Alexander Graef @alxgraef Twitter profile

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Alexander Graef

26 days

New piece for @BulletinAtomic with @TimThies about the new #missile age in #Europe . "The future deployment of US ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, while significant, is just one element of this broader #transformation "

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

1 year

Putin never wanted THIS war. Instead, he expected a limited intervention to achieve regime change, bringing back Ukraine of 2013, if not 2003. His plan was to radically improve the Russian position & enforce changes to the European security order. He failed. It all backfired. 1/3

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

1 year

3/3 And yet, in practice, Putin has been reluctant to commit fully and go all-in, as some Russian nationalists have demanded. He was not prepared for the course of events that he himself initiated. But this will change and already has, because he cannot admit strategic failure.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

1 year

2/3 Since then, Putin has tried to find ways to still reach his original goals: Fighting became brutal, repressions at home intensified. The war transformed into the new state ideology and became a catalyst of global ordering. No longer against Ukraine, but the "collective West".

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

26 days

Kursk: Believing Putin is under pressure or has lost prestige is a Western perspective. Russian information ecology works differently. The Kremlin seems to feel secure. It has been transparent, sharing videos from SecCouncil meetings and governors' messages about the impact. 1/3

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

The promise debate about #NATO enlargement is politically futile. This crisis is about #Russia ’s position in Europe, its long-term #status and #power . 30 years of strategic failure, disappointments, and unintended consequences. A long🧵 1/x

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

26 days

3/3 Third, there's a clear, long established distinction between the bad state bureaucracy and the "good" President. Russian milbloggers will blame Gerasimov (whom they hate anyway) and the Ministry of Defense, while locals will blame the incompetence of the regional governors.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

10 months

This video has become clickbait, so here is the issue: Tokaev greets everyone in Russian, then switches to Kasakh for 20 seconds but afterwards continues in Russian. This is also the final press statement. The Russian-Kazakh talks were conducted in Russian. 1/3

Bakhti Nishanov

@b_nishanov

10 months

This is an encapsulation of the tables turned in the Kazakhstan-Russia relations: President of Kazakhstan pulls a power move and opens his speech to the visiting Russian delegation headed by Putin speaking Kazakh. You can see the bewilderment and confusion among the delegation

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

1 year

@andreivkozyrev Putin by now seems to think in historical terms, which makes the war an issue of fate and the final outcome a test of will and endurance. From this perspective, it seems, even if the original goals are no longer feasible, the war triggered global order changes worth the efforts.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

26 days

2/3 Second, Putin has used the situation to argue that "it is now clear why Ukraine rejects our proposals to return to the peace settlement plan." While Western commentators may mock Putin's "provocation" narrative as ridiculous, it resonates with Russian citizens in the country.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

What is the endgame, the strategy of #victory , or to put it differently, the vision for #conflict #resolution in #Ukraine ? What are feasible scenarios of future relations between #Russia and the #West ? Some thoughts. Highly speculative and simplified.🧵1/9

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

Dugin was never close to Putin. He has never been an advisor. He literally knows people, who know people, who have heard about others, who have met Putin. He is an extravagant ideologue, whose mysticism and shrill style have made him an ideal figure to play the media.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

Russian MFA publishes a list of demands the West must meet to defuse tensions & ensure Russian security: It wants legal guarantees from NATO not to expand to the East and a formal renouncement of the 2008 Bucharest summit decision on Georgia & Ukraine 1/x

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

Much noise about this letter by Gen. Leonid Ivashov & the 'All-Russian officers assembly', calling for Putin's resignation. Yet, when the group was formed in 2003 they already demanded Putin's resignation, supported by communist leader Gennady Zyuganov. 1/

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

9/9 This may sound crazy, but, I am afraid, that's exactly were we could find ourselves. Probability may be low but it does exist. Inadvertent escalation, a NATO-Russia war, is a real possibility. We need to think it through & act accordingly to prevent it

The pathways of inadvertent escalation: Is a NATO-Russia war (now) possible?

A deliberate decision by Western leaders to go to war with Russia over Ukraine is not expected. But actions by Russia, by its proxy Belarus, or by individual NATO member states could spark a larger...

thebulletin.org

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

Since the " #Moskva " battle cruiser sank, here is an #armscontrol story: the ship was launched in 1979. Until 1996 it was known as "Slava". In July 1989 the Slava took part in a unique, joined US-Soviet scientific collaboration: The Black Sea experiment. 1/5

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 months

The problem with deploying US intermediate range missiles in Germany is not the decision itself but the lack of public debate on and political clarification of some of the issues and trade-offs involved. Instead, one is fobbed off with platitudes about deterrence. 1/14

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

The ongoing fast integration of the oblasts Zaporizhzhia & Kherson (citizenship, sim cards, currency etc) into the Russian sphere of influence further raises escalation risks, since Moscow will likely view 🇺🇦 counter-offensives as attacks on 🇷🇺 civilians & territory proper. 1/3

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

The Russian proposals on security guarantees bode ill. This is no hard-bargaining position but a publicity stunt. It will leave NATO no option but to decline demands in public as unreasonable. Russia will say it tried but to no avail. Heading towards further escalation.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

10 months

3/3 This said, there can be no doubt that the general Russian cultural, political and economic influence in countries of the post-Soviet space is decreasing, but it has so for three decades. Neither this video clip, nor the talks provide good evidence for this process, however.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

6/9 Scenario 3: Putin loses militarily in Ukraine and is forced to retreat with heavy causalities. Western sanctions further cripple his power. He is removed from office by an intra-elite coup whose leaders negotiate a ceasefire. Russian statehood as we knew it crumbles.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

4 years

Our Russia strategy is to wait out Putin, to hope for some miracle and, afterwards, to return to the status quo ante. But the old transformation paradigm is dead. 1989 will not return. The strategic dilemmas between Russia & the West are real and go beyond political regime types.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

4/ OOC and Ivashov personally pursue a wild ideological amalgam: a kinda left wing Soviet religious-orthodox, patriotic conservatism. Important for Western readers to understand: anti-Putin in Russia does not equal pro-liberal and even less pro-West.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

9 months

The next two years will be decisive in #Ukraine . #Russia has no rational reason to stop its military campaign other than for operational pauses during this time. Ceasefire talks are unlikely before the outcomes of the US Presidential elections in 2024 are clear. 1/10

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

7/9 The last (unsuccessful) attempt of a palace revolution in Russia occurred in Aug. 1991 but failed due to a lack of both, decisiveness and public support. Make no mistake though: There is no good reason to expect the victory of liberal or democratic forces, only "restrainers".

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

Main combat operations in Iraq lasted 5 weeks, the encirclement/ battle of Grozny continued for 4 months. Putin's expectation that the war in Ukraine would end within days was based on misleading assumptions about the instability of political order, not the correlation of forces.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

This is significant, illustrates the atmosphere. Rogov, in particular, has been a member of the scientific council since the early 1990s. Panov used to be ambassador to Japan and Norway under Putin.

Oleg Shakirov

@shakirov2036

2 years

Putin exluded four experts from the Science Council of the Russian Security Council: — Alexey Gromyko — Alexander Nikitin — Alexander Panov — Sergey Rogov Source Membership

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

The NATO-Russia relationship is about power not security. The #Russian elite views #NATO as the military expression of US political hegemony in Europe, which it is unwilling to accept. This political divide drives threat perceptions and assessments of military capabilities. 1/2

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

8/9 Scenario 4: Putin is at the brink of losing militarily but unwilling to accept his fate, feeling existentially threatened. Likelihood of foreign engagement and inadvertent escalation increases, leading ultimately to a nuclear exchange, which causes multi-million casualties.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

The #Russian troop movement is unusual but EU members can do more than "following with severe concern". At a minimum, activate the OSCE #ViennaDocument , ch. 3, Art. 16, which entitles you to request an explanation, receive a reply within 48h & hold an official meeting afterwards.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

2/9 Scenario 1: Putin wins militarily in Ukraine and achieves his political goals: regime change and demilitarization. Oppression in Russia increases. Western sanctions intensify, aiming at regime change in Russia. European division becomes permanent.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

10 months

2/3 The ceremony itself was bilingual with consecutive translation. This moment is simply not helpful for making a general argument about the dynamics of Russian-Kazakh relations. Talks: Ceremony:

Совместное заявление Путина и Токаева

Владимир Путин и Касым-Жомарт Токаев принимают участие в церемонии подписания совместных документов в рамках официального визита Президента России в Республи...

www.youtube.com

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

4/9 Scenario 2: Putin settles on a military stalemate that enables him to enforce negotiations. The Ukrainian government, in order to prevent further bloodshed, accepts some conditions, i.e. neutrality and loss of Eastern regions, in exchange for hard security guarantees.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

@A_Melikishvili Misleading metrics: first, nominal GDP undervalues the size of the Russian economy but particularly its military-industrial potential. Second, spreadsheets do not fight. Any great power war will be relatively short. We are not in the industrial age.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

4 years

A picture is worth a thousand words. @ohnemax and I created a #visualization of the #OpenSkies Treaty: All flights. One result: The treaty is important. Particularly for #Europe . #Keepflying #Hamburgarmscontrol

Visualizing the Open Skies Treaty

The Open Skies Treaty is in danger - but data shows that keeping the treaty is very important for Europe.

openskies.flights

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

25 days

@shashj Yes, that's true, but they still blame the state admin. I refer here to the overall communication policy though. The Kremlin was under no pressure to publish videos of meetings or let Kommersant publish the article you might refer to. Usmanov surely would've intervened if told so

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

Worth repeating that the #war against #Ukraine is not about territory, ethnicity or language. It is about both, #Russian identity and power in Europe. Because #Putin sees himself in the realm of loss, he has become risk-seeking. To him, it is not about expanding, but defense 1/6

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

5/9 If costs become too high, Putin may want to look for a way out. The question is whether Ukrainian society is able and willing to accept any form of negotiation outcome. Fundamental geostrategic conflict between Russia and the West remains, but stabilizes for the time being.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

2/ Gorbachev ended the Cold War and agreed to asymmetric disarmament to enable domestic reforms but also because he imagined a different international order: A US-Soviet co-dominium in a common European home. Soviet economic collapse and disintegration stopped this from happening

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

25/ The annexation of Crimea briefly boosted domestic support, but did not solve the structural economic problems, which Western sanctions would only reinforce. Putin did not give up on Ukraine, however. The Donbas campaign would make sure to gain a foothold. The rest is history.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

3/9 At the moment this scenario seems very much possible, unfortunately. The question is at what costs. Total destruction? Ukrainian statehood as we knew it will be lost but partisan warfare and sanctions over time may lead to an intra-elite coup in Russia as well (Scenario 3)

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

5/5 Yet, as Thomas Cochran writes (who participated in the experiment) the significance of the results of the Black Sea exercise was not in the physics but in the demonstration that even adversaries can work together in a collaborative effort to improve their relationship.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

3/ Yeltsin’s government initially set out to integrate with the West. It accepted US leadership. Foreign Minister Kozyrev famously believed that Russia had no national interests different from the West. This “romantic” phase ended quickly. Domestic opposition was growing.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

14/ Western recognition of Russian interests, however, never materialized. Instead, Putin’s crack down on the old oligarchs, the nationalization of media & energy companies, the increasing concentration of power & the continuing war in Chechnya led to more criticism & alienation.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

2/It also wants NATO members to legally guarantee that they will not deploy weapons (strike-systems, probably long-range) that pose a threat to Russia on the territory of neighboring countries, regardless of whether they are NATO members or not.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

9/ Comment: Curious though that Russia seems to believe that it is now in a better position to change the status quo than in 08/09 or 14/15. Maybe it is, given US domestic turmoil and fixation on China. Most probably it is not. I doubt it. Getting this right will be crucial.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

16/ By 2007 Putin’s basic view of the Western-Russian relationship had changed as his speech at the MSC illustrates. Russia restarted to conduct strategic bomber flights, left the CFE Treaty (which NATO had not ratified) and signed a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

6/ Comment: This is not (just) about Putin. A summary of grievances going back 20 years & more. Second time after 2008/2009 that Russia forcefully demands changes in the European (security) order where it has become increasingly marginalized and remains excluded institutionally.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

13/ Putin started by reaching out to the West. He hoped for equal partnership, that is, the eventual recognition of Russian interests. With this expectation, Putin accepted the US withdrawal from ABM, the 2nd NATO enlargement round & did not object too strongly to the war in Iraq

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 months

Die geplante Stationierung von US- #Mittelstreckenraketen in Deutschland steht im Kontext militärischer Entwicklungen der vergangenen Jahrzehnte. Für die USA sind sie elementarer Bestandteil eines umfassenden Konzepts der Kriegsführung, das auch für die NATO maßgeblich ist. 1/13

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

15/ In short, Putin did not get what he had expected when making, what he believed were, concessions. The Orange revolution in Ukraine amplified his grievances. Putin, however, got what Yeltsin never had: The economic means to pursue national interests forcefully if necessary.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

19/ At the end of his presidency, Medvedev had lost support of essential Russian constituencies: the siloviki and the military-industrial complex. In short: The Okhranitely (defenders). Putin concluded that further cooperative attempts with the West would be futile.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 months

Russian experts keep looking for ways of how to re-establish deterrence and, so the argument, prevent strategic escalation. Suslov is somewhat more cautious than his mentor Karaganov, but they really should be considered one group. Proposes four steps in the escalation ladder 1/5

Michal Smetana

@MichalSmetana3

3 months

Dmitry Suslov, a Russian academic and member of a think tank close to the Kremlin, proposed a demonstrative nuclear explosion in response to NATO's willingness to allow Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike targets in Russia.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

6/ When NATO enlargement became inevitable, the Yeltsin government decided to make the best of it. It signed the NATO-Russia founding act, but more importantly, pushed ahead with the adaptation process of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

10/ Back to Istanbul: The year 1999 had been a difficult one. NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia in spring had plainly illustrated Russian impotence in European security. A fait accompli Moscow had to accept. It was a watershed moment in Western-Russian relations.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

Blinken and Lavrov have started talks in #Geneva . The meeting will last for only 90 minutes. Press conference scheduled for 1 pm CET. This alone shows: these are no negotiations for problem solving. Final attempt to buy time. Last silence to hold your breath before the storm.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

Putin never feared democracy in Ukraine as such. Neither has unclear long-term Ukrainian economic growth been of any concern to him or his power. Both are popular but wrong assumptions based on Western misconceptions. The truth is way simpler: control. 1/2

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

5/ The Western decision to enlarge NATO increased the pressure on Yeltsin. The Russian elite rejected enlargement but had no way of stopping it. Russia depended on Western financial support. Yeltsin owed his 1996 re-election to Russian media and US campaign strategies.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

10 months

@b_nishanov Not a convincing interpretation. This was the final statement for the press. Tokaev, in fact, starts in Russian, then switches to Kazakh but after the 30 seconds above switches again to Russian. Both delegations spoke Russian the entire day, from 7:22

Совместное заявление Путина и Токаева

Владимир Путин и Касым-Жомарт Токаев принимают участие в церемонии подписания совместных документов в рамках официального визита Президента России в Республи...

www.youtube.com

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

9/ Long story short: The adapted CFE never entered into force. US Congress and, later, President Bush insisted on the full withdrawal of all Russian forces w/o exception from Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia first. In Nov 2002, this would become official NATO position.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

The integration also further diminishes prospects for a negotiated ceasefire, let alone a peaceful settlement w/o exhaustion first. Short of clear defeat, the 🇺🇦 government is unlikely to be ready or able, even for tactical reasons, to accept the loss of these territories. 2/3

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

24/ For Putin the Ukrainian revolution must have been nothing short of a strategic nightmare, which he blamed on the cowardice of Yanukovych. He would not make the same mistake. Gloves were off. From his perspective, the campaign to return Crimea to Russia was an opportunist move

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

12/ Four months later an unlikely candidate was elected President: Vladimir Putin. He had been handpicked by Yeltsin and was supported by Russian oligarchs as a popular, strong decision-maker from a new generation – the bulwark against an eventual communist revival & prosecution.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

21/ Putin set out a new program: He doubled down on military reform, set up ambitious plans for social reforms, imposed more restrictions on civil society and promoted econ integration in the post-Soviet space that would relax EU normative pressure: The Eurasian Economic Union.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

20/ When Putin decided to return in September 2011 as President, he thus adopted a confrontational attitude towards the West: No more concessions, nor more attempts of integration. The domestic political crisis that evolved over the Duma elections was blamed on Western meddling.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

11/ Yeltsin was both furious and tired. He wanted to remind the West that Russia was a great power but, in fact, cut his trip to Istanbul short, dismissive of Western critique over Chechnya. Yeltsin wanted out. He resigned voluntarily in Dec. 1999. A first in Russian history.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

22/ Ukraine was at the center of this project. Over 2013 Russia tried hard (with sticks and carrots) to force Kyiv to accept membership and turn down further integration with the European Union. Moscow eventually succeeded in November 2013, or so it seemed at first.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

4/ The domestic conflict escalated in the 1993 constitutional crisis. Yeltsin decided to bomb parliament & set up a new political system with strong Presidential powers. Meanwhile economic hardship continued. Yeltsin’s popularity plumped, while nationalist forces gained support.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

8/ At the OSCE Istanbul summit in Nov. 1999 participating states signed the adapted CFE, the Charter for European Security & adopted the Vienna Document 1999. Russia promised to withdraw its forces from Moldova by end of 2002 & to negotiate with Georgia about complete withdrawal.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

Whatever one thinks about the problematic remarks by Admiral #Sch önbach, it should give us pause that #Indian Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy right after tells him: "We could not agree with you more, because India also has a very strong strategic partnership with #Russia "

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

17/ Unfortunately for Putin, his decision to pursue nat interests more forcefully coincided with the global financial crisis. The Russian economic model he had built upon turned out to be unsustainable & unable of producing long-term growth. The social contract became fragile.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

18/ By picking Medvedev as his successor, Putin set out for economic, and potentially, even political modernization (two-party system). But Medvedev did not deliver. He failed to secure cooperation on missile defense, lost control in Georgia and got schooled in Libya.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

7/ The OCC, in fact, published another letter exactly a year ago, in which they call the Russian regime "criminal", "incompetent", and even note politically motivated arrests of #Navalny , Furgal etc. No one paid attention then. In short, this is not about Ukraine.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

23/ The violent escalation of the Maidan protests came as a surprise to (almost) everyone. Many different things coincided: Yanukovych’s personal and political weakness, the surprising strength of armed nationalist forces, Western support for and acceptance of elite change.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

2/ In 2008 they even decided to organize a military tribunal against his "destructive" behavior. In 2011 the tribunal found Putin unfit for public office, this time supported publicly by Communist Duma deputy Viktor Ilyukhin, who has been known as the "red prosecutor".

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

Unexpected development: Denis Kireyev, reportedly shot by Ukrainian intelligence SBU during arrest. Kireyev, suspected of treason, had been a member of the #Ukrainian delegation at the first round of talks with #Russian in Belarus.

СБУ при задержании застрелила украинского переговорщика в Гомеле Киреева – ZN.UA

Дениса Киреева подозревали в государственной измене.

zn.ua

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

6 months

@edgarsrinkevics @steven_seegel @EmmanuelMacron Defeat is not the same as "delere" (delenda est) which means to "annihilate" or to "erase". This kind of language is despicable (especially in the nuclear age) independent of who uses it, but even more so for Western officials.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

5/Interestingly, the MFA (still) tries to legitimtize and frame these demands on the basis of the principle of indivisible security in the OSCE. It even explicitly calls upon the OSCE not to remain on the sidelines of discussions about Euro-atlantic security.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

Yet, even if this would be the case, the 🇷🇺 gov is unlikely to stop at these territorial gains w/o achieving regime change, which, so it seems, still remains the strategic war aim. If so, a ceasefire would only create a fragile demarcation line and a tactical breathing pause. 3/3

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

3/In seeks reactions by NATO on previous proposals to reduce tensions by limiting military exercises in the border zone, clarifying safety distances for warships in the Baltic and Black Sea, and the return to direct mil-to-mil dialogue, Russia-NATO, US-NATO.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

8/ Comment: Helsinki not Paris. Often cited together, but, in fact, very different. Helsinki: "sovereign right to freely to choose and develop [...] political [...] systems" and non-interference. Paris: "democracy as the only system of gov". Russia subscribes mostly to Helsinki

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

7/ The CFE-treaty had been signed in 1990 under very different circumstances. It still (even today) knows two military blocs: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Back then, Russia wanted to adapt the Treaty in order to mitigate the military consequences of NATO enlargement.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

Forget about D/LNR. Real issue is regime change by force in Kyiv and the risk of NATO-Russia military escalation. Moscow has three demands: No strike weapons near border, no NATO enlargement, back to 1997 military status quo. West fulfills first two by default. Let's get serious.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 months

Interesting data point: Putin says that Russian tactical nuclear weapons have a yield of 70 to 75 kt. This has not been public knowledge. cc @mattkorda @russianforces

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

3/ The OOC is not a large group. In fact, there is no official membership list. OOC "members" are either part of the OOC Council, about 30 people, or belong to those, who registered at irregular (annual) meetings. OOC itself has no information who these people are prior to 2018.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

15/ Comment: Russia is not the Soviet Union. Power difference is huge but Russia is not weak either. Military power & the political will to take risks could still force a compromise. Moscow might speculate that Europeans are indecisive, while US has bigger fish to fry.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

11/ Comment: Can this work? How to look at these demands? First, demands for legal guarantees about NATO enlargement are a non-starter. This goes beyond the 2008 proposal for a European Security Treaty. No one in the Kremlin believes in such guarantees anyway. A smokescreen.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

@DAlperovitch The question is why this is happening. The closing of airspace is purely punitive (and misleading in my view) but companies are arguably pulling out because of wider risks from sanctions, both direct financial and reputational. What's your view?

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 The Age of Empire, 1875-1914 The Age of Extremes, 1914-1991 The Age of Hopes, 1991-2022 The Age of Transformation, 2022-

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

People who speculate about the coming collapse of Russia with the Soviet Union in mind frequently forget that its disintegration was neither inevitable nor due to economic pressure or popular demand. It was dismantled by competing elites along nationalist and ethnic lines.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

10/ Comment: In 2009 Russian grievances were transformed into the OSCE Corfu process, dying a slow death. Now some people in Germany suggest to organize another pan-European security conference - with an eye on the 2025 Helsinki anniversary

Johannes Varwick

@JohannesVarwick

3 years

Neuanfang im Verhältnis #nato und #Russland - Aufruf von 27 hochrangigen Sicherheitsexperten #rausausdereskalationsspirale als pdf hier 👉

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

Mistake to think that Putin wants to rebuild the Soviet Union. No neoimperialism but struggle against further retreat. The use of military power, which is expensive & risky, covers structural econ/pol weaknesses. If Russia could achieve its regional goals otherwise, it would.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

4/Russia also, once again, invites the US to join the 'moratorium' on land-based INF missiles in Europe. The MFA promises to soon submit drafts of legal documents to begin negotiations about all of these demands.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

2 years

Mearsheimer is right but simply incomplete. Structural factors do matter but they cannot explain all outcomes. Same is true for explanations based on personality or political regime. Theories are not reality. They all tell only part of the story. Some more, some less.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

4 years

On 21 May the #Trump administration announced the U.S. #withdrawal from the #OpenSkiesTreaty . It will take effect in November. Tomorrow the 34 member states hold a virtual state conference to decide the future of the treaty. Can they save it? Bottom line: Yes, they can! 1/15

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

6 months

After 1989 there was the one in a lifetime opportunity to build a truly common, undivided and stable European security order. The previous generation of policy-makers has not been able to achieve it. Our generation has to deal with the consequences of their failure.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

I was told today, as a matter of fact, that Poseidon can carry/will be equipped with a 100 megaton warhead. Where does this information come from? It seems there is a single source: Konstantin Sivkov in Nov 2015 told the BBC about a 100 Mt warhead. 1/8

Russia reveals giant nuclear torpedo in state TV 'leak'

The Kremlin says secret plans for a Russian long-range nuclear torpedo - called "Status-6" - should not have appeared on Russian TV news.

www.bbc.com

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

Indivisible security in #Europe was a product of Cold War détente. What does it mean today? How can #Russia and the #West arrive at shared principles, despite strongly diverging interests? Time to revisit the #Helsinki process & adapt to new realities. 1/7

A Letter from Moscow: (In)divisible Security and Helsinki 2.0 - War on the Rocks

A Russian letter recently darkened Europe’s door. In it, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov criticized the alliance’s understanding and use of a

warontherocks.com

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

3 years

Habe mit dem @Katapultmagazin über #Putin 's #Krieg in der #Ukraine und Perspektiven für #Waffenstillstand und #Frieden gesprochen. Leider kein Grund für Optimismus. Weitere O-Töne von @gerhard_mangott und @CarloMasala1 .

Sieht schlecht aus

Seit etwas mehr als einer Woche führt Russland einen brutalen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine. KATAPULT sprach mit Experten über Optionen für Frieden und kommt zu dem Schluss: Für einen schnellen...

katapult-magazin.de

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

9 months

10/10 The ugly truth is that this war is not (yet) perceived as existential. It is a major issue, no doubt, but it is still only one among others. This is different for Russia. If the Western approach does not change soon, time will increasingly become the enemy of Ukraine.

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Alexander Graef

@alxgraef

1 month

The greatest landwar in Europe since 80 years literally next door, but the European football championship in Germany and the Olympic games in France almost take place as if nothing ever happened. This should tell us something about true preferences, assessments and priorities.

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