Dos teorías: Gob de EEUU se convenció de que gob de Maduro se volvió más frágil con el Coronavirus, o, gob de EEUU se convenció que la reelección de Trump en la FL se volvió más frágil con el Coronavirus.
Except for Boric, unimpressive performance by LatinAm presidents at the UN. Too much sesentismo (60s discourse). Bolsonaro: the left is a threat; Arce/Petro: the US is the threat. Bukele: Only I can make my nation sovereign. Boring stuff. No wonder people pay no attention to LAC.
One reason Russia is supporting the status quo in Vzla is that Russia is actually profiting from Vzla's collapse. Here's one more example. There is a correlation between Vzla's oil production decline, and Russia's oil exports increase.
Re Ecuador and Gangs. Here's why it is so difficult to address the security threat posed by gangs anywhere in Latin America. Gangs combine power assets associated with traditional security threats, but with innovations. Thread.
In many Latin American countries, the problem is democratic deficits. In Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, the problem is autocratic surpluses. For me, the difference is clear.
No me convence mucho eso de que las sanciones de EEUU van a crear más hambre. Las únicas sanciones q crean hambre en Vzla son las q Maduro impone: controles de precio, destrucción de PDVSA, monopolios militares, y rienda suelta a los colectivos. Ésas sí son sanciones.
I'm with the protesters. AMLO wants the new electoral authority to be determined by majority vote. Sounds democratic but in reality, it is anti-democratic. Let me explain why. via
@WSJ
Guaidó has managed to make the Chavista govt panic for its life, three times now. He has demonstrated to Chavistas that they will never, ever feel secure in power. Always in red alert. A very different scenario from the complacent Chavismo of 2005-2018.
Peru’s democracy handled the attempted self coup better than the US. Castillo was repudiated by his cabinet, was impeached, and then arrested. In the US the coup leader completed his term in office, became party king, and lives freely in a FL mansion.
The big story in Bolivia is not so much the role of the military, but of Intl institutions: the OAS. They busted the govt, forced them to accept an audit, produced a devastating report, and provoked serious defections by the ruling party. It unraveled the govt. That’s power.
Why do autocracies hold elections and referenda? The two most important reasons are to signal something to the opposition and to acquire information. If so..,
El éxodo de Vzla tiene parecidos con Cuba. Casi el 10% de Cuba salió en 1959-63, seguido de 4 olas posteriores. La diferencia principal: Castro siempre controlaba salidas. Tenía algo de interés en retener cerebros. Maduro no. Su lema: Que se vayan todos
In China, I bet Venezuela is seen as its biggest overseas failure. No new loan to Vzla since 2015. Horrible vote of no confidence. From darling to pariah. This has got to hurt Maduro more than US sanctions. (And they still have to service their debt.)
@MyersMargaret
In Col, Per, Chi, Arg, or Bra, news of a president forcing a public official to create fake votes would have unleashed street protests, or at least, cacerolazos. US may have strong civil society and maybe institutions, but LatAm’s pro democracy civil society can be louder
On Ron DeSantis quitting. The US is having the least competitive primaries I have seen in my life. If you study Latin American politics, you can pretty much understand what's going on in the US, to some extent.
I have not seen a more impressive women’s movement than this one. They helped make Argentina democratic in the 1980s, pro human rights and pro quotas in the 90s, pro LGBT in the 2000s, and now pro choice. Women can change the world for the good of all.
External actors did not change Venezuelan politics to embolden the opposition. It was the reverse. The brave, peaceful, legalistic, and strategic actions of the opposition starting in 2015 emboldened external actors to side with the opposition.
Vzla's Juan Guaidó is not an outsider, but a groomed politician. Not a party-trasher, but a party leader; not a coup plotter but a constitutional strategist. Old-fashioned institutionalism doing democratization, as we speak.
With the defeat of Bolsonaro and Trump (and the checks on Correa by Moreno in Ecu and Uribe by Santos in Col), we could say that the Western Hemisphere features some of the world’s most important cases of containment of democratic backsliding.
Re-reading old classics. This oped from 2016 reminds us that the person in the Americas who perfected the idea of electoral denialism (I did not lose the election; there was fraud against me) was not Trump, or Bolsonaro, but AMLO
Great news. For the next 2 weeks was starting today, Cambridge is offering free access. Free downloads, everyone! Great for your syllabus: Short intro to the topic, with a comparison to abortion rights. Get it now.
Remember when Hugo Chávez created armed reservistas (2005) and milicias (2008), while the adoring left called him good for democracy? Hopefully this crowd now sees parallels. Presidents who promote armed civilians are never good democracy.
Elected newcomers in the Americas: Not too many happy endings. They don't often pacify. They often turn into (semi) dictators, or hyper corrupt, or both. Many experience early termination. There are exceptions, of course.
@MarianaLlanosHa
@leivm_academic
@jpolga
@aperezli
Re Peru: I wish the press would talk less about the pink tide and more about how the Castro-admiring pink presidents are all deep down auto-golpistas, anti constitution, and anti democratic.
The May 2018 election in Venezuela was the most irregular in the history of Chavismo, and that's saying a lot. In this 2018 paper I summarize all electoral irregularities committed in 20 years of chavismo, broken down by year, type, and effect.
Senator, let me teach you some Spanish: cese de la usurpación. Now repeat after me, cese de la usurpación. That’s all you need to say. How hard is that?
The people of Venezuela are enduring a serious humanitarian crisis. The Maduro government must put the needs of its people first, allow humanitarian aid into the country, and refrain from violence against protesters.
Latin America’s dilemma.
Low tax collection —>
underfunded states —>
bad public services —>
social discontent —>
repression —>
unwillingness to pay taxes for govts that are broke/inept/mean.
We’ve been studying this trap since the early 1990s
In Latin America, we just saw two ways to erode democracy today. In Brazil, members of the military police smiling, taking selfies, and welcoming Bolsonarista mobsters. And in Colombia, Petro smiling and welcoming Venezuela's mobster in chief. Hasta cuándo.
Amazing reporting. How China, Chávez and Boliburgueses used dollars, obtained from oil sales to the US, for self-gain. This occurred when Chavismo controlled all institutions in Vzla, including Congress. No accountability = no development.
Chávez, more so than Maduro, destroyed Vzla's PDVSA. Comparison with Col:
Ven: Despite increases in reserves, PDVSA production declines, but employment surges. Rating: 1 star
Col: despite having less oil, production surges while employment grows at a reasonable pace. 5 stars
5000 arrests in Cuba. In Brazil in 2015, when millions took to the streets to protest the government for various weeks, there were what, 100 arrests? Oh Yeah, the US embargo is the real problem in Cuba.
Venezuela is in the midst of a major oil spill, the second in the last year. It's also cancelling political parties, yet again. These are two sides of the same coin.
We argue that the rise of socially-conservative, homophobic, religious-flaunting populist movement is a predictor of forthcoming democratic backsliding. The argument also applies to countries where Islam is dominant: Erdoğan in Türkiye (since 2014), Saied in Tunisia (since 2021).
Thoughts on Venezuela’s foreign policy and Guyana. The concept of petro-aggression was best established by Jeff Colgan. How does Venezuela fit the theory? Pretty well, with caveats. See thread.
When expresidents refuse to retire, they generate allergies. In Bra this allergic reaction is now overwhelming the country. XPs need to be stopped, but selective whitchhunt is not the way. A ban on repeated re-election is a better solution.
Peru has it all: All the (thr)ills of presidential politics in LatAm. Good luck tyring to explain this in an undergraduate course in the US (and even in Peru)? See 🧵
Bolivia, dos modos de ver lo mismo:
A) los militares dieron un golpe.
B) los militares optaron por no dar un golpe contra el pueblo, es decir, optaron por no acompañar a un gobierno que hizo trampa, que nunca se disculpó, y que hubiera tenido que seguir reprimiendo.
These are the kind of people who imposed Castro-Chavismo in Venezuela: More than 700 companies in FL today are owned or managed by former high-ranking chavistas, including 232 members of the military.
Another way to look at this, the opposition in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua is weaker today than before the start of the Trump administration in 2017. Embargoes + White House incompetence hurt the opposition more than dictators
@frrodriguezc
La vicepresidenta Francia Márquez no cree que Cuba es una dictadura. Dice que Colombia sí lo es. Aquí el interesante fragmento de su entrevista con SEMANA
With Castillo, Latin America and the Caribbean now has 24 cases of interrupted presidencies since 1985 (counting only those who came to power via elections). All cases are different. But here are some commonalities (and differences)
Contrary to what many think, Trump has actually strengthened Maduro, fractured the opposition, and weakened the international coalition against Maduro. He can sound tough but he has delivered weakness
Bukele is expected to win a massive re-election in ElS. What do we know about presidents who win re-election with a large margin of victory in Latam? Here are the top re-election winners since the 1980s. Except in DR, what follows is not stronger democracy, or even democracy.
Caracas in 1976. The country was so wealthy that its airport was one of the busiest in Latin America. Air France chose Caracas as one of its destinations for the Concorde. In aviation, there was no prestige greater than that back then.
What's the relationship between Presidents and their former sponsors? Everyone wants to know re: Sheinbaum/AMLO. Well, it's complicated. Sometimes they become allies, other times, mortal enemies. See below (deceased = sponsor dies).
Huge controversy in Vzla regarding new ruling 002-2021 requiring NGOs to register with the state to prove their innocence.
Hmm.
Sounds a lot like one of Cuba's most repressive articles from its Código Penal, also requiring NGOs to register with the state, or else...
Copycat.
Cuba just approved Same Sex Marriage. No doubt, huge progress in one of the most homophobic revolutions ever. But let’s not get carried away. Here’s the problem. Short thread.
Worth repeating: No (Independent) Courts, No Democracy. Courts are emerging as key actors in LatAm blocking presidents, expresidents and their spouses from breaking the law and seeking re-election. They are helping the region fight strongman politics
Los 60s están de moda en los populistas de AmLat:
Bolsonaro celebra golpe '64
AMLO de camino a dejar de exportar petróleo, lo que sucedió en Méx por 1era vez en '66
Maduro quiere recrear crisis de los misiles '62
Morales imita re-eleccionismo de Paz Estenssoro '64
Hacia atrás.
Argentina's 2nd round. Thoughts on continuismo. I understand the anguish. I understand that Massa represents the worst govt in Arg's history. I understand that Milei represents a crazy gunman. I undertand feeling trapped. But, here's something to think about, if you haven't yet
Argentina continues to defy theory. Theory predicts that democracies typically generate moderate but stable growth. There is nothing moderate or stable in Argentina since its democratic transition. Econ busts in particular are extreme, frequent, or both.
Conclusion, Latin American states are experiencing a new high in terms of security threat. No previous security threat compares with the level and complexity of the security threat posed by gangs. Security threats in this new era of Gang Warfare is like nothing before.
Routes to democratic backsliding:
1) change the const to favor the president
2) capture the supreme court
3) tinker with electoral authorities
4) colonize the bureaucracy
AMLO has not been able to take routes 1 and 2, so he is focusing on 3 and 4.
Colombia’s front-runner Gustavo Petro has said he would re-establish relations with Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro. But what does this mean? There are at least four possible models. See short thread.
US policy toward Venezuela seems to not matter. Sanctions didn't work. Engagement seems not to work. Everything has been tried; nothing has prevented the rise of autocracy, since 1999. See thread
via
@bpolitics
Milei is trying to say he is an outsider (self myth) and indispensable (here we go) to punish everyone (“que se vayan todos” is back). In the Americas, we have experience with outsiders: Chávez, Trump, Morales, Castillo, Bucaram, Aristide. Sure, those episodes went well.
🇦🇷 Javier Milei: "A Argentina solo la puede arreglar un outsider, nosotros armamos esto para entrar y sacarlos a todos con una patada en el culo, se acabó la joda..."
I think any high-school student doing Model UN would do better. Comments like: peace is hard (duh), both countries made the decision to go to war (really?), Europe and the US are promoting the war (what about sanctions), etc., only show that Lula lacks both depth and knowledge.
Lula volta a comentar invasão russa à Ucrânia. “Decisão da guerra foi tomada por dois países”.
Em entrevista coletiva na madrugada deste domingo (16), presidente do Brasil repetiu que EUA e Europa contribuem para a continuidade do conflito.
Assista ▶️
Let's stop the narrative that the US is an unusual case of a saved democracy. Since the 80s LatAm has had 21 crises leading to presidential interruptions, each endangering democracy. In all, constitutional order was restored. That democracy won in US was great, but not unique.
If I had to compile a list of the top 5 rules that most certainly yield dictatorship and ruin policy quality, indefinite re-election would certainly be on it.
In an autocracy, corruption probes don’t mean corruption probes. The rule of law is not being advanced. It’s the opposite. It’s autocratic legalism on steroids, a new chance for the autocrat to purge, to go for the kill, and get away with more corruption.
Here I try to show how the for policies of Vzlan actors are shaping the intl response. LatAm govts are not opposing Vzla because they are on the right; they are on the right now, and criticizing Venezuela, in response to what Vzla did to their country
China did it, apparently. Implications:
1) Chi is calling the shots in Vzla--wow
2) finally provoking some transparency--wow
3) intent on having Vzla comply with IMF, the symbol of savage neoliberalism--wow
4) in order to defend a most illiberal govt--wow
Nos quedamos sin palabras viendo este clip oficial del gob de Maduro. Una apología a la destrucción del mayor capital natural de Venezuela. Neo-extractivismo depredador puro y crudo. Según, así será el futuro del ya triste país que han dejado.
Democratic backsliding is still happening, but we might be entering a new era. A good name could be: illiberal resilience. If a regime becomes illiberal, escape chances are low. Democratic springs are now rare (Pol excepted); autocratic resilience, common
In Central America, we have loud democratic backsliders (Nic & ELS), but also more slow-creep backsliders: Guatemala. Their actions don't attract headlines but are terrible nonetheless.
Esto es una maravilla. Vengan a este Zoom. Conversaremos con David Altman, uno de los colaboradores principales de V-Dem sobre su último informe. En español. No se lo pierdan.
@CharlemosLA
@daltmano
@policentrica
Peru and outsiders: 15 newcomers have become presidents in the Americas, including Trump. Here's their record:
5 became semi-authoritarian
4 left office prematurely
2 carried out or tried self coups
2 sought refuge abroad on charges of corruption
1 pleaded guilty to corruption
Those who argue that all that all the US wants in Vzla is oil may not understand this dynamic:
Vzla' oil collapse ->
less OPEC production ->
oil price increases ->
more incentives to produce shale oil in US ->
less interest by the US in Vzla oil.
More than 7M Venezuelans have left. This has positive consequences for authoritarian rule. (Half of Venezuelan households have relatives abroad; 1/3 of those households receive remittances, often in US$). Less need for the government to worry about providing welfare.