Kristin Ven Bruusgaard Profile
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard

@KBruusgaard

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Director NORIS @Forsvaret_no , affiliate @nuclearoslo and @StanfordCISAC RT not endorsement, all views my own

Joined January 2015
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
1/ My new piece in on Russian nuclear decision making is out in @WarOnTheRocks In it, I argue that Russian idiosyncrasies are useful to discuss potential Russian nuclear employment in Ukraine. Thread 1/7
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
2 years
Professional update: very pleased to announce that as of this fall, I will be the new Director of the Norwegian Intelligence School @Forsvaret_no
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
21 days
Adding my two cents on the doctrinal developments in Russia in the last 24h - for what its worth. A thread 1/
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
2 years
I write in @ForeignAffairs on the potentially perilous moments of Russian nuclear protocols
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
6 years
Just successfully defended my thesis at @DefenceResearch and am now apparently Dr. Bruusgaard!!
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
21 days
The spectacle here is the key: the act of communicating "our doctrine is changing" now has the worlds attention, with the implicit message: you should be worried. 2/
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
21 days
And spoiler alert: I dont think this content will do much to shift deliberations in Western capitals. END 8/8
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Absolutely thrilled to have been awarded the @jststs 2020 Amos Perlmutter Prize for my article on Russian nuclear strategy and conventional inferiority
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
21 days
The content of Putins speech is less spectacular; a number of issues receive more detailed treatment than before, but the granularity of nuclear thresholds remain as blurred as before – as is intended 3/
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
@james_acton32 <THREAD> on why Putin would do something like raising the alert level of his nuclear forces? First, it conveys pretty directly to the West (US) the severity of the situation. Seemingly pertains to strategic forces only - certainly hope so. (1/9)
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
21 days
Ukraine features clearly rel states with support of nuclear-armed states; but again, this links to Russia reserving the right to attack non-nuclear states. We knew this: its the reason weve been debating Russian nuclear use in Ukraine for 2yrs. 6/
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
4/ One uncertainty is whether Putin believes the potent Western economic, political, and military response could become existential threats. As of now, seemingly not. But the question is how desperate Putin will get amid domestic and international pressure.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
21 days
Key question is what now? Will we see a document, will it contain more than what Putin has stated? Is this a trial balloon or is this the shabang? If so; curious that changes were so little if one were to go through the motions of updating the doctrine. 7/
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
21 days
Belarus as part of Russian nuclear umbrella similarly implicit in 2020 doctrine. Issue of sovereignty is new, but the interpretation of «sovereignty» and «the very existence of the state» may both be subjective 5/
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
2/ This probably remains a local war in the Russian lexicon, one “with a few states pursuing limited political-military objectives”. The nuclear signaling we have seen so far is all oriented to deterring it from moving to the next level: a regional war.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
21 days
Issues that we already knew include massive air/space attack (implicit in previous incoming ballistic missile attack) and tgting non-nuclear armed states (negative security guarantees were removed from Ru mil doctrine a while ago) 4/
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
3/ A regional war is one which would implicate for example NATO. In such wars, nuclear weapons use would be much more likely, as they may quickly become existential to Russia. This explains why Russia is now doing what it can to deter NATO from intervening.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
7/ Finally, useful to delineate two analytically distinct scenarios for nuclear employment: in Ukraine and nuclear escalation if this turns into a direct NATO-Russia confrontation (much more likely). This is not clearly delineated in many pieces out there.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
6/ What would they tell him? IMO they would not advice nuclear use now: it would leave Russia with few options left for further escalation. Other analysts such as @mikekofman have also hinted to Russians likely reserving capabilities for such scenarios
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
5/ In the event that he would move toward the nuclear option, he would likely be forced to consult with his Defense Minister or Chief of General Staff. This is my estimate, but @russianforces have weighed in on this too
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 months
As part of a Special Issue on Norway, Deterrence, Reassurance and Strategic Stability in Europe, I published a new article on the NATO/Russia deterrent relationship in @jststs . Eprints availble here Deterrence asymmetry and strategic stability in Europe
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Russian State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence - thoughts: 1/ Reiterates what was already known through military doctrines: that Russian NWs are weapons of last resort, to be used to deter or defeat existential threats Will the West listen now?
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
@james_acton32 2/ Putin’s statement that conveys this as a response to Western statements about Russia are shocking: Putin basically says that these guys are saying terrible things about us so we must “raise the alert level”. latest in series of horrifying statements.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
@james_acton32 3/ Stark departure from existing and officially communicated doctrine regarding nuclear employment –Westen statements, no matter how evil, could not realistically be spun as “threatening the existence of the Russian state”.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
@james_acton32 5/ If Putin is about to lose his marbles, however, then this information, combined with concerning and unverified chatter about nuclear incidents and dirty bombs, paints an extremely concerning picture. Major caveat here relating to the ongoing info war.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
@james_acton32 7/ But this brings us back to rationality : most of the campaign seems irrational from perspective of political objectives Russia likely to achieve. Previous Putin statements re nuclear weapons suggest he believes these are different. Now – who knows?
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
5 years
And I too am thrilled to join @UniOslo_SVfak and #OsloNuclearProject and to work with the brilliant @Malfrid_BH
@Malfrid_BH
Malfrid
5 years
I am delighted that @KBruusgaard has joined #OsloNuclearProject at @UniOslo_SVfak from our friends at @StanfordCISAC . Kristin's expertise on Russian nuclear strategy is much needed - and challenges many preconceptions.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
5 years
Phew! Survived it, thank you @StanfordCISAC for the opportunity to get a ton of incredibly useful feedback on my manuscript before I head off to @UniOslo_SVfak
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
@james_acton32 4/ Nuclear deterrence theory and practice closely related to rationality: If Putin remains rational, then this conveys stay out from a next and more ugly conventional phase in Ukraine – as many have pointed out.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
5 years
my reaction: Interesting overview of E2D debate. But doesn't focus on key US misunderstanding: that Russia would start war b/c of confidence in own ability to control escalation. 1/
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
6 years
just published a piece on Why U.S. Tactical Nukes Are a Bad Idea.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
@james_acton32 8/ I wonder about reports of elite mumblings and resort to old skool Kremlinology when seeing the face of Shoigu in recent displays. I personally don’t think the Russian military elite will cheer on the idea of limited nuclear use in or about Ukraine.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
@james_acton32 9/ But who will break the news to Putin that this may in fact not work – and be as utterly counterproductive as his other efforts at producing the outcome he seeks?
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
@james_acton32 6/ Is this E2D? Russian doctrine thus far has been about nuclear use in face of existential conventional military threats against Russian homeland. If this remains a guiding principle, then unlikely we will see nuclear employment in or near Ukraine.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
2 years
Look forward to new challenges and opportunities for collaborations, including with my great colleagues @NuclearOslo
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
5 years
#OsloNuclearProject is very excited about the inaugural Oslo Nuclear Forum on 9 September with @Gottemoeller NATO Nuclear Policy in a Post-INF World
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
Takk for det - et viktig og spennede oppdrag som jeg gleder meg til å ta fatt på!
@Malfrid_BH
Malfrid
3 years
Kollega @KBruusgaard er oppnevnt i Statsråd i dag som medlem av den nye Forsvarskommisjonen. Vi i @NuclearOslo gratulerer med det viktige oppdraget! @UniOslo_SVfak
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Very excited about presenting my work this evening CET/midday EST at @MIT_SSP
@MIT_SSP
MIT SSP
4 years
What factors have impacted Russia’s #nuclear strategy since the Cold War? What role does #military autonomy play in #Russia ’s civil-military relations? Find out at our 3/31 Weds. Seminar w/ @KBruusgaard ! Info: . #AcademicTwitter #weapons #ForeignPolicy
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Fun times and stimulating discussion @NATO_DefCollege #nuclear #strategist workshop, excited about two more days of this!
@doreen__h
Doreen Horschig
4 years
Great presentations at @NATO 's #Virtual Early-Career #Nuclear #Strategists Workshop (ECNSW) by @areddie89 , @KBruusgaard & @LorenzoTerm on nuclear deterrence & strategy! @NDC_Research
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
Reupping this: ONF21 happening this Friday 14.15CET! Come talk Russian nukes and European security with @AnyaFink @OlyaOliker live if you're in Oslo, via zoom if not. Signup here:
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
2 years
Looking forward to this 4 May @NuclearOslo conversation in Oslo on Chinese, Russian, US approaches to strategic stability with @Fiona_Cunning @CameronJJJ @HenrikHiim
@NuclearOslo
OsloNuclearProject
2 years
Next week, on May 4th, we are hosting a seminar together with @IFS_Oslo to discuss Chinese, Russian and US approaches to great power competition and strategic stability. More information about the seminar can be found here:
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Very excited about presenting my @NuclearOslo work to @ManagingtheAtom
@ManagingtheAtom
Managing the Atom
4 years
Next Wednesday at 9:30 am EDT: "Explaining Change in Russian Nuclear Strategy After the Cold War" with @KBruusgaard
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
Jeg skriver I Dagsavisen I dag om russiske atomvåpen og vanskelige valg I norsk sikkerhetspolitikk: disse må være en del av debatten om Forbudstraktaten
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
2 years
I had the pleasure of conversing with @HannaNotte and @sbidgood about nuclear risk and conventional forces in their new video/podcast
@HannaNotte
Hanna Notte
2 years
Concerned about #nuclear escalation? Releasing Episode 3 of "Machiavelli in the Ivory Tower" w/co-host @sbidgood , feat. @KBruusgaard . We discuss #RussiaUkraineWar / Russian nuclear strategy / modernization of Russian conventional forces @JamesMartinCNS
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
2 years
Jeg debuterte som ny fast spaltist @DN_no og snakker på @dagsnytt18 i dag om veien videre i Ukraina
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
Come work with us @NuclearOslo in Norway's leading polisci department @UniOslo_SVfak
@Malfrid_BH
Malfrid
3 years
🚀🚀DEADLINE IN 10 DAYS 🚀🚀 Two 4-year postdoctoral fellowships focusing on strategic stability and arms control & one predoctoral fellowship focusing on new challenges for nonproliferation with @NuclearOslo ☢️☢️☢️☢️☢️☢️☢️☢️☢️☢️
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
5 years
sure, Russia has range of ltd nuclear options and will consider ltd strikes. But are they confident in the result this would produce? I think no, which is reason they continue to insist they would only do so when existence of state under threat 2/2
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Looking forward to taking part in this discussion today at 7pm CET
@carnegienpp
Carnegie Nuclear Policy
4 years
TODAY AT 1PM EST: @james_acton32 @KBruusgaard and @AnitaFriedt discuss a new report on five proposals to make meaningful arms control progress between the U.S., Russia, and China. Send in questions via Youtube live chat or by tweeting @carnegienpp !
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
This Wednesday 1 Dec at 2.30 CET we are thrilled to host @eriklg in an Online @NuclearOslo Seminar on Crisis Signaling in the age of Twitter, with comments by @Mauro_Gilli . Signup here:
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
5 years
Very proud of my colleague, the brilliant @Malfrid_BH - well deserved!
@Malfrid_BH
Malfrid
5 years
Personal news: I am delighted to announce that @fr_jensenius and I have been promoted to Full Professor of Political Science at @UniOslo_SVfak !
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
2 years
I am very excited to be chairing the panel on Intelligence at the EISS Annual Conference in Barcelona in June. CfP closes 27 Jan, see below for details on the conference and how to submit an abstract 👇👇
@EISSnetwork
European Initiative for Security Studies
2 years
🚨REMINDER🚨 📌6th edition of EISS Annual Conference 🗓📍This year, the conference will take place at @IBEI in Barcelona on 29-30 June 2023 📢 Send us your panel and paper proposals before 27 January through the Indico platform!  ➡️   1/2 🔽
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
A unique Russian deterrence concept that seamlessly integrates nuclear and non-nuclear assets demonstrate shortcomings of mirror imaging Western concepts when deciphering Russian strategy
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
In it, I demonstrate how perceptions of the conventional balance of forces has produced change in Russian nuclear strategy over time
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
Looking forward to the conversation in this exciting @UNIDIR conference
@UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
3 years
@andrewfutter @LyuJinghua @shakirov2036 @raji143 @SFU @VSamson_DC On 26 May, the second day of our conference, we’ll dive into the blurring line between advanced conventional and nuclear capabilities. @KBruusgaard , @rebeccahersman , and @KomissarWhipla will consider: what are the potential consequences of different types of ambiguities? [5/]
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
This is happening online tomorrow @NuclearOslo . Looking forward to the discussion! sign up below
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Highly recommend this sobering analysis: @CameronJJJ @NuclearOslo spells out the challenges beyond New START extension
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
Great new piece by my @NuclearOslo colleague @CameronJJJ with useful reminders about gauging adversary intentions
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
6 years
Yours truly (+ others..). on Russian discussion on clarifying nuclear doctrine Эксперты в США назвали цели разработки новой ядерной доктрины России:
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
7/ To conclude: most of this not new to geeks who follow Russian debates and declaratory strategy; but the publication and level of detail is a first - in history of Russia and USSR, far as I know. also: those who believe declaratory strategy has no value will still shrug
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
Jeg har anmeldt @halvorkippe og S Høibråtens meget gode rapport om Russiske kjernefysiske styrker
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Indeed, Russia has made Basic Principles of Nuclear Deterrence Policy public! - amid much Western debate on the content of this document
@KomissarWhipla
Dmitry Stefanovich
4 years
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time the Basic Principles of State Policy in the field of Nuclear Deterrence are made public in Russia. Stay tuned for a thread!
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
I argue that Russia is not a unique actor perceiving nuclear weapons as uniquely suited for pursuing revisionist ambitions
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
6 years
Textbook playbook
@nukestrat
Hans Kristensen
6 years
Extensive GPS signal disruption in northern Finland during NATO exercise #TridentJuncture2018 If your offensive military capabilities rely on GPS, guess what the adversary will try to do?
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Rather, Russian nuclear weapons have compensated for conventional shortcomings, like many other nuclear powers
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
The Finns are on the ball, unsurprisingly
@charlyjsp
C Salonius-Pasternak
3 years
Finland's Defence Forces clearly signals 'Game On'... ...I've been asked almost daily whether Finnish military has done anything recently to raise readiness. My answer has always been a Kimi-like: "yes" Now its partially visible. Thread follows.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
@KomissarWhipla It is the first time and very interesting, including the earlier reports that they were considering publishing it to reduce confusion
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Unlike others, Russia has in the past decades sought to escape a too strong reliance on nuclear by improving conventional tools
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
7/ To conclude: most of this not new to geeks who follow Russian debates and declaratory strategy; but the publication and level of detail is a first - in history of Russia and USSR, far as I know. also: those who believe declaratory strategy has no value will still shrug
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
2/ It spells out what Russia seeks to deter, including the concentration or deployment of nuclear capable or conventional forces on its periphery: short and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles, missile defence, early warning, UAVs, space assets, you name it
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
5 years
Jeg skriver om Russland som regional utfordrer sammen med en rekke smartinger fra @IFS_Oslo
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
6 years
@nukestrat No, no delineation of incoming nuclear or conventional attack. BUT critical that he emphasises no preventive strikes
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
2 years
Read this excellent piece on the world Putin wants by two leading ladies of Russia watching
@AngelaStent
Angela Stent
2 years
Fiona Hill and I discuss what Putin wants as he propels Russia back into the past @ForeignAffairs
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
Noen tanker om faren for bruk av atomvåpen; via @Atlantkomite @NuclearOslo
@Atlantkomite
Den norske Atlanterhavskomité
3 years
Til tross for det enorme ødeleggelsespotensialet fortsetter stater å utvikle atomvåpen. Hvor stor er faren knyttet til at stater tar i bruk sine atomvåpenarsenaler i dag? Vi har spurt eksperter om faren for bruk av atomvåpen øker i takt med opprustningen.
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
5 years
This 👇 an absolute privilege to be a part of this conference cc @mfritzbartel
@DrRadchenko
Sergey Radchenko
5 years
Attending a fantastic conference at @Yale , packed full of bright minds, including Arne Westad, John Ikenberry, @e_sarotte , Bob Jervis, @JimGoldgeier , @shifrinson , Nuno Monteiro, @SevaUT , @crmiller1 , Simon Miles, Paul Kennedy, and many others. An intense discussion!
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
Good read by @DrUlrichKuehn on some of the many inadvertent pathways to NATO-Russia confrontation
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
4/ some novel elements that highlight evolution of Russian deterrence thinking: key principles are adaptiveness, credibility ("readiness and decisiveness of RF to use NWs") and unpredictability in terms of scale, time, place, and the means used
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
5 years
Gøy å være med i interessant debatt i regi av @IFS_Oslo om fremtidig forsvarskonsept!
@IFS_Oslo
IFS
5 years
Postdoktor @KBruusgaard ved @NuclearOslo @UniOslo ser i dagens seminar "Hvordan skal vi forsvare Norge" på Russland som regional utfordrer i arbeidet med ny langtidsplan for forsvaret. @FHS_Oslo @Litteraturhuset
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Jeg har skrevet #ukensanalyse om den nye russiske kjernevåpenstrategien for @Atlantkomite @NuclearOslo
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
3/ Also spells out that nuclear weapons may be used to contain escalation of conflict and end it on terms acceptable to Russia. Ie spells out a deterrent and warfighting role, interesting delineation as pointed out by @OlyaOliker
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
6 years
@OlyaOliker hits the sweet spot on Russian nuclear strategy in
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
2 years
Excellent thread from @russianforces
@russianforces
Pavel Podvig
2 years
It's understandable that a few recent developments again made people worry again about nuclear use. I don't have a crystal ball, but there are a few things to consider. And they seem to suggest that we are still at least a few steps away from that point. 1/11
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
3 years
This is a great read on Putins decisionmaking bubble
@SevaUT
Seva
3 years
Adam Casey and I examine how Putin’s opaque and tight-knit inner circle shapes his foreign policy decision making. [ungated] @adam_e_casey
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
If you want to receive @nuclearoslo news and events, sign up here
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
6/ Spells out some conditions for RF nuclear use, to include reliable warning of incoming ballistic missile attack, nuclear or mass conventional strike against RF territory, attacks on critical infrastructure that prevents secure nuclear retaliation
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
5/ the latter is interesting also in terms of make sense of the large range of Russian dual-capable system
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@KBruusgaard
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
4 years
Looking forward to this!
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