1/ Thread: Analysis of Russian defensive network and field fortifications on Kopani-Robotyne-Tokmak sector of the Zaporizhzhia front. This analysis was done using Sentinel Hub EO imagery and commercially available very high-resolution satellite imagery by Airbus DS Pléiades Neo.
05JUL24. Nearly two months have passed since Russia began its Kharkiv offensive. In terms of captured land, Russian gains have been limited and bought with very high cost. During the past month or so, most of the heaviest fighting has been in Vovchansk. 1/
16MAY24 ORBAT and analysis thread on Kharkiv Front. RuAF began offensive operations in northern Kharkiv oblast UKR-RUS border regions on 10MAY24. During the past six days RuAF has advanced between 9 to 5 km in three distinct directions along the border. 1/
Two years of Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is an overview thread on the situation at the front and deployment of UkrAF and RuAF forces as of 24th FEB 2024. Attached is high resolution image of our Order of Battle tracking map. Zoom in for more detail. 1/
A short thread on Kupiansk sector and the disposition of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA). Between 19-28JAN24 Russian forces from the 1GTA managed to capture the villages of Krokhmal'ne and Tabaivka. 1/
27APR24 Avdiivka sector ORBAT and operational thread. Over the past week RuAF has achieved series of local successes on Avdiivka sector. These began with sudden and unexpected penetration into village of Ocheretyne on 22APR24. 1/20
We have decided to release a series of full satellite images used to construct this thread, since at this point they are nearly five months old (13MAR23) and could be useful for geolocation as well as providing some transparency on the methods used in the original analysis. 1/
1/ Thread: Analysis of Russian defensive network and field fortifications on Kopani-Robotyne-Tokmak sector of the Zaporizhzhia front. This analysis was done using Sentinel Hub EO imagery and commercially available very high-resolution satellite imagery by Airbus DS Pléiades Neo.
2/ Russian defenses have been constructed along dominant heights and ridgelines. Defenses have been established at depth of 25-30km from Russian forward line of friendly troops (FLOT) all the way to the city of Tokmak.
3/ There are several distinct layers or defensive zones. Zone 1: first 3-4km from the RuFLOT is the forward security zone consisting of individual squad or platoon outposts and individual company strongpoints.
4/ Zone 2: first defensive line, 2-3km deep. Company trenches and strongpoints arranged along key terrain features in continuous line. This zone has seen recent additions and is constantly being improved. Villages of Kopani and Robotyne form the linchpins of this position.
17/ Finally we would like to thank
@wihurinrahasto
for funding our research and enabling us to purchase commercial satellite imagery. This analysis would not have been possible without them. This thread will be followed by tactical-operational analysis at later date.
5/ Zone 3: 4-5km deep zone with reserve- and possible decoy positions. This zone is also where majority of the local Russian artillery and mechanized reserves will be maneuvering behind the first defense line. Multiple shelter areas for vehicles and equipment observed.
6/ Zone 4: Prepared main defensive line. Massive multilayered trench lines with anti-tank ditches and dragons’ teeth obstacles. Extensive minefields are likely. These fortifications form nearly uniformly continuous defensive belt across the front. Built 3-4km deep.
8/ I have complied a collection of samples of different field fortification types and examples from across this sector. Note that the high resolution Pléiades Neo images are from 13thMAR 23 so they are quite old at this point. Many fortifications were under construction.
7/ Zone 5: Reserve and fallback positions behind the main defensive line (zone 3). Zone 6: Town of Tokmak and the surrounding AT-ditch and strongpoints form the last fallback and reserve position on this sector, prepared for all-around defense.
9/ 1: Forwardmost Russian platoon (+) strongpoint 600m wide. 2: 1,20km company (-) trench line. 3: 500m wide trench in tree line + additional trenches under construction. 4: Two squad or section outposts guarding a gap between positions.
10/ 5: Company trench system 1600m wide under construction. 6: Anti-tank ditch at the northern edge of Robotyne + small squad strongpoints. 7: Trenches, dugouts, and AT-ditches west of Robotyne. 8: Trenches under construction, northern edge of Kopani.
11/ 9: Reserve trench under construction south of Robotyne. 10: Trenches and dugouts being constructed on heights overlooking Rivne. 11: Two 300m wide platoon strongpoints under construction. 12. 300m wide platoon strongpoint between Solodka Balka and Novoprokopivka.
13/ Notice the large number of dugouts and vehicle firing positions being constructed. These positions have been completed since then. Trenches in the sample pictures 13a and 13b are roughly 3km in width and could serve as battalion strongpoint.
12/ 13: Around Solodka Balka, 11km behind the RuFLOT, a multilayered main defensive line is being constructed. It comprises of AT-ditches, dragons teeth obstacles, minefields, and multiple consecutive trench lines at average depth of 2-3km.
15/ Finally before Tokmak, there is a second robust reserve line 6-7km behind Solodka Balka. Tokmak is also surrounded by circular AT-ditch and multiple separate strongpoints. Village of Ocheretuvate is also being fortified for all-around defense.
15/ Finally before Tokmak, there is a second robust reserve line 6-7km behind Solodka Balka. Tokmak is also surrounded by circular AT-ditch and multiple separate strongpoints. Village of Ocheretuvate is also being fortified for all-around defense.
14/ 14-15: as can be seen from this sentinel image, the Russian trench lines and fortifications continue on both sides of Solodka Balka strongpoint with multiple fallback positions and reserve trenches. Russians can deploy multiple battalions of infantry along this defensive belt
Ukrainan asevoimien (AFU) vastahyökkäys Pohjois-Luhanskin rintamalla jatkuu. Lymanin kaatuminen lienee tässä vaiheessa vain ajan kysymys. AFU aloitti hyökkäykset Lymanin suunnalla käytännössä välittömästi Harkovan oblastin offensiivin saavutettua Oskil joen 8.-9.9. 1/
Made some rudimentary calculations on how the Russian 2024 summer offensive compares to the Ukrainian 2023 summer offensive in terms of territorial change of Russian controlled area on our map. 1/
Balakliyan alueella käynnissä laajamittainen Ukrainan asevoimien (AFU) vastahyökkäys. Tulokset viimepäivien taisteluista näyttäisivät olevat erinomaisia. AFU joukot ovat kyenneet toteuttamaan liikesodankäyntiä tavalla jota ei ole nähty kummaltakaan osapuolelta moneen kuukauteen.
Kokonainen komppania (ainakin 10kpl) panssareita, esikunta btr ym muuta.. varmaan jossain Izyumin nurkilla? Kaikki näyttävät jääneen täysin käyttökelpoisina sotasaaliiksi.
In Vochansks a costly urban battle has taken place with both sides actively seeking to control this natural tactical and operational bottleneck. The now completely ruined town has become crowded with both sides committing considerable number of units into the battle. 2/
Näyttäisi siltä, että RuAF:n vetäytyminen Khersonin pohjoisrintamalla oli ainakin jossain määrin valmisteltu etukäteen. Vetäytyminen tapahtui ilmeisesti paremmassa järjestyksessä kuin aiemmissa vastaavissa tilanteissa, mutta kokonaiskuva tapahtumista on vielä epäselvä. 1/
Päivittelin taulukoitani Venäjän asevoimien päämanööverielementtien osalta (
@JominiW
data) ja yritin samalla hieman hahmotella tappioita, reservejä ja rintamayksiköitä BTG luvuissa. Kuvien taulukot eivät ole helppolukuisia, mutta ehkä niistä havainnollistuu ainakin se, 1/
Havaintoja ja pohdintoja Popasnan taistelusta: Popasnan kaupunki on ollut sodan etulinjassa vuodesta 2014 lähtien. Ukrainan asevoimat linnoittivat aluetta vahvasti kuluneiden vuosien aikana ja kaupunki on ollut hyökkäysten kohteena heti sodan ensimmäisistä hetkistä lähtien. 1/
19.10. Tilannekatsaus Pohjois-Luhanskin rintaman tilanteesta. Rintama on ollut verrattain aktiivinen kuluneiden parin viikon aikana Ukrainan asevoimien (AFU) pyrkiessä laajentamaan asemiaan Kupyanskin itäpuolella ja 1/
So far, such crises have come in one at a time, with Ukraine being able to contain and stabilize the situations with great cost and difficulty. But what happens when these crises eventually start to happen in multiple locations at the same time? 13/13
In my 16MAY24 thread estimated that the Russian operational goals were threefold: create a buffer zone, place Kharkiv under artillery fire and fix Ukrainian reserves before the onset of the Russian summer campaign. 3/
Of these three goals the first two have failed with Russian forces being unable to advance past their initial gains. However, the third goal of fixing Ukrainian forces seems increasingly more successful. 4/
@Eleskola
On this sector I am confident that we have detected most (80-90%). But some small outposts are impossible to detect without up to date high res images. And those are not available at the moment. Decoy positions are also hard to discern from real ones.
the Ukrainians in turn overcommitted heavily to the battles of northern Kharkiv oblast. Ukraine has sent (either elements or whole units) somewhere upwards to 14 brigades to first stabilize the situation and then push the Russians back to the border. 6/
Unit rotations remain the Achilles heel of Ukrainian defence due to miscommunications, bad planning and the general lack of proper reserves. The latest such mishap fell on the 41st Mech Bde being rotated straight from the meatgrinder of Chasiv Yar to Toretsk sector. 12/
The Kharkiv offensive was badly coordinated and ill-timed in relation to other Russian operations, with no clearly definable concentrated offensive efforts following it during June. But just as Russians failed to synchronize their actions, 5/
Back on May 8th I posted the thread on the Russian defences around Kopani – Robotyne - Tokmak axis. Quite frankly I did not quite expect the way it captured attention of the people and the amount of discussion it generated. 1/
1/ Thread: Analysis of Russian defensive network and field fortifications on Kopani-Robotyne-Tokmak sector of the Zaporizhzhia front. This analysis was done using Sentinel Hub EO imagery and commercially available very high-resolution satellite imagery by Airbus DS Pléiades Neo.
Khersonin pohjoisrintaman tilanteessa on kyse nyt noin 4-6 heikohkon rykmentin/prikaatin (tai vastaava) romahtamisesta. On jotenkin huumaavaa tajuta, että paikoista joista taisteltiin katkeran verisesti läpi kesän ja syksyn, on vihdointi päästy tähän pisteeseen.
The costly and difficult battle of Vochansk in particular has drawn in outsized number of Ukrainian units with elements from up to 8 different brigades taking part in it. I fail to see how attempting to push the Russians back from Vovchansk could be a rational course of action 7/
This operation is conducted by recently created NORTH (SEVER) operational-strategic grouping (OSG) based on the re-established Leningrad Military District. Offensive operations in Kharkiv area are conducted by two army corps. 2/
in this highly critical period where Ukraine should instead carefully husband and preserve its reserves. Vochansk is as much a difficult bottleneck for the counterattacking Ukrainians as it is for the Russians. 8/
While the overall Russian progress this summer has so far been abysmally slow and costly, the Ukrainian commanders are constantly being forced to juggle their depleted and tired formations from one crisis sector to the other. 11/
Meanwhile Ukrainian reserves are running critically low. The 150-154 series brigades established last autumn are some of the last remaining strategic reserves Ukraine has, but their readiness and overall capability is likely to be questionable at best. 9/
2.11. Bakhmut – Siversk Rintaman tilannekatsaus ja joukkojen ryhmityksen karkea arvio. Aloitan ensiksi kertaamalla karkeasti rintaman tapahtumat ja kehitykset täysimittaisen invaasion alusta: 1/
Green and untested Ukrainian brigades tend to have terrible track record with their baptism by fire. One of the new Ukrainian brigades (153rd) seems to have been at least partially committed to Kharkiv front, all though it could be just their drone unit at this point. 10/
Sinäänsä ihan onnekasta, että tein eilen loman viim. pvän kunniaksi 10h töitä päivittääkseni Khersonin rintaman mallinnukseni (venäläisten osalta) ja voinen siten käyttää sitä tämän illan aikana tilanteen havainnollistamiseen. Toiveenahan on, että sen vanhenee nopeasti. 1/
It is therefore likely that this operation is intended as fixing action / diversionary offensive in preparation for the main Russian summer campaign and UkrAF will have to carefully avoid overcommitting their limited reserves into this battle. 7/
RuAF operational goal is likely threefold: 1) Secure a buffer zone to prevent UkrAF from conducting cross border raids into Belgorod oblast. 2) Tie down local UkrAF units and draw in as many UkrAF reserves as possible. 3) Place city of Kharkiv under tube artillery fire. 6/
The offensive seems to have been local and opportunistic in nature, with several UkrAF 103rd TDF Bde positions being overrun by assaulting elements from RuAF 47th Guards Tank Division (47GTD) 2/
11thArmy Corps (Kaliningrad) and the recently established 44th Army Corps (Karelia). Each army corps has two motor rifle divisions: 18thGMRD (11th AC) and 72nd MRD (44th AC). 72ndis still partially undergoing formation. 3/
#Ukraine
: Ukrainian forces took out a base with several
#Russia
-n BM-27 Uragan MLRS and transloaders. Munition detonated and launched to areas around the base. Also seen from a Stugna-P screen at the end.
Siitä mitä olen tilannetta ja siihen liittyviä kommentteja sekä analyysejä seurannut Oskil joen / pohjoisen Luhanskin rintamasta, niin arvioisin Venäjän asevoimien (RuAF) todennäköisesti yrittävän alueella seuraavaa: 1/
RuAF continues to pressure and probe UkrAF lines along the entire frontline. Ukraine should by my calculations still have uncommitted reserves, but it is crucial to correctly balance their use and avoid overcommitment on the eve of anticipated RuAF summer campaign. 12/
Russians have so far failed to capture the town of Vovchansk which is proving to be difficult bottleneck for the Russians to overcome. Closer to Kharkiv in the direction of Lyptsi and Vesele RuAF has had more successes. 10/
Russians were able to seriously threaten UkrAF positions around the village of Berestove and Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka, but it seems that at least for the time being RuAF forces have been unable to further exploit their initial success. 3/
The fighting is reportedly fierce and situation far from stable. Russians have not yet started any other major offensives and the threatening situation near Ocheretyne has, at least for a moment, been brought back under tentative UkrAF control. 11/
However, the RuAF commitment of multiple elements from the 1GTA is somewhat worrying sign. To what extent these units have been brought into the area, will be a crucial question in determining the true scope and aim of this operation. 8/
Capture of Krokhmal'ne and Tabaivka has resulted in forming a salient some 5km deep and 5-8km wide. After the initial effort by elements of 47thGTD petered out, RuAF has reportedly reorganized their forces in the salient 4/
Ukrainian forces along the frontline are organized in three “Operational-Strategic Group of Forces” (OGS): Odessa (O), Tavriya (T) and Khortytsia (K). 2/
There is also evidence of VDV battlegroup taking part in the offensive, but exact extent of VDV participation is still largely unclear. Most of the RuAF units have likely been committed in detached battalion groups, with bulk of their forces still held in reserve. 5/
RuAF has also recently redeployed additional forces to partake in this offensive: 6th Combined Arms Army (6CAA) elements from 25th and 138th SGMRB’s as well as elements from the 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA). 4/
22.6.2022. Taistelu Donbasin pullistumasta on ehkä kääntymässä Venäjän pyrrhoksen voitoksi. Läpi touko- ja kesäkuun raivonneet taistelut Donbasin pullistuman alueella, Izyumin ja Lymanin sillanpäissä, Sievierodonetskin kaupungissa ja Popasnan läpimurtokohdassa ovat tuottaneet 1/
UkrAF has redeployed some reserves and units from other sectors of the frontline to help contain the Russian offensive: 92nd Assault Bde, Khartia Bde, and elements from several other brigades. 9/
Exact reasons for this sudden success aren’t entirely clear, but likely involve a botched rotation of troops, misallocation of resources and problems with coordinating forces drawn from multiple different brigades on ad hoc basis, 2/
and likely lack many necessary elements for successful defence. The breach at Ocheretyne could allow the Russians to prematurely enter the first defensive line. It is also likely that Russians will attempt to exploit the situation by entering various gullies and ravines 14/
Käytin iltapäivän kartoittaakseni Ukrainan mahdollisten reservien määrää nyt kun taistelut keskittyvät Itä- ja Etelä-Ukrainaan.
@JominiW
tuottaman tilannekuvan ja omien laskelmieni perusteella Ukrainan asevoimien prikaateista on sidottuna rintamavastuuseen: 1/11
exacerbated by general lack of munitions and manpower. Russians constantly pressure the Ukrainian lines with small scale assaults and probing actions looking to exploit exactly these kinds of conditions. Following the sudden success in Ocheretyne, 3/
bringing forth elements from the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division (2GMRD). So far there has been no evidence of them being able to advance any further. Salient continues to threaten Ukr positions in Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka, 5/
Prematurely rushing the elements of 27th MRD which are still in training into the front could also be another option. The northwards push from Avdiivka area is quite likely to be combined with Russians attempts at breakthrough around Chasiv Yar. 17
Frontline around this sector is particularly crowded so it is unlikely that the Russians have committed entire brigades and regiments into such tight battlespace. 5/
Where these offensives will take place is hard to predict. There are predictable options: Continue offensives in the directions of Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk and Lyman. It is also possible that RuAF will seek to attack directions which have seen less action over the past months.13/
The 1st Guards Tank Army seems to be concentrating bulk of its forces along roughly 30 km wide area of the front between Verkhnia-Duvanka and Svatove. 9/
Ukrainians have been constructing new defensive lines at quick pace during the last few months following the fall of Avdiivka, but these lines are still very much under construction. At this stage they mostly consist of series of strongpoints 13/
We estimate that forces from both sides operate in rough tactical groupings of forces, but especially on the UkrAF side, the order of battle is in reality much more chaotic and unclear. Many brigades have been broken in individual battalion groups, and may operate 8/
30.1.2023 Ketju: Ajatuksia Ukrainan sodan tämänhetkisestä tilanteesta ja kuluneesta sotavuodesta. Tämä ketju toiminee todennäköisesti alustuksena sarjalle pohdintoja erilaisista sotaan liittyvistä aiheista, ilmiöistä ja tapahtumista. 1/
Comparison of sentinel imagery from the area of the salient between 13JAN and 21JAN does not show any significant preparatory fires from the Russians which further reinforces the image that this was mainly an opportunistic local action 7/
Khersonin rintama. RuAF joukot piirretty vastamaan Ukrainalaisten esittämää arviota noin 30 pataljoonan taisteluosaston (BTG) vahvuudesta Dnieprin länsirannan sillanpäässä. Useimmat BTG:t todennäköisesti 50-75% määrävahvuudesta. Mahdollisesti täydennetty LDPR nostoväellä. 1/
and if the 1GTA were to go on in to fully committed offensive, this position could be at risk of being cut-off and overrun. At the moment it seems that no such commitment of 1GTA forces has been made yet. 6/
These could be for example push from Svatove towards the Oskil river, or perhaps in the southern front from Polohy towards Hulyaipole. RuAF recently began to redeploy their 76th Guards Air Assault division from Orikhiv direction. 14/
Where this unit will be deployed next is likely to be good candidate for a next major effort by RuAF, but we must also remember that small detachments from this and other VDV units could be used as part of maskirovka (deception). 15/
Bakhmutin taisteluista leviää nyt perusteettomia huhuja Ukrainalaisten toteuttamasta vastahyökkäyksestä. Tästä ei ole ilmaantunut mitään todisteita ja huhujen alullepanija on jo perääntynyt väitteistään. Huhu leviää silti edelleen ja elää omaa elämäänsä, joten suosittelen malttia
Russians promptly began to concentrate additional forces in the breach, apparently drawn from multiple different brigades and regiments (30, 35, 55th MRBs and the 433/27 MRR). 433th Motor Rifle Regiment is part of the still forming 27th Motor Rifle Division. 4/
rather than beginning of full-scale offensive by 1GTA. For comparison here are sentinel images from Ivanivske-Klischiivka area near Bakhmut showing the extensive cratering from artillery fires between 13-23JAN24. 8/
PSA: We are quite literally working around the clock to observe, catalogue and analyze the situation in the Zaporizhzhia front. Please, if you really feel the need to challenge analysis or info presented by our group, kindly provide concrete evidence or stop wasting our time.
Its is likely that majority of the units committed to the front have considerable portions of their force either still in reserve or reconstituting after previous battles. These maps only represent general locations of units where their elements have been committed to battle. 6/
I will see if I can work out a similar thread on the situation around Avdiivka in the near future, but that battle may wrap up sooner than I can get it done (the situation over there does not seem good at all). 17/17
As the battle for Avdiivka now approaches its climax, Ukr high command has to make difficult decisions whether to commit significant reserves there or not. This may in turn serve to signal RuAF to commit 1GTA into general offensive 14/
This thread was sourced from various TG channels (K. Mashovets and WarArchive_ua to name a few),
@UAControlMap
, CDS substack,
@GeoConfirmed
. Special shoutout to
@moklasen
who closely follows RuAF units and orbat changes.
OSG Odessa is tasked with conducting raids and harassment across the Dnipro River and prevention of Russian incursions in its area of operations (AO) stretching roughly between cities of Odessa and Zaporizhzhia. 3/
Russians are unlikely to allow UkrAF to concentrate their limited reserves exclusively on this front so we can expect several other hotspots to develop within the coming months, further straining the Ukrainian resources. 20/20
This concentration seems to comprise of elements from all three divisions of the 1GTA: 2GMRD, 4GTD and 47GTD. Additionally a grouping of 27thSGMRB and 7th MRR seems to be present near Kuzemivka-Novoselivske. 10/
Another special thank goes to
@wihurinrahasto
for providing the funding which allows us to maintain our ORBAT map and continued analysis. You can follow our daily frontline situation map here:
OSG Odessa has roughly 11-12 Brigades = equivalent of approximately four divisions (as depicted in the map attached to tweet
#2
). Most of these are light infantry forces (TDF and NG) reinforced by four Marine Brigades). 4/