@lawtwitter
University Prof Penn Law and the Wharton School, occasionally comments on antitrust issues and follows legal history, public law, and econ policy
I argued in the Yale Law Journal that the big digital platforms are not “winner-take-all” markets. Rather, they face competition from differentiated newcomers. Yesterday, Facebook, TikTok, and the stock market proved me correct.
I've had a few requests for my teaching slides for antitrust. Here is the fall semester, 2022 -- mainly dominant firms and horizontal restraints. Balance in spring semester. If you're teaching and want the ppt I'm happy to share.
Here's my comparative study of alternative antitrust goals – the curse of “bigness,” concern for the “competitive process,” and “consumer welfare.” They employ different assumptions and their outcomes favor different interests groups. Comments welcome.
Sorry to abandon so many conversations in the middle but I am heading for Ecuador tomorrow, for about two weeks. Probably be too busy for Twitter. Hopefully you will have solved all antitrust problems by the time I return.
Here is my new piece on antitrust and unilateral monopolistic conduct: briefly, the United States should adopt an abuse of dominance standard as the proper approach to “self-preferencing” as well as other anticompetitive practices in networked markets.
How to address anticompetitive dominance in digital platforms without causing economic harm, in contrast to proposals currently pending before Congress and the State of New York:
yes, but you never asked me. I received a single Google payment for work on a patent case in 2002, and I worked for the government on Microsoft in 1999 -- both about twenty years ago. No payments since then, no grants, and no paid board memberships. Check your sources.
The letter raises concerns about Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, in particular, who has recently been cited in a decision favorable to Facebook, sits on the board of a tech-funded think tank, and has a history of taking money from Google.
My piece with Fiona Scott Morton on "The Life of Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Model" is up this morning. It focuses mainly on how the Supreme Court has articulated the goals of antitrust.
But since you are apparently free of corporate money, will you call for your counterparts at other universities to commit to being transparent about corporate payments?
Fiona Scott Morton and I offer a more balanced alternative to the sycophantic histories of Chicago School Antitrust. Part of a symposium on the Chicago School in the Penn Law Review, with an excellent introduction by Christopher Yoo. See .
Here is my latest piece, showing that the case for anti-enforcement error cost bias in antitrust was already obsolete in economics when it was formulated and has subsequently weaponized antitrust in support of rent seeking.
Promarket just posted my new piece on Robert Bork and the corruption of antitrust’s consumer welfare standard. The damage can be fixed, provided that people appreciate what happened.
Under US law the "acquisition" of an employee cannot be an unlawful merger, even though §7 covers "assets," which includes employees. Hiring and NONuse can be a Sherman Act violation, but never actual use, and courts have found overriding interest in assuring employee mobility.
There is, of course, an interesting antitrust angle to the the whole OpenAI saga.
Microsoft would never be allowed to acquire OpenAI, but can they just hire whomever they want? What does this mean for the pre- and post-acquisition effects on competition and innovation?
The Epic Games injunction is under California state unfair competition law, not under antitrust law. It is permanent and says nothing whatsoever about territorial scope. So does the injunction apply only to iPhones sold in California? I think not, but this is not crystal clear.
My "the antitrust text” is nearly out; one of Solum’s “downloads of the week,” querying what antitrust enforcement would look like if jurists stuck to the text of the Sherman and Clayton Acts plus ordinary rules of statutory construction. Many surprises.
The European Commission has appointed Fiona Scott-Morton its top competition economist -- a notable first, because she is both an American and a woman.
I have time for only a few minutes a day on this site. Today I blocked the first person in 10 years—something I would never do except to an extreme abuser
Congratulations to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, whose publications won five out of eight categories of the Jerry S. Cohen annual awards for antitrust scholarship.
My piece on Antitrust Error Costs is soon to be published in the Univ. Pa. Journal of Business Law. It explains why an obsolete anti-enforcement bias continues to undermine intelligent antitrust policy
The Progressives created nearly the entire toolkit we use today to analyze conduct and power under the antitrust laws. It’s a period well worth revisiting. Comments welcome.
My piece on gatekeeper antitrust policy and the problem of self-preferencing on tech platforms is coming out in the Mich. Tech. L. Rev. Still time for comments.
Historically out biggest antitrust expansions have been provoked by litigation losses – the Clayton Act (1914) by Henry v. A.B.Dick (1912) and the Celler-Kefauver merger statute (1950) by Columbia Steel (1948).
I've heard this argument before, but it feels like spin. I don't see "We failed to prove our case, so legislators please lower the bar" ever having succeeded as an argument for legislation.
But it's not "the" law and economics discipline, just one small and declining fragment of it. Many progressive and more interventionist scholars also do law and economics today. Including PhD economists in both econ departments and law schools.
My short piece on digital cluster markets, forthcoming in the Columba Business Law Review, evaluates the FTC’s amended complaint in the Facebook antitrust case:
Good piece by David Evans on why excessive regulation is harming the European digital economy. This is why it is so important that our eyes in the USA be on the rollout of the DMA. Until now, the EU has provided too many examples of what not to do.
I just posted “Digital Cluster Markets,” which considers how antitrust law should evaluate market power when a large digital platform such as Facebook, Google, or Amazon produces many diverse products.
@HalSinger
I’m with
@jasonfurman
here. You get nauseous if you’re allergic to poor people – what happens when the antitrust war on consumers turns sour.
just got back from nearly a month traveling in the EU, including antitrust talks at OECD (Paris), ASCOLA (Athens), and CRESSE (Greece). Met many interesting people and got a little different perspective on EU-American relations in competition law.
Ct. just approved a claim that airlines coordinated their pricing through institutional investors. 2023 WL 5930973 (DDC Sep. 11, 2023). Not pure horizontal shareholding because one claim was that the investors communicated with one another about need to limit capacity.
One interesting thing about "consumer welfare" in the U.S. is that the term never appears in an antitrust case until the 1970s. Prior to that the courts spoke almost exclusively in terms of reduced output and higher prices. Was the use of "CW" an improvement? I think not.
@IlanStrauss
,
@timoreilly
, and
@MazzucatoM
have written a superb and I think very important paper on information costs, search algorithms, abundant but imperfect information, and the role of New Institutional Economics, focusing mainly on Amazon.
I hope you pay special attention to this set of comments on the 2023 draft Merger Guidelines, submitted by a group of lawyers and economists who have worked in this field for a long time.
Concurrences published this interview of me, graciously conducted by Doug Melamed. In part it is retrospective and in part my thoughts on the unhealthy divisions in antitrust policy today.
The most interesting thing about the FTC's Amazon complaint today is how non-exotic it is -- no fancy theories, just allegations of conduct that raise prices for consumers
The antimonopoly movement in the United States is populist, not progressive. Will it or should it evolve into more? I just posted “Will Antitrust Become Progressive?” Comments welcome.
"Worker Welfare and Antitrust" shows how both neoliberal and populist policies, which are disdainful of high output, harm labor: neoliberalism because it defines “consumer welfare” to include profits, and populism because of its aversion to bigness.
I just posted this short piece on antitrust market definition, comparing the two methodologies most often cited by courts and antitrust enforcement agencies – namely, the Hypothetical Monopolist test (HMT) and the Brown Shoe factors. Comments welcome.
I am happy that Promarket published my exposition of the good and the not-so-good in recently proposed Congressional legislation intended to rein in competitive abuses by the big internet platforms.
Here is my new piece on court-compelled interoperability, both static and dynamic, as a remedy for platform monopoly. It provides significant advantages over structural relief but is not always the best solution. .
NCAA vs. Alston is the first private plaintiff’s victory in a Supreme Court rule of reason antitrust decision in decades. Will it now be easier for future antitrust plaintiffs to win cases? My take:
My paper on interoperability remedies is coming out in the Columbia Law Review Forum, including some thoughts about the proposed ‘‘American Innovation and Choice Online Act’’.
Good post. “Competitive Process” is a slogan, not a standard – like “free markets.” People of widely different views state it. Justice Harlan used it to attack the per se rule against maximum RPM, while Justice Stevens used it to defend the same rule. Not much of a standard
While the way court have applied the consumer welfare standard has led to underenforcement, DOJ Antitrust Head Kanter’s proposal to replace it with a “competition and the competitive process” test raises concerns discussed in my new piece. A thread: 1/18
My paper "The Antitrust Text" was published today: 99 Ind. LJ 1063 (2024): what would antitrust policy look like if it were driven by the text of the antitrust statutes using ordinary rules of statutory construction. file:///C:/Users/hhovenka/Downloads/ssrn-4277914.pdf
Steve Salop has written a provocative piece proposing a "Reasonable Competitive Conduct" antitrust standard that combines elements of judicial decisions, consumer welfare, rule of reason reform, and increased attention to vertical conduct.
I posted a short piece on self-preferencing, briefly examining relevant patent and antitrust law, including the right to repair. I also consider whether new legislation is needed and what it should look like. Comments welcome.
yes, the impact was dramatic, making it one of the most successful antitrust decrees ever. But the successes came entirely from forced interoperability and global interconnection rights. It had nothing to do with the geographic breakup of traditional wired carriers.
@matthewstoller
@Sherman1890
I don't think he could have lived through it and have this opinion. The effect was immediate where I lived - more phones available and lower long-distance prices. But I remember asking mom about it (I was little) and feeling vaguely sad that "Ma Bell" was being broken up.
Promarket just published my new piece on antitrust, innovation, and the Justice Department’s “New Madison” doctrine. How long will it survive in the Biden administration?
The Chicago Law review is about to publish my piece on antitrust and workers. If antitrust wants to get serious about aiding workers it needs to be more attentive to output in both labor markets and product markets.
My history of antitrust policy and thought during the long progressive era has been revised. Thank you to the excellent editors at the Southern California Law Review. Comments are still welcome, and I appreciate those that I have already received.
it exposes a big divide between progressive and populist antitrust. The first embraces growth and increased competition while the latter resists it. The tech bills, particularly AICOA, represent protectionist reactionary populism.
I would go even further. The Progressives invented modern antitrust doctrine during the period from 1900 to 1935 and we are returning to it today. See my new piece, “The Invention of Antitrust,” forthcoming USC Law Review.
Eric Posner has a fascinating, pro-enforcement, and certainly controversial new piece in Promarket arguing that increase in margins should be the principle guiding merger policy.
Nessie sounds like pretty standard behavior in imperfectly competitive markets, and it happens ever day. Firms guess at what kind of competitor reaction a price change will produce. Does using an algorithm make it worse? In any event, Section 2 requires exclusionary conduct.
I’ve posted “potential competition,” with an evaluation of the 2023 draft Merger Guidelines and their treatment of related concerns such as “entrenchment.” It also assesses the relationship between potential competition and market definition.
The dismissals of antitrust cases against Facebook increase pressure on Congress to pass new legislation. They strengthen the argument that current antitrust law is not adequate. Congress must act wisely. Here’s my evaluation of the current proposals.
This thread reflects some important themes. The "hostility" toward tech is largely manufactured by political activists. True, tech firms do some anticompetitive things, but targeting the most productive and innovative part of the economy based on innuendo is a costly mistake.
WP veteran Steve Pearlstein - whom I've known, respected, and worked with for years - has a new opinion essay on how last year's failure of AICOA reflects Congress' dysfunction.
Steve is entitled to his opinion - but I think he makes 4 key mistakes:
1/
My short piece on Antitrust Interoperability Decrees will be published by the Columbia Law Review Forum. Antitrust law can make better use of them than it currently does.
@HalSinger
FTCA §5 seriously possible. Absence of agreement makes Sherman Act §1 impossible, and dangerous probability of creating a monopoly under §2 unlikely too. This is what §5 was meant for. It has been used before for unaccepted solicitations.
I’ll be on an OECD panel on the circular economy, 15 June. One concern is that changing U.S. antitrust attitudes toward productive efficiency are harming the war on climate change.
This morning Promarket posted the diverse views of four of us (
@conlon_chris
,
@ProfFionasm
, Harry First, &
@Sherman1890
) on the FTC's monopolization case against Amazon.
Hastings Law Journal’s excellent Feb. 4, 2022, conference on antitrust and tech invited my talk on “Selling Antitrust” -- about why the press is enamored of antitrust's extremists, but impatient about its more productive but also more technical center.
Fiona Scott Morton says of Sherman Act: “If it is not intended to protect consumer welfare, the Sherman Act does not seem to have much purpose at all...., courts have already stated that antitrust laws are not designed to protect competitors,”
@leah_nylen
An alarming trend. AT&T/Time-Warner court made same error, as did Penguin. Postmerger conduct among constituents is unilateral and largely unreachable, so we need to assume that the firm will maximize after the merger even if it promises not to. See
@LPEblog
@sandeepvaheesan
@laz_radic
. I'll stand by what I wrote. I'm sure that if the authors write a treatise based entirely on 1960s SCT case law and ignore everything else, as they advocate, it will be a best seller.
1: Brown: 370 U.S. at 323: “Congress used the words “may be” … to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.…” “No statute was sought for dealing with ephemeral possibilities. Mergers with a probable anticompetitive effect were to be proscribed"....
We hope to have a good discussion of the 2023 draft Merger Guidelines, featuring one high ranking economist from each Agency, and two commentators. I hope you can join us.
On 9/13 at noon ET, join us for an online discussion on the labor market aspects of the proposed U.S. merger guidelines. Featuring Herb Hovenkamp
@Sherman1890
,
@GusHurwitz
, Ioana Marinescu
@mioana
, Aviv Nevo & Sanjukta Paul.
@Penn
Register here:
Recent growth of the digital economy is nearly four times that of economy overall. AICOA is an example, just as the Robinson-Patman Act, of targeting highly productive firms for adverse treatment in order to satisfy special interests who profit by ignoring consumer choice.
It's not a merger. It's an asset acquisition and not of productive assets. A merger would be purchase of the rival's chickens. She'll be back in the morning.
Fascinating. The welfare maximizing solution is clearly a choice screen among the top search engine alternatives. If a violation is found, important for assessing the remedy.
My new paper about
#USvGoogle
. It presents an economic model of search engine defaults to study their effects on competition. As far as I know, this is the first study providing a formal model of search defaults.
Free download:
Thread:
1/n
Promarket asked Hiba Hafiz, Eric Posner, and me to each select what we thought was the most important recent antitrust development. Acting independently (no collusion or even conscious parallelism, I promise), we each picked labor.
this discussion misses that the law school market is competitive (200 of them); several are conservative: Scalia, BYU, Regent, Baylor, Ave Maria, others. If demand for more conservatives is keen, these schools would rise to the top. I see no evidence of collusion. What gives?
My Promarket piece on the Apple antitrust case considers two questions: 1) after initial repudiation, is the DOJ returning to a consumer welfare standard? What does the government need to show in order to win?