Over the moon to announce my book deal with
@wwnorton
for WE SHALL OUTLAST THEM.
The book will tell the story of how
#Russia
recalibrated its entire global foreign policy to persevere in a long standoff with the West - over
#Ukraine
and, indeed, over global order
🧵
Having worked in Moscow when
#Russia
intervened in
#Syria
in 2015 & engaged RUS officials/experts on
#Syria
for yrs, I see 5 parallels in approach to
#Ukraine
vs
#Syria
1. Sequential war
2. Encirclement/corridors
3. "Human shield" claims
4. Foreign fighters
5. CW claims
Thread.
I don't think I've ever seen the Russian strategic community engage in such intense public debate over nuclear use as over the past 1 week.
Here a summary of all contributions, for those who missed it:
(Others, feel free to add pieces I left out to this thread!)
Leaving Moscow as Russia marks "Defender of the Fatherland Day" with a heavy heart after days of intensive mtgs. Some Russians said I witnessed a historic moment (DNR/LNR recognition) but one devoid of euphoria, unlike 2014. Instead, I sensed disbelief & shrugging shoulders (1/8)
Speaking w/some contacts in
#Russia
to try to understand evolving sentiments in society re:
#RussiaUkraineWar
, 3 factors stand out for me:
1. Adaptive behaviour
2. "Besieged fortress"
3. State propaganda working wonders
A thread. /1
All eyes on
#Putin
speech and
#Transnistria
today.
But something else is happening in Moscow:
+10 Palestinian groups - including
#Hamas
& Islamic Jihad (PIJ) - are hosted by Russia for mediation talks.
What's
#Russia
up to? How's it linked to
#Ukraine
? And can it succeed? 🧵/1
Infotweet für diejenigen GEGEN
#Waffenlieferungen
an
#Ukraine
& FÜR sofortige Verhandlungen mit
#Russland
:
„Alles wird mit einem Vertrag enden, aber die Parameter dieses Vertrags werden durch die mil. Situation bestimmt, in der dieser Vertrag Wirklichkeit wird.“ (Lawrow, 25.04.)
The predominant take on this platform is that yesterday's events revealed
#Putin
's weakness & vulnerability. The beginning of the end of his regime.
I think that's premature.
After all, Putin came out on top & there is so much we don't know about what exactly went down. (1/4)
The imperative that we must not waver in supporting
#Ukraine
is reinforced by a factor we often overlook in our
#West
-centric bubble:
#Russia
is not isolated globally.
Pushing back against Russia thus 1) takes extra effort & 2) is of strategic importance beyond
#Ukraine
(1/11)
2. Encirclements/corridors: Many have called
#Mariupol
the "2nd Aleppo”. Indeed, in
#Syria
, we saw Russian encirclements/bombardments/humanitarian corridors, time & again. Civilians failing to leave were labeled “terrorists” = legitimate targets. Expect to see more of this in UA.
Parallels between
#Syria
&
#Ukraine
are highly imperfect. The 2 wars are different for
#Russia
in objectives, stakes, mil nature, West's reaction, reaction of own population. Still, useful to understand aspects of
#Russia
war in
#Syria
for analysis of what could come in
#Ukraine
3. Related,
#Russia
MoD claims 7,000 Azov fighters in Mariupol using civilians as “human shields” () When Russia/Syrian army “mopped up” DEZs in 2018, armed opposition was accused of same tactic. "Human shield" claim = mainstay of RUS discourse on
#Syria
.
4) That said, I have not seen evidence of direct
#Russian
backing for
#Hamas
and this attack - planning, weapons, execution.
And to be clear: There was no need for Russian assistance. The Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas axis is *highly* capable. Let's not delude ourselves. /4
I have seen scores on this platform characterize Monday's events as an inflection point in our relations with Moscow. True, but for many of us long-time Russia-watchers, it's been a rolling inflection point. And I believe the ball is still very much rolling. (8/8)
...a) Russia’s successes in
#Ukraine
's South/East in coming weeks, b) Russia's (mil.) resources (UA totally different ball game than Syria!), c) where we are at with Russia-Ukraine talks in a few weeks. But it’s to caution against assumption that this is over yet.
1. Sequential war: RUS recently termed 1st phase of
#UkraineWar
done, announcing focus on Donbas. In
#Syria
war, Russia had declared new phase in 2017, establishing de-escalation zones (DEZs) in Western parts, which freed up regime resources to take more territory toward the East
Once that was done, regime/Russia turned back & we saw sequential take-over of DEZs (E Ghouta, Homs, Deraa) in 2018 under guise of CT. Not at all to say that sequencing in Ukraine will be the same. Return of larger-scale fighting toward W Ukraine will depend on...
a) serves Russian domestic narrative re: WMD threat emanating from
#Ukraine
that necessitates preventative "special mil op." b) creates terror & fear in
#Ukraine
, c) is picked up by conspiracy theorists in
#West
, sowing doubts here and there in W societies. All at little cost!
Among more liberal/pro-Western minded, the predominant feeling Monday night was bewilderment - with folks thinking until the last moment that "he's not gonna go there" - mixed with a deepening worry about the future trajectory of the country: domestic & its foreign policy. (2/8)
I highly recommend you read this by Dmitri Trenin - just to get an understanding for where influential Russian elites see
#Russia
headed:
-Total break with the current world order and its institutions
-Radical & sustainable reorientation to the non-West
What's going on? No useful military role for foreign fighters at this point in the war? Logistical constraints in moving them? Concern about resulting vacuum in Syria and ltd. bandwidth to deal with any instability there? Combination of above? Curious to hear
@RALee85
& others.
4. Foreign fighters: In
#Syria
, Russia justified intervention claiming internationalization of conflict – for. fighters "flocking in" to join opposition. In
#Ukraine
, Russia claims that 1000s of foreign mercenaries & terrorists have joined AFU & are to be “ruthlessly destroyed”.
Meanwhile, we see shift re:
#Russia
’s own use of foreign fighters. While it originally announced readiness of 16k
#Syrian
/ME fighters to come to Ukraine,
@CENTCOM
saw few actual movements. On Frid, Russia MoD indicated that DNR/LNR preference is “to defend their land themselves”
5. Chemical weapons claims: In
#Syria
, Russia warned of false flag CW attacks by armed groups for years. Never actively used CW itself, but enabled Syrian gov. in doing so, plus shielded it from facing attribution/accountability
@OPCW
& UN Security Council.
In
#Ukraine
,
#Russia
false flag claims have spanned whole CBRNe spectrum, getting many worried. Would Russia use CW? My view: there's no “red line” left, should Russia judge it militarily expedient to use CW, which is not a given. But "false flag" propaganda is useful regardless:
The more hawkish felt vindicated by the building of momentum up to Monday (coercive diplomacy needed as gamble toward rectifying past injustices) but were equally caught by surprise by Putin speech (tone & substance). And seem to lack clear sense of where all this will end. (3/8)
1)
#Russia
-
#Hamas
relations are active and go way back. Moscow only recently hosted a Hamas delegation
Russia's also been active in intra-Palestinian mediation, trying to carve out a niche for itself on the peace process. The Russian Academy of Sciences has played a role here /1
3) Generally speaking, a modicum of instability in the Middle East and new crises suit
#Russia
, as they deflect Western attention/resources/bandwidth away from NATO's eastern flank and
#Ukraine
.
Iran's proxies causing havoc is not against Russian interest. /3
However, the U.S. response to whatever will unfold in Israel in coming weeks - coming down hard on the side of Israel - *may* cause an even further Russian drift into Iran's orbit, given the geopolitical dimension here.
And that could have significant implications. /10
There is a wall in Europe, not a Berlin wall, but one between freedom & lack of freedom. And that wall becomes bigger with every decision not taken. We turned to you, warning that North Stream 2 is preparation for war. And you responded: North Stream2 is economy, economy, economy
5) There are also several reasons why
#Russia
would be cautious about backing such a vile attack on Israel directly:
a) Chiefly, Moscow still hopes to keep Israel cautious on the
#Ukraine
war, ie Israel not giving lethal weapons to Kyiv;
b) Russia's relations with Israel.../5
It is my sense that these factors 1.-3. now constantly reinforce each other & drive apparent (and growing) support for what many in
#Russia
- yes, it's hard to believe - still believe is a "special military operation" with limited scope & aim.
#RussiaUkraineWar
Trying to find explanations, many were hard-pressed. Some suggested that Putin calculated - as he indeed stated before - that Russia will be sanctioned, called "the bad guy", with its interests disregarded by the West, anyway.... So, "he might as well go for it?!" (4/8)
2)
#Russia
-
#Iran
relations have been expanding and changing qualitatively, with significant implications for:
-Iran enjoying a near-nuclear status, as I argued here:
-both countries' military capabilities, as I show here: /2
If there was a bigger war in the region,
#Russia
would not have the capacity and bandwidth to deal with it.
And Moscow doesn't need that kind of war - low-level instability suits its needs just fine. /8
Many fear that
#Russia
might escalate, horizontally or vertically, in response to Ukrainian long-range strikes.
But Western states are not alone in facing escalation dilemmas -
#Russia
faces them, too.
My latest column in the
@FT
🧵/1
Amid a variety of views on what precisely will transpire next, there's consensus that we're far from the end. Either rapid escalation soon, or incremental "tightening the screws" on Ukraine - until, some say, he finally forces the West to "become serious" about talks... (5/8)
3. State propaganda: The sheer masse of detailed counter-narratives & lies thrown at most Russians by state media re
#Bucha
, alleged
#WMD
in Ukraine, or the war broadly, produces chains of thought: "The situation's really complicated" -> "We will never really know the truth"../4
..have been more rocky recently (esp. under Bennett & Lapid), but remain extensive: intel sharing, huge Russian diaspora in Israel (which predates the Ukraine war), extensive trade, deconfliction in Syria. Bibi and Putin have personal chemistry. /6
c) While Russia welcomes instability, I'm not sure it would be happy about an Iran-Israel war that would engulf
#Lebanon
- and probably
#Syria
.
Russia has naval/air bases in Syria that allow it to project power into the Eastern Med/MENA.
It wants quiet & for the US to leave /7
One final thought: Notwithstanding its growing ties with Iran, its forging of an "axis of the sanctioned", Russia has continued to value its ties with
#Israel
and the Arab states.
I don't think
#Russia
wants to go "all in" with Iran. /9
Russian daily Kommersant publishes interview with former Indian foreign secretary/ambassador to Russia, in which he warns:
If
#Russia
uses a
#nuclear
weapon, it will lose the support of the Global South. It would be dangerous for Russia to think otherwise.
Israel-Hamas, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, Sudan etc
@mkimmage
& I look at today's international order & argue in
@ForeignAffairs
that it is marked by a toxic combination: Great power competition & great power distraction
The result: a profusion of crises
1. Adaptive behaviour: Many Russians say "what is expected of them" - they support the
#Kremlin
on
#Ukraine
. They might (or not!) hold different views privately, but perceived social pressures + fear of reprisal drive adaptive behaviour - so you can best cope in everyday life /2
6 months into
#Russia
’s aggression against
#Ukraine
, there are mostly losers.
One potential winner is
#Turkey
, given 2nd-order effects of the war.
Since Feb, Ankara has gained some leverage vis-a-vis both
#Russia
and
#NATO
.
An attempt at a (complicated) balance sheet🧵(1/18)
...Add to that, "the West often lies, why would we trust their version...?"
Looking for alternative information is possible, but 1. & 2. increasingly mitigate against an openness to learn about (and then live with!) uncomfortable truths /5
MUST READ.
#UA
negotiator M. Podolyak gives insights into
#Russia
-
#Ukraine
talks to
@Kommersant
. Bottom line: cautious hope that
#Russian
war aims lowered and negotiated settlement possible over time. Summary of main points from
@kommersant
👇
2. Besieged fortress: Adaptive behaviour is amplified by a sense among many Russians that their isolation& life under sanctions will be for a long time. Plus, whether you wanted the war or not, Russia is now "mobilized" against immense outside pressures. Result: consolidation. /3
In
@WarOnTheRocks
I reflect on the recent Russian debate on preemptive nuclear use against
#NATO
allies, what it suggests about escalation risks w/
#Russia
, and the nuclear implications of the
#Prigozhin
mutiny:
The West Cannot Cure Russia's Nuclear Fever
#Einfrieren
Wir haben das ja mal in einem anderen Krieg gesehen, in dem
#Russland
auch meinte, die größeren Interessen und den längeren Atem (uns ggü.) zu haben:
Syrien, 2017-2018
Das Einfrieren hielt nicht lange und war für die Syrer katastrophal.
Kurzer historischer🧵/1
Yes.
#Hamas
delegations have been travelling to
#Moscow
for years, sure.
That doesn’t mean you can explain this attack today by lazily pointing the finger at Russia.
That obscures what are more complex dynamics and doesn’t help anyone
Trying to link Hamas to Russia is a pretty desperate manoeuvre, especially considering how warm relations are between Netanyahu and Putin. Don’t take those takes seriously.
In my latest for
@WarOnTheRocks
, I argue that the ripple effects of
#RussiaUkraineWar
have reduced Moscow's ability & willingness to lean on
#Iran
to accept restoration of the
#JCPOA
.
So, don't expect Russian help on the nuclear deal after the US midterms.
PERSONAL NEWS: Extremely happy to be directing
@JamesMartinCNS
's work on Eurasia & Russia going forward -- based out of Berlin.
I look forward to continued collaboration with my former
@VCDNP
colleagues, as I embark on this new chapter.
10 yrs ago today -on Aug 21, 2013- the Syrian regime used chemical weapons (CW) against its people in
#EasternGhouta
.
#Syria
has yet to be held to account for its CW attacks & for its retention of CW.
But
#Russia
is trying to remove the issue from the international agenda (1/)
#Russia
has not labeled last weekend's attacks on Israel by
#Hamas
"terrorism".
This is noteworthy and stands in contrast to Russian statements during the Second Intifada and the 2014
#Gaza
War.
A🧵with some history 👇
Yday,
#Lavrov
’s confirmation in
#Cairo
that
#Russia
seeks to “help the Ukrainian people to free themselves” from their regime gained - understandably -considerable attention in Western capitals.
But it might obscure other important aspects of
#Lavrov
’s visit to
#Egypt
. A 🧵1/14
Yesterday, the US State Department formally accused
#Russia
of using chemical weapons (CW) against Ukraine, violating the Chemical Weapons Convention.
It also said Russia had used riot control agents as a method of warfare in
#Ukraine
.
🧵/1
My debut on
@nytimes
op-ed pages on
#Russia
benefiting from the
#IsraelGazaWar
:
Ukraine has receded into the background; U.S.-led diplomacy in the Middle East is in disarray; and the West & the rest face each other over an abyss of mutual incomprehension
This is not to argue that Western sanctions against
#Russia
& current aid to
#Ukraine
are inconsequential. Far from it
But it does suggest we need to be extra staunch in supporting
#Ukraine
& making sure it doesn’t gradually slip off the agenda because our societies tire, (7/11)
My latest research report - "Dangerous Decline" - looks at the future of
#Russia
's military & security influence across the Global South (arms sales, Wagner/PMCs, other military activities) & the implications for the United States.
5 key take-aways:🧵
But if scope & success of
#Ukraine
's counteroffensive fall below expectations / Russia's able to hold back better than thought,
#Putin
's regime might prove less brittle than many thought yesterday
Especially since his oppressive apparatus will likely go into overdrive now (4/4)
For those interested in context, amid fears that
#Russia
might stage false-flag chem. (or bio) attack in
#Ukraine
, I've followed the
#Russia
#Chemical
weapons dossier
-in
#Syria
,
-re
@navalny
poisoning &
-
@OPCW
for years.
Some background readings that might be useful (1/6)
8) And on Karaganov's piece, and Putin's flippant remarks on nuclear arms control in St. Petersburg last week,
@ElenaChernenko
for
@kommersant
, 20.06.2023,
Over just the past week
-US announced withdrawal from
#Niger
-
#Chad
sent letter to US threatening to cancel Status of Forces Agreement
-
#BurkinaFaso
expelled another 3 French diplomats
Dynamic situation in Central Africa & Sahel, where
#Russia
is steadily consolidating influence
Much will surely depend on what happens in Russia's war against
#Ukraine
.
#Prigozhin
's appeal partially stemmed from the fact that the war is not going well - he put his finger on the issues, unapologetically, openly. (3/4)
It's conceivable that the corrosion of his rule is in motion. And more importantly, that the process will continue.
But there's also the possibility that the immense dysfunctionality of the system we observed yday can prove quite durable & not become dangerous to
#Putin
. (2/4)
NOW:
#Ukraine
President
#Zelenskyy
addressing the German
#Bundestag
via video broadcast. I speak to you, the German people, as Russia bombards us, destroys everything that we have built in our country. Over past 3 weeks, 1000s of Ukrainians have been killed, incl. 800 children.
Many worry that
#Russia
might turn to
#ChemicalWeapons
in
#Ukraine
, as things go increasingly poorly for it on the battlefield.
In my latest for the
@washingtonpost
, I examine the (limited) options to deter/punish such a horrible scenario:
🧵/1
"If the Middle East explodes, it will hurt Russia’s enemies—but it will hurt Russia, too."
My latest for
@ForeignAffairs
, looking at some of the specific benefits and risks to
#Russia
of a wider war between
#Israel
and
#Hezbollah
or
#Iran
Not good: Satellite images show increased activity at nuclear test sites in Russia, China and US
Kudos to
@ArmsControlWonk
& his team at
@JamesMartinCNS
for uncovering this
On balance, I still believe
#Russia
stands to gain more than to lose from a protracted conflict in
#IsraelGaza
.
But there are risks & vulnerabilities, as became clear yesterday, when an antisemitic mob stormed the
#Makhachkala
airport in Dagestan, looking for Jews.
A 🧵
For proof that
#Russia
is not isolated, look toward big parts of Asia, LatAm, Africa, Middle East. Voting patterns at
#UNGA
. Who hasn’t joint sanctions against
#Russia
. How media beyond the "West" reports on the war in
#Ukraine
. And most of all: Look at
#China
and
#India
. (2/11)
S Karaganov doubles down on the nuclear scare, after he got some pushback by serious scholars in Russia's strategic community (👇earlier thread):
"There's no choice: Russia will have to launch a nuclear strike on Europe"
h/t
@lapszynski
Summary👇(1/10)
I don't think I've ever seen the Russian strategic community engage in such intense public debate over nuclear use as over the past 1 week.
Here a summary of all contributions, for those who missed it:
(Others, feel free to add pieces I left out to this thread!)
"Western sanctions mean the Russian economy is securely insulated from global shocks. If there is no sudden fall in oil prices, or anything similarly catastrophic, there is enough money to maintain current spending for about 2 years"
Always read
@amenka
What is this historical responsibility (of Germany) before Ukraine after these past 80 years? We need help, Europe cannot preserve its values otherwise. I say to you, Chancellor Scholz: Destroy the wall, give Germany the role to lead, which it deserves, Support UA, stop this war.
"We could..face a nuclear confrontation w/Russia, after which, assuming we emerged 'victorious,' we immediately faced a 2nd nuclear confrontation w/China"
Who's gonna tell John Bolton that, after nuclear war w/Russia, we won't be doing much of anything?
I implore you in the name of the older Ukrainian generation, who survived Babi Yar. Every year politicians here say: 'Never again'. But now we see that these words count for nothing.
What a timely visit -
#Iran
's chief of police, Ahmad-Reza Radan, is in Moscow to meet with
#Patrushev
& Russian National Guard head
#Zolotov
.
Sharing best practices on how to suppress various domestic threats to regime stability?
Meet the Munich Young Leaders 2024:
@HannaNotte
is the Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the
@JamesMartinCNS
and a senior associate at
@CSIS
. Her work focuses on Russia, the Middle East, and arms control. Read more:
#msc_myl
If you've been following
#Prigozhin
/
#Wagner
over the past months (in fact, years - and activities not just in
#Ukraine
, but
#Syria
,
#Libya
, elsewhere in Africa) - and you're still cheering his proclaimed "march of justice" onto Moscow on from the sidelines - maybe think again.
In the
@FT
, I warn that last week's US-Russia prisoner exchange does not signal a return to pragmatism in
#Russia
's foreign policy - not on
#Ukraine
& not on any other issues
Instead,
#Putin
sent a message to his agents and would-be assassins: “Game on.”
Chinese peace plan. Scholz & Macron offering a security pact to
#Ukraine
.
Such “mediation fever” doesn't just court disappointment. It rests on a faulty understanding of the war and risks both distraction & complacence.
My latest with
@mkimmage
for
@WSJ
:
Second, perceptions matter: if feeling of Western societies tiring—only 3 months into this war—seeps in and dominates narrative across "non-West", conclusions drawn will include: Russia “hangs in there” vs. West is “decadent and weak”.
Plus, “aggressors can get away”. (10/11)
The temptation to exploit anti-Western sentiments over
#Gaza
has been so powerful that Russia has been willing to sacrifice its (once good) relations w/
#Israel
These relations have been very rocky since Oct 7 & we probably haven't reached the bottom: /6
Yesterday, Israel's representative at the UN called Ukraine an ally, denounced Ru's invasion, and promised to provide an early warning system to UKR. Israel's approach to Ru is shifting rapidly, with officials drawing a link btw October 7 and Ru's invasion
This report has the *most alarming* recommendations re
#nuclear
issues: Russia should
-leave MTCR
-help
#Iran
build nuclear weapon (if it renounces intent to destroy Israel)
-convince 'global majority' that ltd. nuclear strikes against states supporting Ukraine might be necessary
A leaked report by Sergey Karaganov (co-authored by Aleksandr Kramarenko, Fyodor Lukyanov and Dmitry Trenin) (h/t
@KassenovaNargis
, link below) is the quintessence of Karaganov's school of foreign policy. A lot of acid stuff, but in the end of the day it's all about love. 1/7
Though it may go unnoticed in our
#West
-centric bubble,
#Russia
is now highly active diplomatically to ensure the “non-West” continues this “fence-sitting”.
Just look at who
#Lavrov
& RUS diplomats meet with these days.
Scroll though
@mfa_russia
website to get a sense. (5/11)