_org
#LWC
11/This article rightly stresses reach back. Assuming bandwidth, data can travel infinitely. So there is no need to aggregate staff. Reachback HQs should become much more important. Future Plans, Current Plans, and most of Intel functions could all be done back: data sent forward
10/On 24 February, most observers believed that Ukraine was doomed. Russia would defeat UAF and depose Zelensky. In the event, Ukraine inflicted a terrible defeat on Russia in 2022, it defended most of its territory, it united itself as a genuine, democratic republic. It won.
Why not just try to increase the size of the professional armed forces;
@BritishArmy
to 100k,
@RoyalNavy
to 50k and
@RoyalAirForce
to 40k supported by a properly resourced reserve of 100k?
15/ To link those dispersed nodes together, I might recommend a human-centric approach. (Those of you who know me know what I'm going to say!). Commanders might create closely integrated command teams, of empowered deputies, subordinates, who can as for, or even as their boss.
4/Despite horrendous losses in men and materiel Russia has endured, it has regenerated its force. It has fortified the territory it has taken. It has about a three to one advantage in artillery on current figures.
13/ In order to repel Russia forces and to deter the Kremlin, a new strategy is required. What are its main features:
(1) Build a network of interconnected citadels in and around frontier towns and villages, each one of which the Russians could only take at great cost.