We have all heard about public goods, private goods, toll goods and common-public resources (CPR) from econ. I have been thinking about how this classification is applicable to blockchains. A thread ๐งต
Gm everyone! I will be at Denver from 2/26 to 3/3. Would love to meet all the innovators, whether you are in tech or in BD or in finance/econ or in governance and discuss how to enrich and enhance
@eigenlayer
.
AVS/middleware/infra teams headed to Stanford SBC next week, weโd love to chat
@eigenlayer
. If interested, send me a note to connect! I will be there 8/27-9/1.
Once upon a time, I wrote about the
@Rocket_Pool
layer zero bull case.
Rocket Pool has a bonafide army of node operators with huge capital at stake - the perfect partner to turn
@eigenlayer
into a decentralized powerhouse.
Time to bring yield to decentralization, a thread ๐
Two points to elaborate on point 4 of rarity of forks:
(a) it is critical that the rules of coordination determined in the setup phase for AVSs be codified in a manner such that any fault in the AVS is self-evident and self-executable during execution phase.
Some great questions on how Eigen works.
We will put together an FAQ on EIGEN.
1. EIGEN is staked for validation tasks so the fee revenue is paid to EIGEN stakers in the normal mode not only when there is a challenge or fork.
2. EIGEN staking has the ability to charge for
With
@sreeramkannan
, in this article, we present a mental model to decide when slashing might be beneficial to you and what risks you need to be mindful of if you incorporate slashing.
In this new post that
@sreeramkannan
&
@soubhik_deb
wrote for us, they break down the controversial practice of โslashingโ in Proof of Stake protocols, providing a careful analysis of under what circumstances slashing might be useful.
Read here:
Since we have announced our partnership with
@eigenlayer
, I have been getting the same question:
"What is
@NEARProtocol
's Super Fast Finality Layer (SFFL), and how does it help the Ethereum rollups?"
Here's a tweet thread about our partnership and what we are building ๐งต
We are excited to announce the release of the testnet for the first stage of the EigenLayer protocol, which supports liquid and native restaking.
Please read the full details here:
1/8
@sreeramkannan
often compares
@eigenlayer
to a โVerifiable Cloudโ platform for Crypto, but what exactly does this mean? Sharing some thoughts on that framing along w/
@cbventures
take on the burgeoning EigenLayer AVS landscape.๐๐พ
See ๐งต for summary.
Would be at
@EFDevconnect
from 11/13-11/19. Excited to meet all AVS/middleware/infra builders who are thinking of building on EigenLayer ecosystem. Shoot me a DM if you wanna chat.
๐ฃ Calling all Wardens! Put your skills to the test on
@eigenlayer
โs codebase. Help secure their ecosystem to take your share of the $90,500 prize pool.
Start now:
Above all
@eigenlayer
values โopen innovationโ. To me this is a commitment to collaborative, positive-sum experimentation, and I plan to live it fully.
Itโs going to be a challenging, rewarding journey, and a total privilege to go on it with this team. Iโm grateful & excited :)
๐ฅ Are you a dedicated Ethereum Solo Staker?
Is decentralization your passion? Want to contribute to Ethereumโs consensus and EigenLayer restaking?
๐ Weโre excited to roll out the EigenLayer Solo Staker Working Group and Intake Questionnaire! We're eager to understand your
Our paper "PoSAT: Proof-of-Work Availability and
Unpredictability, without the Work" would be presented on March 2 at Financial Crypto 2021 (
@IFCA_Conference
). Would be great of you could join my short talk!
Paper:
Long video:
Sneak peek of a very exciting new proposal
Augmenting MEV-Boost using
@eigenlayer
to enhance Ethereumโs censorship resistance
@sreeramkannan
will speak soon at the SBC MEV workshop
Quick summary below
However, it seems in blockchains we need another axis for classifying these goods: the security axis. This security axis will specify under what trust assumptions, can a good be classified into a particular category. Let us go through some examples.
From econ, we have CPR: (non-excludable, rivalrous), public goods: (non-excludable, non-rivalrous), club goods: (excludable, non-rivalrous) and private goods: (excludable, rivalrous).
Happy to announce that our work on designing a peer-to-peer network for
#Blockchains
that minimises the broadcast latency has been accepted at ACM PODC (
@podc_disc
).
Paper:
Pre=recorder presentation video:
1/n
Censorship is observable from outside the chain but the accused validators can't be penalized algorithmically in a smart contract. This work is a solution on how to solve it. ๐งต๐
(CPR, Honest-majority assumption): NFT airdrop, liquidation, DEX swap with exchange rate within a range are examples. They are non-excludable and rivalrous with only honest-majority assumptions.
With honest-majority assumption, these goods are rivalrous. Assuming honest-majority assumption is not violated, observe that if an NFT with unique rarity is confirmed to have been bought by someone, it is not available anymore for anyone else to buy it in the canonical fork.
Ready to build the next unicorn? Introducing our newest research on The EigenLayer Universe ๐ Explore 15 unicorn ideas ๐ฆ and what you can build with EigenLayer now!
Research Post:
In economics, one of the ways to classify goods is based on exclusivity and rivalry. Exclusivity basically asks if anyone can be excluded from consuming the good. Rivalry asks if consuming the good prevents other eligibles from consuming it.
The beacon state contains inactivity_scores per-validator which are updated during inactivity leak. Would be awesome to have smart contracts access to those scores so that stakers can hedge against their validators for not participating when chain not finalizing. Any risks?
Many protocols like Themis, Multiplicity, Espresso sequencing for guaranteeing short-term censorship-resistance feature algorithmic consensus for achieving multilateral ordering of transactions and so, non-excludability relies on honest-majority assumption.
Assuming the simple P2P transaction like transfer of ETH between two friends is not time sensitive, then having the guarantee of ledger-growth and long-term censorship-resistance makes the exclusion difficult.
We built ODIN
@EthereumDenver
, itโs a security service that uses
@eigenlayer
to bond block builders to follow the rules of ODIN , i.e protocol invariants like x * y = k is never violated by a transaction. It was an amazing experience hacking with
@zk_asv
On the other hand, if you are making an RPC call to some other entity who is running a full node, then you are trusting this entity to truthfully let you know about all forks or data from the canonical fork. But no one can exclude you from making your choice on how to read data.
One pattern with the new stuff getting built in crypto is they are far more engineering-heavy than projects that were built in 2020-2021
Last year if you knew some Solidity you were relevant as a dev and could get hired at pretty much anywhere
(Public goods, Inter-subjective trust assumption): Reading data from blockchain is an example. They are non-excludable and non-rivalrous with inter-subjective trust.
It is non-rivalrous as a P2P transaction getting included in a chain doesnโt prevent other P2P transactions from getting included in the chain eventually (assuming long-term censorship-resistance).
This tweet thread only touches the tip of the categorization of all possible goods in blockchain. I believe that to build a good economic model around various goods in blockchain and extend decades/centuries of economic research, these categorizations will be of immense help.
Can these four terms: powers-of-tau setup, trusted setup, srs and crs, be used interchangeably? If not, what are the differences? Have seen many places use them interchangeably, making me confused!
Without short-term censorship-resistance in L1, NFT Airdrops, liquidation events etc., become excludable as an address trying to consume it can be excluded easily due to unilateral ordering power of the block proposer.
In the case of Ethereum, inactivity leak ensures that ledger growth continues. As for long-term censorship-resistance, weak-subjectivity and PBS with crList would be necessary.
Assuming no network eclipse, if you are running your own full node (need not be participating in the consensus), one can read all data from blockchain (advantage of โopen-stateโ architecture).
If relying on altruism, both ledger growth and long-term censorship-resistance will be guaranteed (here we are ignoring the censorship attack where a block does not get enough attestations because it contains a certain transaction).
@dannyryan
Under peer discovery, even if a node knows the node_id of the peers that can satisfy its sampling demands, how does theย node get the info on the IP addresses of the peers from whom it can sample? Does the dynamic nature of custodied_rows and custodied_columns makes it harder?
(Public goods, Unconditional trust assumption): On-chain state correctness for an address is an example. They are non-excludable and non-rivalrous with unconditional trust.
@colludingnode
There is whole line of work on putting a finality gadgets on top of longest chain protocols (which offer dynamic availability). Here are couple of them: ,
If there is no upper bound on how much stake can opt-into AVSx, someone being able to opt-into AVSx doesnโt prevent anyone else from being able to opt-into the AVSx.
(Public goods, Honest-minority assumption / adversary getting bankrupt if relying on rationality): Simple P2P transactions between two accounts is an example.
Wrote my first distributed systems project in Rust - Paxos. Here is the link to the repo: .
Thanks
@rustlang
for amplifying the various
#rustlang
resources. Also, big shout out to
@ryan_levick
for his tutorial video on threads that motivated me to do it.
Is there an one word for the event when you tell a joke which the listener doesn't find funny and then you ask whether the joke was boring to which the same listener laughs hysterically? Is the word
#poorjoke
?
(Club goods, Honest-minority assumption / adversary getting bankrupt under rational model): Example is the ability to opt into an AVSx in EigenLayer that specifies only stakers with rETH can opt-into it. It is excludable and non-rivalrous.
@colludingnode
Single confirmation rule-based ledgers can give you either liveness/dynamic availability or safety/finality under network partition but not both. Dual confirmation rule-based ledgers break that limitation.
It is excludable because the AVSx is excluding stakers holding any other token from opting-into it. Furthermore, long-term censorship-resistance is needed to ensure that any staker is able to opt-into this AVSx eventually. So we have the same trust assumption as the previous e.g.
Anyone in the social consensus who is provided with the pre-transition state, the transactions being executed and the rules for state transition can be convinced unconditionally whether a particular on-chain state transition is wrong or right.
@superphiz
@Jasper_ETH
@ether_fi
Problem is this leads to an employer-employee relationship. How do you ensure that these validators arenโt now incentivized to always support the payerโs position so that they can keep getting paid?
Given that you have to be part of a committee to have the ability to be able to raise a fraudproof makes it excludable. Furthermore, long-term censorship-resistance in L1 is warranted for being able to submit the fraudproof.
@aeyakovenko
What happens to the price of the L1 tokens in the swap transactions in between the loan tx and repayment tx? Seems like complete devaluation.
(Private goods, Honest-minority assumption / adversary getting bankrupt under rational model): Ability to submit a fraudproof in the slow mode of a rollup only if you are part of a committee is an example. It is excludable and rivalrous.
One account being able to get on-chain state correctness doesnโt mean some other account canโt have on-chain state correctness. Therefore, non-rivalrous.
@amytongwu
Soon enough best builders will be deploying their own infrastructure innovation (aka middlewares) permissionly using restaking paradigm
@eigenlayer
.
#openInnovation
(b) if the setup phase for the AVS is designed properly, any attempt to raise fradulent challenges will incur cost to an adversarial challenger in the form of challenge bond (referred to as CPF). This is because no one in social consensus will accept the challenge and hence, the
2/ Mantle is a new generation L2 network that derives security from
@Ethereum
via rollups and uses a modular approach to build a separate data availability layer with one of our partners
@EigenLayer
. Hyperscaled throughput on heavy-duty applications is now possible.
@bbuddha_xyz
@pmcgoohanCrypto
One can probably incentivize detection of premature decryption by giving rewards if someone can present pre-image before the scheduled decryption.
We then propose the
#first
proof-of-stake protocol using verifiable delay functions that achieves true dynamic availability and unpredictability while being secure under honest majority.
Combination of both these points will ensure that forks are raised only if intersubjective faults can be attributed beyond a reasonable doubt, which lends to rarity.
A question on EVM that has been bugging me for a while:
Why is zerobyte priced differently from nonzerobyte in a CALLDATA?
Any help appreciated.
@solidity_lang
@ethereum
We first discuss how existing proof-of-stake protocols like
#Ouroboros
#SnowWhite
#SleepyModelOfConsensus
are vulnerable to costless simulation attack where the computation of verifiable random function can be simulated by an adversary without any cost.
@colludingnode
That is the part of dual confirmation rule for Ethereum in order to self-heal from network partition. Under network partition, LMD Ghost keeps going on (dynamic available) while Casper FFG stops finalizing until inactivity leak slashes enough inactive stake.
Therefore, the fork that is considered to be canonical by social consensus will always have the correct on-chain state as per the rules of state transition. Hence, no address can be excluded from having on-chain state correctness.
@mikeneuder
@soispoke
@metachris
Given that getHeader doesnโt check the identity of the caller, that also means the relay can be subjected to DOS by getting it to respond with the current highest-bid header, no? How do relays currently safeguard against that?
@moodlezoup
If there is a mechanism to do forced inclusion via Ethereum to ensure censorship-resistance of the rollup, this would break the privacy guarantees of the sealed-bid auction. Maybe a decentralized sequencing network for privacy-first zk rollup would help.
@moodlezoup
Nice work! I was thinking more about the concern raised on overcollaterization at the end of the article. An alternate idea could be to conduct the sealed-bid auction in a privacy-first zk rollups. One issue would be potential censorship by the sequencer.
Other PoS uses social consensus for resolving the issue of determining canonical fork under private adversarial attack. Babylon uses bitcoin timestamp to resolve this attack.