We
@CrisisGroup
have a new report on Taiwan out today❗
A lot of the discourse around preventing war over Taiwan has been focused on the military piece of the equation. We look at the other piece - the political.
Our takeaways 🧵 : 1/
A quick look at China's immediate responses to Speaker Pelosi's arrival in Taiwan.
1. The language used in the statements is fairly typical--not particularly inflammatory--and continues to emphasize that time is "firmly in our hands" wrt Taiwan. This is Beijing's way of .. 1/
Prelim thoughts: China’s new Taiwan White Paper
While basic principles to CH’s approach on TW are same, details suggest CH's “One Country Two Systems” may involve less political autonomy for TW than before, making an untenable political proposition even more untenable for TW 1/
Aug 5 Chinese countermeasures for Pelosi visit to TW
- More median line crossings
- Pelosi sanctioned
- US-China exchanges cut
- Shaping narrative for domestic and external audiences 1/
signaling confidence over the TW issue, and suggests they are not in a hurry to "reunify."
2. Mil responses appear much more escalatory, the announced Aug 4-7 exercises seem to extend into TW's territorial waters and maybe even internal waters credit to
@duandang
@Nrg8000
2/
Our new
@CrisisGroup
report on the China-India border dispute is out today!
One aspect we look into is the logic behind China's decision to escalate along the disputed border in 2020, in ways that mirror 🇨🇳's approach w the Philippines in the SCS and Taiwan 1/
Gen. Milley orders a review of all interactions between the U.S. and Chinese militaries in the last five years in the SCS and beyond, following recent reports from the U.S., Australia, and Canada of dangerous aerial intercepts by the PLA
U.S. strategy on China has shifted from "compete, cooperate, and confront" to "invest, align, and compete," an approach that prioritizes shaping the strategic environment that China operates in over and above engaging China itself.
The party appears to be using a new phrase to describe its Taiwan policy - the Party’s Overall Strategy for Solving the Taiwan Issue in the New Era (新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略). This expression appeared in the Sixth Plenum Resolution in November 2021. 2/
This is likely just the beginning of a series of countermeasures from Beijing.
For more on the context and calculations of the key actors see our latest: 11/
The MFA statement says Pelosi's visit "in any form and for any reason is an escalation of official exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwan and a major political provocation." 3/
The policy content of this new phrase remains to be seen, but suggests Beijing wants to show it is taking the initiative on Taiwan in the face of what it sees as growing obstacles to its goal of reunification. 5/
- Continues to place responsibility on the U.S. executive branch to prevent the visit
- Taiwan authorities are pushing for "incremental Taiwan independence" 4/
More significant part of Biden's 60 min interview is his view that "TW makes their own judgments about their independence." Long-standing policy is that the US does not support TW independence and is opposed to unilateral changes from either side.
Aug 4 China’s countermeasures to Pelosi’s visit
-Missile tests, median line crossings, drones
-More DDos attacks on TW websites
-Taiwanese citizen arrested in China on pro-independence charges
-TAO calls out TW rep to US Hsiao Bi-khim 1/
and with the Biden administration ..
- Attracting allies and forming a gang to play the TW card against China
- Attacking UN Resolution 2758
- Spreading the "fallacy" that Taiwan's status is unsettled
- Internationalization of the TW problem 6/
Here's a great overlay of the area where the announced exercises will take place from
@duandang
as compared with the ones that took place in 1996 in the last crisis. Coordinates here: 9/
China's military exercises around Taiwan in August 2022 and March 1996 (Third Taiwan Strait crisis). This time, some exercise areas overlap with Taiwan's territorial waters, an apparent escalation.
Taiwan Affairs Office statement is where we find language that the "time and trend of realizing the reunification of the motherland are always firmly in our hands."
Also lists grievances it has with Congress (passing many "negative" Taiwan bills)
5/
Earlier in the day there was:
- announcement of SU-35 jets crossing the TW Strait that TW denied
- ban of 100 TW food products
- cyber attacks on TW govt websites 10/
Two notables from China’s readout on Xi-Biden mtg as addtl info & statements trickle out:
1) Military communications are resuming – very positive
2) Section on what 🇨🇳 seeks from 🇺🇸 on Taiwan is more concrete, less fire and fury 1/
Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Yang used this phrase yesterday at the annual Taiwan Work Conference. Notably, he did not reference the “one-China principle” in his speech and emphasized risks and challenges in the TW Strait situation. 3/
Eastern Theater Command says PLA will conduct joint air and sea exercises to the north, southwest, and southeast of Taiwan, as well as conduct long-range live fire tests in the Strait, and regular missile tests to the east 常导火力试射 (?) 8/
Former dep. director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Sun Yafu recently said that Beijing would put forward new policy decisions and arrangements 新的决策部署 and new propositions 新主张 on Taiwan at the 20th Party Congress. 4/
Defense ministry says the PLA will "launch a series of targeted military operations to counter" the actions of the U.S. and the DPP authorities in TW 7/
In this
@CrisisGroup
Q&A on the recent spike in China's military activities around Taiwan, I reflect on what Beijing hopes to achieve through its military signaling, and whether this tactic has paid off. 🧵 1/
Beijing's moderated response to the Tsai-McCarthy mtg so far suggests that it recognizes the change of venue to the U.S. and relatively low-profile nature of Tsai's visit as the compromise it was intended to be.
Beijing is likely also wary of the awkward position... 1/
This shows confidence if the CCP believes itself to be on the rise long-term. However, if it feels it is peaking, then this line could also suggest anxiety.
Good recent piece from
@ryanl_hass
on this 14/
Taiwan extends compulsory military service from 4 months to 1 yr, overhauls training (incl operating portable anti-tank, anti-air weapons), in an important step towards defense reform
"Only by preparing for war can we avoid war"
Tsai's full speech 👇
Continuing with this given interest
Aug 3 announced responses from Beijing to Pelosi's visit included:
- Wang Yi statement
- Commentaries from PLA and in People’s Daily
- Taiwan Affairs Office calls out Tsai directly
- Addtl economic sanctions 12/
A quick look at China's immediate responses to Speaker Pelosi's arrival in Taiwan.
1. The language used in the statements is fairly typical--not particularly inflammatory--and continues to emphasize that time is "firmly in our hands" wrt Taiwan. This is Beijing's way of .. 1/
Our piece on the foreign policy implications of the 20th Party Congress report, w discussion of China’s darker reading of its external environment, its foreign and defense policy objectives, and approach to Taiwan. With
@Kwekii
Thanks
@cnni
for having me on to discuss the risks of Pelosi's potential visit to Taiwan. Yesterday's Xi-Biden call was a positive first step toward preventing a crisis but Washington and Beijing can do more ...
Stay tuned for more recs
Significant - on the eve of TW's elections, Beijing has taken the risky move of resuming tariffs on 12 out of the 539 TW exports to China designated to be tariff-free under ECFA.
By adopting a partial suspension rather than a complete one, Beijing is signaling to TW that it ...
Starting from January 1, 2024, the tariff rates under ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) between Chinese mainland and Taiwan will no longer apply to the importation of 12 products from the Taiwan island, including propylene and ortho-xylene, the Customs Tariff
Very interesting line:
“Never before have we been so close to, confident in, and capable of achieving the goal of national rejuvenation. The same is true when it comes to our goal of complete national reunification” 13/
2. Taiwan – Continuing to create wedge btwn DPP/ ”secessionists” and the rest of TW — sticks for the former, carrots for the latter. Language around “Two Systems” no longer says Beijing will not send troops and administrative personnel to Taiwan, language that existed before 4/
Paper is directed at multiple audiences w diff goals:
1. Domestic - Burnishing XJP’s legacy on TW ahead of 20PC to strengthen his political position; the publication of this paper might have been moved up due to Pelosi’s visit; likely originally targeted for 20PC 3/
3. External - Rhetoric emphasizing CCP’s efforts to peacefully resolve the issue w TW, historic roots of its claims of sovereignty over TW, and “intl consensus” around OCP and UN Res 2758 are all continuing attempts to drive wedge between pro-TW US/ Western countries and... 5/
Aug 6-7 Chinese countermeasures for Pelosi’s visit to TW
Last update, barring major developments
- Median line activity
- Simulated blockade and attack N, S, E of TW
- Drones, ADIZ
- CH insists world on its side 1/
A newly empowered Xi has chosen to use the political strength he has consolidated at home to begin to stabilize the U.S.-China relationship, showing more flexibility than previously. Plenty of differences remain, but this was a positive step.
1/
Skipping over history section except to say this paper cements critical role that UN Res 2758 plays in CH’s narrative on TW which increasingly frames the OCP as part of intl law & order (Qin Gang oped)
For more see
@BonnieGlaser
@jessicadrun
paper 7/
The Tsai-McCarthy mtg and China’s military response were damaging to peace and stability. But, the episode could have played out in worse ways. This time, all three tried to reduce the level of provocation of their actions.
Our analysis 👇
... countries that tend to view the Pelosi episode as unnecessarily risky and who have no interest in taking a stance on the TW issue at the cost of their econ relationship with CH. 6/
Chinese readout of Xi-Putin mtg appears partly an effort to address domestic criticism of Xi's decision to align so closely with Russia, by showing more explicitly what China is getting out of it -- Russian strategic alignment on TW -- on eve of 20 PC
TW says total 68 PLA aircraft + 13 vessels around the TW Strait
Of those, 10 Chinese navy ships and 20 military aircraft crossed median line in morning, accd to Reuters
MND:
So far, no CH statement on median line activities 2/
PLA dispatched 68 aircraft and 13 vessels until 17:00 (UTC+8) for the activities around Taiwan Strait, part of which had crossed the median line and jeopardized the status quo of the strait.
New commentary from my colleagues and I that looks at national responses--including China's--to the Ukraine crisis.
On China: Beijing’s instinct is to understand the Ukraine crisis largely through the lens of its confrontation with Washington. 1/
Basic principles incl:
1. Peaceful reunification remains Beijing’s preference, use of force is still an option they reserve
2. One China Principle (OCP)
3. One Country Two Systems (OCTS)
2/
Again, how the optics of Pelosi's visit are managed is critical to crisis management in this moment. The more publicity and unnecessary leaks from officials about her itinerary and what will or will not happen will contribute to tensions, short and long-term in the TW Strait
Reunification “only way to avoid risk of TW being invaded & occupied again by foreign countries, to foil attempts of external forces to contain CH"
= It's about CH's rise, not only natl humiliation, but also strategic interests, ie breaking thru 1st island-chain 12/
Hou has conceded the race in Taiwan's presidential elections. The DPP has won a historic third consecutive term. However, Lai is set to win with only 40% of the vote.
Join me on BBC at 9 pm Taiwan time for post-election analysis
1993 paper said "high-degree of autonomy" incl:
- administrative, legislative, independent judicial, final adjudication rights
- autonomy over party, govt, mil, econ, financial matters
- CH will not send troops or govt personnel
- Unofficial exchanges w foreign govts ok 19/
Each leader, Mao to Hu, gets one para on their achievements, Xi’s section is a bit longer
Becomes clearer the “overall policy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era” announced Nov 2021 partly about burnishing Xi’s legacy on TW by giving his TW policies a rebranding 9/
Sun Yafu, former dep dir of TW Affairs Office in Aug 12 interview tries to manage domestic expectations:
"Even if we have the ability to militarily block and control Taiwan, we will still work hard to strive for peaceful reunification"
h/t
@niubi
1/
Lack of details on "Two Systems," compared with 1993 2000 papers suggest an arrangement that might involve less political and legal autonomy for TW
2022 white paper says TW would maintain “current social system” and “high degree of autonomy." 17/
Readout from 🇨🇳 Vice FM Ma and 🇷🇺 Deputy FM Rudenko mtg:
"[I]t is necessary to... communicate and synchronize in a timely manner, ensure the stable and long-term relationship btwn the two countries, and safeguard the common interests of both sides"
Communist Party has worked hard to solve the Taiwan question peacefully, incl by promoting X-Strait dialogue, giving TWnese in China preferential treatment, and delivering concrete $$ benefits 8/
Three batches of four drones entered waters off of Lieyu on Kinmen Island and near Beiding Island Aug 4 night; TW fired flares
Missed this before– TW said Aug 2 cyberattacks on govt bodies was 23x higher than previous record
5/
Calls out the DPP for adopting a “separatist stance” for refusing to recognize OCP, distorting & denying 92 Consensus, and the Tsai administration’s delicately worded phrase for X-Strait relations 互不隸屬 meaning that neither is subordinate to the other.
(This is not new) 15/
The U.S. also apparently now assesses China to have both the "intent" and "power" to reshape the international order--a shift from the Mar 2021 Interim Natl Security Guidance, which assessed China was "the only competitor potentially capable" of challenging the existing order.
Taiwan’s presidential election presents “a window of opportunity” to lower rising tensions,
@CrisisGroup
said in a report. It provided recommendations on how China and Lai Ching-te (if he wins) can seek to resume dialogue.
Thanks
@nytimes
for incl my views:
“In canceling all these exchanges..Beijing is really pulling away the last strings in an already threadbare relationship...It shows that there is little left...that Beijing can use to register its protests over TW.”
...a disproportionate response would put Ma, Macron, and von der Leyen in. All of them are currently in China.
The system has issued a slew of par-for-the-course statements condemning the mtg. 2/
a “deterrent exercise” - suggests there were nuclear subs. Also claims CH mil presence forced USS Reagan to retreat and Pelosi’s plane to detour
Speaking of, anyone seen Shandong aircraft carrier?
7/
It has been a good week for Chinese diplomacy
Honduras will switch ties from Taiwan to China. This will be the ninth diplomatic ally that China has taken from Taiwan since 2016, over half them from Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S.'s backyard.
Is this tactic working for Beijing?
The message of Beijing’s ire has certainly been received. But this show of mil power is more likely to strengthen arguments of the need to reduce Taiwan’s int'l isolation and strengthen its defenses—exactly what Beijing does not want… 8/
E Theater Command says continued actual combat joint exercises in the sea and air spaces N, SW, and E of Taiwan
Says on Aug 4 conducted over 100 sorties, incld fighter jets, bombers, early warning aircraft, tankers and... 3/
White House statement on Xi-Biden meeting is out. What is notable: 1) Looks like a series of working-level dialogues will resume on developing principles on managing competition and transnational challenges (incl climate change and the global economy).
If this is true, it shows how Beijing can use Pelosi’s visit to further other objectives, expanding and normalizing its military and paramilitary presence in the Taiwan Strait, including on the Taiwan side. Change the status quo using a crisis, just as in 2012 Senkaku crisis
#TAIWAN
SOURCE BRIEFED ON THE MATTER: ABOUT 10 CHINESE NAVY SHIPS TEMPORARILY CROSSED TAIWAN STRAIT MEDIAN LINE AND REMAIN CLOSE IN THE AREA FROM WED NIGHT TO THUR MIDDAY
Party officialdom talks about the policy as having begun in the 18th PC, when Xi took power, even though it was not announced till Nov 2021.
Xi’s TW policy is outlined in five parts, he is credited with adding to “theory on natl reunification”: 10/
A few thoughts on China's potential responses to Taiwan's elections.
A Lai win will produce the most tensions in the near term & more pressures are likely. But tensions may also follow a Hou win, further down the line.
Many thanks to
@WarOnTheRocks
For more on how an unintended collision could quickly escalate into a larger crisis, and the steps that Washington and Beijing should take to mitigate these risks, see our report on U.S.-China crisis management:
Beijing is actively boosting an image of itself as a peacemaker and therefore a credible alternative to U.S. leadership
But the Ukraine-Russia context is much less straightforward than the Saudi-Iran one, where the two parties were already interested in repairing relations
Managing domestic sentiment
State media trots out mil experts to highlight how unprecedented China’s response is; first time that drills are so closes to TW, encircles TW, missile tests in E, missile fired across TW, aircraft carrier formation conducted... 6/
Managing external narrative
- Amb Qin Gang op-ed makes bold claim that “one-China principle is part of the postwar international order and has become a general international consensus” 10/
sent more than 10 destroyers and navy escorts that carried out joint closure and control operations in the waters around Taiwan and swept missile test areas 4/
In a new
@CrisisGroup
report, we look at the risk of an unintended collision or misinterpreted signal in the U.S.-China relationship and outline ways the two sides can strengthen existing crisis management mechanisms. 1/
“External forces are using TW as a pawn to undermine China’s development and progress, and obstruct the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”
= U.S. also doesn’t care about TW, they’re using the issue to contain us (Also not new) 16/
MFA Hua Chunying links Pelosi’s visit to TW to US mil interventions in Yugoslavia, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and very distastefully says US treating sovereign countries like a George Floyd that can be killed through kneeling 11/
The U.S. continues to uphold the one-China policy, but its increasing unofficial cooperation w TW and encouragement to other govts to do the same is contributing to incremental changes to the status quo.
For more 👇 10/
Continues to emphasize the economic benefits of reunification – “backed up by the vast mainland market TW’s economy will enjoy broader prospects, become more competitive…” 21/
- Way of life “fully respected”; private property, religious beliefs, lawful rights & interests of ppl "fully protected”
- Can have econ and cultural exchanges w foreign govts 18/
-Promoting China’s rejuvenation & peaceful reunification
-Seeking innovation in a “Two Systems solution”
-Abiding by OCP
-Integrating cross-straits development
-Forging X-Strait ppl to ppl ties 11/
- G7 countries summoned in Beijing for a berating, statement for Canada as ex:
- 钧声in PLA Daily: Focuses on blaming Taiwan, calls Tsai out directly, for collusion w US, insisting on Pelosi going to TW
12/
Shandong aircraft carrier is operating E of TW
Law enforcement vessels are patrolling in the TW Strait
TW warned China may forcibly inspect TW commercial ships. But, doing so would undercut Beijing's current objective - to push cross-strait exchange ahead of elections 3/
& cooperation in repat. of illegal immigrants, criminal/legal, transnational crimes, drug control, and climate change
* Stopping DPCT and MMCA is extremely concerning given increase in dangerous encounters 9/
Countermeasures against US begin
- Pelosi and immediate fam sanctioned
-Cancellation of US-China exchanges, including phone call between theater command leaders, Defense Policy Coordination Talks, Maritime Military Consultative Agreement talks ... 8/
TW military expert Chieh Chung says new PLA flight paths around median line--in which PLA planes fly along the east side of the line for a distance before returning--increases risk of an unintended accident and represents a new form of lawfare
Taiwan draws a line in the sand, saying its definition of "first strike" now includes flights by Chinese aircraft and drones into its territorial airspace. In the past, an attack by artillery shells or missiles was considered a "first strike."
This suggests China has limited tools when responding to a Biden admin TW policy that resembles a diplomatic version of China’s own gray zone tactics. 9/
Previous leaders statements expounded on 🇨🇳's TW position *at length.* This time, we have a very brief mention with specific asks of the US:
- Match its rhetorical non-support to TW independence with actions
- Stop arming TW
- *Support* peaceful unification 2/
2. China wants to see if it can move the needle on how Washington interprets & talks about its commitments to Beijing on TW.
The current context makes it impossible - and inadvisable - for the U.S. to say it *supports* peaceful unification. This would be a major shift in US..4/