Time to make this official: I am thrilled to announce that I will be joining the faculty of the Department of Geography
@UF
this fall! So excited to join such a stellar department! Flor-i-da!
It breaks my heart to realize that the greatest beneficiaries of the coups in the Sahel may not be in Niamey, Ouaga or Bamako but in the Liptako, Parc du W, and creeping along the borders of northern Benin, Ghana and Togo, as our maps suggest. All the Jihadists have to do is wait
As Nigeria flexes its muscle, let's not forget that 40% of violent events and more than half of the fatalities recorded in NWAfrica by
@ACLEDINFO
from 21-22 were in Nigeria. Half of the Nigerian territory is currently in conflict. Diplomacy should prevail
Which regions have experienced the highest levels of violence in North and West Africa? Do conflicts cluster or spread across the region? And how do military interventions affect conflict from Dakar to N’Djamena? It's all here
Border regions are proportionally more dangerous than other regions in West Africa. 10% of the victims registered since the late 1990s were located within 10 km from a border
Violence tends to spread south, from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea. In this new
@SWAC_OECD
paper, we show that more than 10% of newly affected conflict zones are now located in the north of coastal countries,
West Africa has experienced 9 major holy wars (jihads) since the early 18th century, including the two currently underway in the Central Sahel and Lake Chad region. The last time a Jihadist insurgency was defeated militarily was in 1898, when Captain Gouraud captured Samori Touré
One of my favorites maps shows how each of the Sahelian sedentary cores is associated with a nomadic area in the Sahara. This organization has played a key role in the circulation of people, ideas and goods between North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea
There are 20 large border markets between Niger and Nigeria. This
@SWAC_OECD
map shows how much time it takes to travel from any market in northern Nigeria. Border closures - not to mention war - will considerably affect regional integration in the Sahel
Very happy to announce that we've just signed a contract to edit the Routledge Handbook of African Borderlands! This 27-chapter book is a collaborative project of
@AborneNetwork
bringing 45 border scholars from Africa, North America and Europe together
Ten years ago, who would have thought that (central) Chad would be the only island of relative stability in an otherwise war-torn region extending from Bamako to Addis Ababa?
All I hear from West African policy makers at the moment is 'The West must give us more weapons or we'll ask the Russians'. As if the region needed more weapons. As if insurgencies could be defeated militarily. As if Jihadist weapons were not looted from state arsenals
Isolated clusters of violence have started to coalesce in West Africa. Our new spatial indicator of political violence developed with
@SWAC_OECD
shows that more than half of the Nigerian territory is affected by one type of conflict or another in 2020
Niger’s economy has always been intricately linked to Nigeria. The rice supply chain that connects the two countries, for example, depends on 2000 traders based in border markets, as
@LeenaHoffmann
,
@PaulMelly2
and
@SWAC_OECD
demonstrated
Border delays, checkpoints and road conditions reduce accessibility in West Africa - This new paper published in JTG measures what the accessibility of border cities would be if they were removed
West Africa is one of the most expensive regions to do business in the world, due to poor road conditions, roadblocks and border delays Burkina, Mali and Niger’s withdrawal from
#ECOWAS
can only make things worse for the majority of the Sahelian population
Côte d’Ivoire is building a new cross-border bridge in Chache to facilitate trade between Bouna (🇨🇮) and Bole (🇬🇭). To my knowledge, this is the only bridge on the Black Volta between Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Burkina. Africa needs better infrastructure
Border scholars should develop common protocols to collect and analyze border-related data. Africa is leading the way with the
@UNDP
Borderlands Data Forum
Formal trade has abruptly stopped beween Niger and its neighbors. In Gaya, hundreds of trucks are waiting at the border, loaded with agricultural products (credit: M. Koné)
Blaming France and
#ECOWAS
for everything that went wrong in the Sahel cannot be a long-term development strategy. What some of the poorest countries in the world, like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, need the most is better schools, hospitals, roads and jobs
Some personal news: I am thrilled to share that after 7 fantastic years
@jborderstudies
, I will be joining
@Pol_Geog_Jl
as Associate Editor, with a particular focus on quantitative methods, conflict studies and/or Africa
Hundreds of passengers and trucks are still stranded at the Benin-Niger border due to the current political crisis. On the Nigerien side, in Gaya, the queue is several miles long (credit: M. Koné)
3 landlocked countries quit ECOWAS. This is really bad. One of ECOWAS' key missions is/was to provide access to the Gulf of Guinea to Sahelian imports and exports
The first paper of our special issue on Security and Trade in African Borderlands was published by
@dalmar_thompson
in
@jborderstudies
last week Six more papers will follow!
Benin and Togo have closed their borders to pastoralists from the Sahel. This study from
@lasdel_labo
describes the consequences of this policy of forced sedentarization carried out officially to combat terrorism
The combined military intervention of Nigeria and the MNJTF against Boko Haram neither eliminated nor relocated violence. Violence tends to persist at lower levels around specific places for longer durations around Lake Chad
West Africa has been affected by three major waves of jihad in 300 years. The current one is the most dangerous because the transnational expansion of Muslim identity challenges the legitimacy of postcolonial states, as Bill Miles explains here
Woah. I have received 36 proposals for this special issue on security and trade in African borderlands, from Casablanca to Cape Town, and from Gambia to Gisenyi. A big thank you to everyone for making this call so successful
This interesting new paper by
@Chris_W_Blair
suggests that border fortification encourages insurgents to launch indirect attacks and develop cooperative relations with civilians
I am saddened by the number of Sahel experts who believe that an imperfect democracy is reason enough to justify a military coup. What did Churchill say about democraties again?
Very happy to introduce the Spatial Conflict Dynamics Indicator (SCDi) of Political Violence with
@SteveRadil
, David Russell and Marie Trémolières in
@terpolv
. A big thanks to
@ACLEDINFO
for the data
Our new report maps the changing rivalries and alliances among state forces, rebels, extremist organisations and their victims in 21 North and West African countries since 1997
Our paper "Introducing the Spatial Conflict Dynamics Indicator of Political Violence" is now available in print in
@terpolv
. There are 50 free online copies here:
Tomorrow at the Munich Security Conference
@SWAC_OECD
will present its latest report: the largest assessment ever conducted of
#conflict
patterns in border regions, combining data on events and victims across North and West Africa.
#MSC2022
#MunSecConf
Border Studies at 45: As we approach a metaphorical middle age, it is time to invest our energies into developing common theoretical and methodological frameworks
Discover
#SWAC_OECD
's new “Cities” collection on the role of border towns for
#regionalintegration
in
#WestAfrica
. The research looks at the economic & institutional obstacles facing border towns and offers place-based policy options.
#AUNiamey2019
This new
@SWAC_OECD
report examines whether borderlands are more violent than other regions, how the intensity of border violence has changed over time, which borderlands are the most violent, and why violence emerges near borders
New report in the
#WestAfricanPapers
series on “Military coups, jihadism and insecurity in the Central Sahel” by Alexander Thurston (
@sahelblog
), who analyses the Sahelian coups of 2020-23 and the trajectories of
#jihadism
and
#insecurity
👉
Alienating Western and multinational donors is a risky strategy in the Sahel. In 2021, Niger received $1800 million from rich countries and multilateral institutions, or 12% of its GDP, according to the OECD
#TBT
In the lead up to the launch of
#Africa
's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020, discover the top 3⃣ ways supports policy makers in making Africa's cities of the future more resilient, inclusive and sustainable
#AfUD2020
#DevMatters
The Sahel military juntas want to leave ECOWAS, not UEMOA. Perhaps they remember Malian president Keïta and his painful experience of building monetary sovereignty without a strong economy. Faced with enormous difficulties, Mali appealed to France and returned to the FCFA in '84
Mobility patterns around Lake Chad suggest that Boko Haram is highly fragmented. Our new paper with
@rafaelprietoc
and Neave O’Clery also identifies key routes frequently traveled by separate BH cells, possibly across borders
In West Africa, capital cities attract more than 90% of formal businesses crucial to regional integration. We argue that this is bad news for national cohesion in this
@SWAC_OECD
paper
Just got word that our paper "Mapping international co-authorship networks in border studies" with
@klatt_mk
and Freerk Boedeltje was accepted for publication in
@jborderstudies
!
So cool to have our special issue on security and trade in African borderlands in
@jborderstudies
in hand. With contributions from
@SteveRadil
, Ian Irmischer, Martin Doevenspeck,
@Deen1000
,
@ulibeisel
, Samuel Akakpo, Daniel K. Thompson, and Martin Evans
My take on Michel Foucher's article on the artificiality of African borders is out in
@jborderstudies
Foucher's paper and Anthony Asiwaju's response will follow...