Oleg Itskhoki @itskhoki Twitter profile

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Oleg Itskhoki

2 years

w/ @sguriev we argue that European embargo on Russian oil and gas is the fastest way to end the war by stopping Putin’s ability to finance it. Any other policy option is more costly and dangerous. It is not just a humanitarian, but also an economic imperative for Europe. 1/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

A comment I often hear: oil/gas embargo has little effect on Putin’s ability to continue the war. This is wrong. In fact, the correct calculus: each marginal euro received from energy exports to Europe contributes exactly one euro to the war in Europe, as simple as that. 1/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Мы считаем, что действия руководства России наносят огромный ущерб будущему России. Развязывая войну против Украины, руководители России действуют против интересов российских граждан. Мы требуем немедленного прекращения агрессии!

Stop the War

Мы, сообщество экономистов, работающих в университетах и научно-исследовательских центрах в России и за ее пределами, заявляем решительный протест против войны, начатой 24 февраля 2022 года российс...

sites.google.com

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

I am bewildered by the arguments I occasionally hear from my European colleagues and friends, including that putin needs a “face-saving exit so he can gracefully resign” and that the costs of shutting down gas supplies from Russia are too high. 1/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Yes, this embargo is costly for Europe, but its costs are manageable. More importantly, not imposing the embargo has much larger costs. Pre-war status quo is not an option. The war is an economic disaster for Europe, prolonging it will result in much higher economic costs. 3/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Foreign cash Putin receives is used to continue the war in Europe. Depletion of foreign currency undermines Putin's ability to finance it, but also to pay policemen & propagandists - the key pillars of his oppressive regime at home, making further foreign aggression inviable. 4/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Please watch and donate to @fbkinfo

Navalny | CNN

The CNN Film follows Russian opposition leader, Alexey Navalny, through his political rise, attempted assassination and search to uncover the truth.

www.cnn.com

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Indisputably, embargo hurts ordinary Russians. Yet, not imposing sanctions does not help them, as Putin reorients Russia’s fiscal resources towards this war, and has already destroyed welfare of hundred million people. Rebuilding Russian economy requires stopping the war. 6/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

What we know for sure is that every euro received for Russian exports is used by Putin to finance his war against Europe currently fought in Ukraine. We also now know approximate magnitudes of war expenditure - €500m/day - comparable to what Europe pays Russia…

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Therefore, every marginal euro of exports now goes directly to the war fund. The ability to redirect energy exports to other countries is very limited, whether by sea or by pipelines East. So one-for-one is the correct estimate. It is in Europe's hands to stop it now. n/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Complete export substitution towards China and other countries is impossible. More importantly, the embargo is the ultimate statement of resolve and unity from the West, which will make it much easier to bring China onboard… 5/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

5 months

President Biden @POTUS , would you hold your word, and hold Putin accountable? Speaker Johnson @SpeakerJohnson , would you do your job and hold the vote on the aid to Ukraine on your floor? We need your leadership.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

11 months

RU ruble depreciated ~100% since its peak of 53 rub/USD last summer to ~100 now. The pace⬆️ this summer since Prigozhin mutiny and expropriations of West./private companies Time to step up fin+export sanctions to further limit fiscal space for Putin’s war efforts in 🇺🇦/elsewhere

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Why? Because domestic constraints are kept tight and all spare resources are devoted to the war, right now or later after a short break to regroup (it is myopic to expect Putin stops with an effective military defeat when the original goal was to occupy Kyiv in one week). 2/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Impossible to comprehend how our @PrincetonEcon @PrincetonBCF doctoral student, now @Cambridge_Uni Professor, has to fight in a war in Europe against the aggression of my country of birth. Unbearable shame. This war has to be stopped.

Alexander Rodnyansky

@arodnyansky

2 years

My hometown of #Kyiv today is beautiful as ever. I say this naturally as a proud sixth-generation Kyivan (from my mother's side), taking a Sunday stroll around #Andriivskyi descent. While the oligarchs continue to flee the country on their private jets, thereby putting their ...

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

The goal of policy should be to minimize the possibility of such catastrophic events. The longer the war in Ukraine proceeds, the greater the possibility of further escalation beyond Ukraine. Thus, a regime of extreme economic pressure on putin is necessary immediately. 5/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

At current level of sanctions, Putin has enough resources to resolve his domestic fiscal constraints, at least temporarily: both domestic fiscal commitments to pay pensions and public sector salaries, and stabilize the financial system and the exchange rate (a symbolic goal). 3/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

10 months

Central Europe since 1990 is a most underappreciated growth miracle. Institutional pool of the EU allowed these countries to effectively complete the transition from developing to developed in three decades, a rare (if not exceptional) feat historically. 1/n

Konstantin Sonin

@k_sonin

10 months

This graph tells a lot. At the beginning of the transition 30 years ago, Russians were richer than people in all newly-market East and North European countries. Now, they are poorer, on average, than all of them. For two major reasons: first, the depth of the 1990s crisis, and,

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

More detailed English version here: 2/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

Very impressed by the precision of our forecast of the Ruble exchange rate with @MukhinDA which we made back in August based on a calibration of our model using the likely path of Russian exports and imports. The model predicts 75 ruble per dollar at the one year mark of the war.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Перед российским гражданским обществом сейчас стоит выбор между массовым протестом против мобилизации и войны и потерей многих десятков тысяч молодых жизней. 4/4

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Статья с Максимом @mironov_fm про мобилизацию: Принудительный призыв сотен тысяч россиян на войну в Украине обернется дополнительными десятками тысяч бессмысленно потерянных молодых жизней уже в первые месяцы. 1/

Maxim Mironov

@mironov_fm

2 years

Написали с Олегом Ицхоки @itskhoki статью про мобилизацию. Читать в ФБ: ... и в телеграме:

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

This war is putin’s legacy, there is no face-saving exit for him. However, the absolute majority among Russian “elites” do not want to live in a mixture of Soviet Union and North Korea which Russia will turn into if the war carries on. 7/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

It is also crucial to engage China to isolate putin’s regime. China has arguably a lot to lose from economic turmoil from further escalation of the war in Europe. n/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Thanks to @MSchularick @ben_moll @BachmannRudi @LukaszRachel @kuhnmo @lugaricano @ailex n/n

Öl und Gas aus Russland: Warum ein Embargo Wladimir Putins Krieg beenden könnte

Der schnellste Weg, den russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine zu unterbinden, wäre ein Importstopp für russisches Öl und Gas. Denn die Einnahmen aus diesen Geschäften halten bisher das Herrschaftssystem...

www.spiegel.de

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Economic costs to Europe in those circumstances would be immeasurably higher than any costs from gas supply shut down now. 4/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

While putin may have military resources, it is important to keep in mind that his position is extremely weak in light of his military failures in Ukraine and the economic collapse in Russia. He is a liability to everybody in Russia, and Russian “elites” are well aware of it. 6/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Extreme economic pressure from sanctions and embargo will act to further coordinate the dissenting Russian “elites”. It is crucial to emphasize that these sanctions are in place until Russia can provide credible assurances of no further aggression in Ukraine or elsewhere. 8/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

It is crucial to avoid direct military conflict of western countries with Russia, which is what putin aspires to (including possible use of nuclear weapons, as casually discussed on Russian TV), as this is his only way to improve his otherwise very weak bargaining position. 9/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Nonetheless, I think this misses the main argument. One needs to think of the possible tree of events, and consider the branches that lead to a complete catastrophe of a much larger escalation of military action in Europe. 3/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Саботаж и уклонение от призыва любыми способами - это безусловно правильная индивидуальная стратегия поведения для каждого. 2/

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

AEA panel "The Economic Implications of the Russian War in Ukraine" organized by @YGorodnichenko My portion on the effects of sanctions on the Russian economy starts from minute 6 here:

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Open letter of Russian economists against the war with Ukraine – EACES | European Association for Comparative Economic Studies

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

I applaud the work of @ben_moll and co-authors to quantify the costs of gas supply shut down and share the moral arguments in tweets by @HannoLustig and @BachmannRudi against financing putin’s war in Ukraine. 2/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

4 years

A survey for @AnnualReviews based on my graduate lectures, with my fascination with the Real Exchange Rate (RER) going back to 2005 when I took my PhD class with @krogoff , and then working with @GitaGopinath , @MaryAmiti , @MukhinDA and other co-authors

NBER

@nberpubs

4 years

A survey and discussion of recent empirical and theoretical work on equilibrium forces that determine the real exchange rate, from @itskhoki

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

It is essential to acknowledge that this is the only logical continuation if the war carries on, there is no other endgame. 10/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

My AFA @JofFinance Lecture introduced by @MarkusEconomist on Exchange Rate Puzzles and Policies covering our research agenda with @MukhinDA slides:

Exchange Rate Puzzles and Policies

AFA Lecture: Exchange Rate Puzzles and PoliciesLecture Saturday, Jan. 7, 2023 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (CST) Sheraton New Orleans, Napoleon B & CHosted By: AME...

www.youtube.com

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

4 months

Первая серия нашего "подкаста" с @plushev , давно хотел поговорить на эту тему:

Социализм vs Капитализм. Олег Ицхоки

Раз в неделю мы встречаемся с профессором экономики Калифорнийского университета в Лос-Анджелесе Олегом Ицхоки, чтобы обсудить события и тенденции мировой эк...

www.youtube.com

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Interesting analysis, which nonetheless misses a few important points about export sanctions. Summary in thread below, formal analysis see Corollary 1 1) While indeed export and import sanctions achieve the same goal (due to Lerner equivalence), ... 1/n

Matthew C. Klein

@M_C_Klein

2 years

New at THE OVERSHOOT: On the Russian Oil Sanctions <-- The new oil sanctions will add to the pressure, but at substantially higher cost to the allies and the rest of the world. Good news is that Russian imports fell further in April compared to March.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Но эта стратегия не позволяет существенно изменить количество призванных и отправленных на войну в первые месяцы кампании, и как следствие избежать безвозвратной потери жизней. 3/

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

@navalny is being slowly killed in jail, he needs to be saved, hoping for an exchange for some putin's criminal abroad (there are many)

Вадим Кобзев

@advokatkobzev

1 year

Навальный, конечно, пишет веселые и жизнерадостные посты, но в них он не напишет о том, что в ночь с пятницы на субботу к нему в камеру вызывали скорую из-за вновь обострившейся после очередного ШИЗО болезни желудка. Неизвестной болезни, от которой его никто не лечит.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

… Without these revenues, sustaining this war is not feasible. We also know the vast extent of military recruitment in Russia and $2-4k/month payment promises to soldiers - about an order of magnitude above typical Russian salaries. All sustained by export revenues.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

there is no doubt left that Russia is a mafia-captured state in its entirety, and it's been this way for a long time, sadly this stayed largely unnoticed by the world before the full scale war in Ukraine has begun last year

Konstantin Sonin

@k_sonin

1 year

One might think that Russia is a huge country with a lot of people. Yet the judge Sergei Podoprigorov who sentenced @vkaramurza to 25 years today is the same judge who ordered the arrest of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in 2008 who was then killed in jail. @Billbrowder 's best-seller

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 months

One of the questions we ponder in this paper: Can exchange rate be generically reconstructed by no arbitrage from other asset returns (e.g. stocks and bonds) and discount factors that price them?

NBER

@nberpubs

2 months

An analytical framework that characterizes the link between exchange rates and finance across all conceivable market structures, from Mikhail Chernov, Valentin Haddad, and @itskhoki

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

W/ @MukhinDA , we put together a draft explaining the effect of sanctions on the exchange rate: 1/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

An important insight from the Russian trade data (w/ @mironov_fm @elinaribakova @ben_hilgenstock @TaniaBabina ): China and supposedly Western allies India and Turkey hold the keys to ending this war with a massive economic leverage over Putin

Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

AEA panel "The Economic Implications of the Russian War in Ukraine" organized by @YGorodnichenko My portion on the effects of sanctions on the Russian economy starts from minute 6 here:

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

3 years

Oleg Itskhoki: "Dominant currencies: How firms choose currency invoicing... via @YouTube

Oleg Itskhoki: "Dominant currencies: How firms choose currency...

On April 23, 2021, Oleg Itskhoki (UCLA) gave an online lecture organized by the "International Macroeconomics" Banque de France - PSE Chair: "Dominant curren...

www.youtube.com

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Updated draft: Sanctions and the Exchange Rate (ER) Two new insights: 1. share of exports in gov revenue and of imports in GDP determine the effectiveness of sanctions, but surprisingly this is independent whether sanctions are on imports or exports 1/3

Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

W/ @MukhinDA , we put together a draft explaining the effect of sanctions on the exchange rate: 1/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

3 months

A devastating failure of the US government to protect its citizens, including government officials, against a systematic attack by rogue hostile foreign state. How are we not taking it with all seriousness it demands?

Havana Syndrome evidence suggests who may be responsible for myster...

Efforts continue to investigate brain injuries suffered by U.S. officials. This is the fourth 60 Minutes Havana Syndrome report and, for the first time, ther...

www.youtube.com

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

5am seminar with some tough questions!

Virtual Israel Macro Meeting (VIMM)

@vimacro_org

1 year

Excellent VIMM #seminar and discussions yesterday with @itskhoki ( @UCLA ) that presented his paper "Optimal exchange rate #policy " @vimacro_org Thank you Oleg! Paper & Video: #EconTwitter #Research #Economics #Forex #MonetaryPolicy #AcademicTwitter

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

ECB Webinar on our new work with @MukhinDA on "Optimal Exchange Rate Policy"

09 Optimal exchange rate policy

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www.youtube.com

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

3 years

My virtual ITM seminar on "Granular Comparative Advantage" and government policies:

Oleg Itskhoki: Granular Comparative Advantage

http://kjrs3.com/dti/itskhoki.pdf

www.youtube.com

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

10 months

This provides an optimistic prospect for former Soviet states (Ukraine, Moldova, free Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, perhaps Kazhakstan) if they can escape the corrupt insitutional pool of Putin's Russia and be in the pool of attraction of European insitutions. n/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

11 months

In addition to capital outflows, the major challenge are fiscal deficits driven by military expenditures, again despite high world oil prices. Limits on export revenues would now go a long way in making financing Putin's war increasingly costly economically and politically.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

11 months

Depreciation driven by capital outflows, which started as soon as the war, but were offset by record-high trade surplus in spring 2022. Since, exports started coming down and imports recovered; capital outflow persisted, hence persistent trend depreciation since last summer.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

I wish everybody courage and resolve. Everybody will need it now, irrespective of our actions or lack thereof. Putin escaped the bounds of Russia and came to Europe.

Christo Grozev

@christogrozev

2 years

! Russia's main propaganda "news program" tonight.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

11 months

Prigozhin mutiny and expropriation/nationalization of companies accelerated this trend recently, which itself triggers further acceleration of capital outflows and currency demand within Russia, hence further depreciation.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

Economists ( @RobinBrooksIIF @HannoLustig @ben_moll @BachmannRudi and many others) warned about this possibility - a longlasting war in Europe vs short term economic hardship from embargo. We explained the reasons in an article with @guriven back in March:

Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

w/ @sguriev we argue that European embargo on Russian oil and gas is the fastest way to end the war by stopping Putin’s ability to finance it. Any other policy option is more costly and dangerous. It is not just a humanitarian, but also an economic imperative for Europe. 1/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

To sum up, export sanctions are effective to reduce purchasing power of the government a) when imports >0 and b) when imports=0 but households want to hold FOREX as a vehicle for savings. n/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

10 months

2. Unlike in Post-Soviet states, transition in CE was associated with limited increase in inequality, and their growth was much more inclusive. Thus, outcomes for *median* incomes p/c are even more impressive than for GDP p/c. (in particular, compare e.g. Romania and Russia). 3/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

My earlier tweet on this:

Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

A comment I often hear: oil/gas embargo has little effect on Putin’s ability to continue the war. This is wrong. In fact, the correct calculus: each marginal euro received from energy exports to Europe contributes exactly one euro to the war in Europe, as simple as that. 1/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

10 months

This transition has 2 important features: 1. All countries followed essentially parallel trends, despite different initial conditions. As a result, a few countries already reached GDP p.c. of the EU, and others are on a similar convergence trajectory just a few years behind. 2/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

11 months

Generally, we expect depreciation to improve trade balance and stabilize the currency market. But RU is already running a consistent trade surplus given high oil prices, despite partial sanctions.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

Slides for the talk: Referencing forthcoming research joint with @elinaribakova @mironov_fm @ben_hilgenstock @TaniaBabina and our work with @MukhinDA on sanctions and the exchange:

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

€s are essential to support both the military needs, but also to compensate repressive and propaganda machines at home that are essential elements of Putin's military machine. None of this comes for free or could be sustained without hard currency from energy exports to Europe.

Alexey Navalny

@navalny

2 years

1/14 How an ordinary Russian TV viewer (one of whom I currently am) sees it. I learned about the monstrous events in Bucha yesterday morning from the news that Russia was convening the UN Security Council in connection with the massacre by Ukrainian Nazis in Bucha.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

What a powerful text @BachmannRudi absolute must read!

Why it is imperative to help Ukraine

As a question of international order, economics, and history, it is imperative for Russia to lose its war of aggression on Ukraine. And for that, Europe has a moral duty to help Ukraine. This column...

cepr.org

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

11 months

Export sector is unlikely to expand, though, under sanctions. Notably, at current high oil prices, we would expect currency surplus in Ru and CBR buying currency reserves to offset appreciation. Capital outflows more than offset this, and depreciation is likely to persist.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

@BachmannRudi @fritzfelgentreu @IvanWerning a less technical explanation coming out as voxEU:

Sanctions_VoxEU.pdf

Shared with Dropbox

www.dropbox.com

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

@hmeyer78 @econ_hmg the argument is different: perhaps the war can still be financed for months, but with current export revenues it can be financed for extra months on top of it - this is the relevant marginal calculation.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

It is very sad and shameful that @yandex became a key part of Putin's propaganda and domestic suppression machine, along with state TV channels.

Konstantin Sonin

@k_sonin

2 years

16 years ago I used Google searches (two left panels, in China and elsewhere) to illustrate what media freedom is. In 2022, one could search for the word "Bucha" in Google and Yandex (two right panels), the prime Russian search engine, to illustrate the same concept.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

11 months

Given limited reserves, CBR's last resort is return to financial repression used in spring 2022 and further interest rate increases.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

The overall conclusion: imposed sanctions worked the way they must have worked, no magic there. Not imposing export embargo early led to record high trade and fiscal surpluses that gave Putin's regime a huge financial cushion - enough to sustain many months of the war.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

...they act cumulatively -- that is the total effect is additive. 2) The effect of sanctions on govt fiscal revenues in rubles is proportional to the share of export taxes in total fiscal revenues, and is not fully offset by depreciation (in response to export sanctions)... 2/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 months

@lugaricano @sguriev While this is plausible, Russia now is hardly a place where elections matter for govt decisions. I think a simplified view that the only relevant dimension of sanctions is its affect on the tightness of the government budget constraint (via worsening terms of trade) is justified.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

@ben_moll @BachmannRudi not that it is important for the argument, but 2022 oil prices alone would have given +7% growth in Russia, so the actual economic decline from war is very dramatic (despite 2-digit trade surplus and govt spending⬆️), and sanctions didn’t start till Dec in earnest

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

... this is for the same reason why financial repression works to stabilize exchange rate. This allows the government to avoid redistribution via other means e.g. inflation or cutting spending. ... 4/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

thread 👇

Garry Kasparov

@Kasparov63

2 years

Russian media are saying Macron spent 100 hours on the phone with Putin. They lie all the time, but I'd like to hear a denial from Elysée on this one. If true, Macron will get special places in both the history books and the Guinness Book.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

Nonetheless, embargo and tighter price cap are better late than never, as each marginal euro of export revenues increases Putin's ability to finance the war and hence unnecessarily prolongs it:

Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

A comment I often hear: oil/gas embargo has little effect on Putin’s ability to continue the war. This is wrong. In fact, the correct calculus: each marginal euro received from energy exports to Europe contributes exactly one euro to the war in Europe, as simple as that. 1/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

... 3) additionally, sanctions reduce purchasing power of these rubles. 4) Importantly, even if imports = 0, FOREX export revenues allow to redistribute from households to government if households want to used FOREX for savings... 3/n

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

VoxEU summary with @MukhinDA now out: Sanctions and the exchange rate | VOX, CEPR Policy Portal

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

That's indeed the best way to put it!

Hanno Lustig

@HannoLustig

2 years

Suppose we did a helicopter drop of dollars in Red Square in Moscow. If no one bothers to pick them up, then export curbs are indeed irrelevant. Not a likely outcome of this experiment.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

+1

Hanno Lustig

@HannoLustig

2 years

Suppose we did a helicopter drop of dollars in Red Square in Moscow. If no one bothers to pick them up, then export curbs are indeed irrelevant. Not a likely outcome of this experiment.👇

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

The model calibration is described in Section 5 here: In the data, imports indeed recovered by the end of 2022, as we assumed, and the Jan-Feb data suggest a significant decline in export revenues, as EU sanctions on RU crude and products are kicking in.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

@kbburchardi @LukaszRachel @hmeyer78 @BachmannRudi @sguriev To clarify, it won’t be raising taxes it will be cutting transfers, and these transfers go to Putin’s core supporters. The right way to see it: Putin operates under extreme pressure from various constraints, some military, some political, some financial. Why make his life easier?

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

3 months

Unraveling Havana Syndrome: New evidence links the GRU's assassination Unit 29155 to mysterious...

A yearlong investigation by The Insider, in collaboration with 60 Minutes and Der Spiegel, has uncovered evidence suggesting that unexplained anomalous health incidents, also known as Havana Syndro...

theins.ru

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

Composition of Russian export revenues (in BB USD per month):

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

China (CN) now accounts for nearly half of Russian imports (data below for March-Septebmer when trade with China has not yet fully increased). Turkey (TR) and India (IN) are growing fast too:

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

This is mostly meant as an illustration of the quantitative properties of the model. To be sure, our emphasis is largely on the qualitative economic forces that drive the complex dynamics of the ruble exchange rate since the start of the war.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

Russian unprecedented trade surplus as % of 2021 GDP:

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

Excellent write-up in FAZ:

Rudi Bachmann

@BachmannRudi

1 year

Ich stimme bekanntermassen mit @hankrainer nicht immer ueberein. Aber dieser Beitrag ist wirklich eine fulminante Zusammenfassung der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion von 2022.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

Sloan Foundation

@SloanFoundation

2 years

Introducing… the winners of this year’s Sloan Research Fellowship! These extraordinary researchers represent some of the most exciting young minds working today—and we are thrilled to support them. Meet the winners here: #SloanFellow

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

As oil embargo/price cap become more binding, the model predicts further depreciation in 2023 towards 85-90 ruble per $, abscent signficant FX interventions (which we show have only temporary effects) or inflationary resolution to fiscal deficit (which leads to extra devaluation)

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

3 years

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 months

On one hand, exchange rate is a conversion of units of two currencies, and if one knows the value of a unit of each currency, then perhaps the answer is yes.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

1 year

New paper with @MukhinDA for AEA P&P shows complementarity between financial and export sanctions and how import sanctions undo effects of financial sanctions (a particularly poor mix if the goal is a sudden stop, a bank run or a financial panic):

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

These insights, while help make sense of the ER and policies, do not change the basic economic principle that war requires resources, in particular financial resources, and export revenues are a key source of such resources to continue the war. 3/END

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

@ben_moll @M_C_Klein @HannoLustig @sguriev Import sanctions are working (slowly), but sanctions are inherently leaky, and euros from oil/gas exports still have considerable purchasing power (both internationally and domestically), and there are lots of these euro export revenues.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

2 years

@M_C_Klein @lugaricano I see no reason not to impose a steep russian energy tax at the very least.

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Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

11 months

@ben_moll Now is still a good time to do it to end the war faster:

Oleg Itskhoki

@itskhoki

11 months

RU ruble depreciated ~100% since its peak of 53 rub/USD last summer to ~100 now. The pace⬆️ this summer since Prigozhin mutiny and expropriations of West./private companies Time to step up fin+export sanctions to further limit fiscal space for Putin’s war efforts in 🇺🇦/elsewhere

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