Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Russia and Eurasia Program, focusing on defense issues in Russia. Opinions mine RTs not endorsements.
A brief 🧵about updates and observations about Russian forces' response in Kursk and Russian operations in Donetsk near Pokrovsk. I start by including guidance from Admiral Stockdale, as it's been meaningful to me in my analytic practice, perhaps others will find it helpful too.
The long-term damage to the Russian army, marines, VDV from this war cannot be overstated. It goes beyond the numbers of men killed and equipment destroyed. This will also be a story of a military generation that is damaged or gone, and who remains. /1
For those in town making choices on security assistance to Ukraine, if you need more reasons, then I have a warning to share with you about the Kremlin. I feel that I have a duty to warn. /1
Russia begins its response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk. Multiple ministries are involved and the command structure is still forming. Someone in Ukraine knew what they were doing and exploited a weak seam in Russian C2. A few important issues to watch: 🧵
The Kremlin is starting to gloat that it is beating us – the west. If they feel like they can win by outlasting the political will of the United States and Europe about Ukraine, they will become much worse in the years to come, cocky and partially reconstituted. /2
Russian forces are in the middle-to-late stage of a controlled withdrawal/retreat from the west bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson. A few thoughts about why it’s different than the panicky collapse near Kharkiv, and things to consider moving forward (/1 )
Today Shoygu and Gerasimov demoted Surovikin, and put Gerasimov in charge of the operation in Ukraine, demoting their most competent senior commander and replacing him with an incompetent one. This is a story that has it all: infighting, power struggles, jealousy /1
Why? Every time the Russians think that they have “won” in a conflict under Putin -- Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2014, Syria 2015 – they learn something about us – and they become overconfident in their abilities and in a few years they try bigger and bolder operations. /4
It appears that the Russians may be losing multiple brigade elements from the 2nd CAA and DNR forces in their assault on Avdiivka. Gerasimov strikes again, this time with no pushback on his bad ideas (so far). Yet there are some troubling issues to consider. A thread. (/1)
It is my job to look at different futures being rebuilt on the horizon. And I tell you that a bruised , vengeful, and overconfident Russia is one of them that I see on the path we are on, unless choices are made now. /3
If the Kremlin concludes they can outlast Ukraine and Western support, they will tell themselves they overcame or defeated US and NATO intelligence, planning, weapons, tactics, will, and defense production. It would be an inaccurate but dangerous conclusion for them to arrive at.
The most important reason to continue to fund security assistance to Ukraine is for Ukraine. They want to live free from Kremlin subjugation and brutality. They fight hard, they do not ask anyone to fight for them. Look what they've done already to the Russian army./8
Dysfunction is reaching peak levels in the Russian military command as another general is sacked for speaking truth to power and others are detained, or under suspicion. Where incompetence meets betrayal: a thread of the Russian high command and implications for the front /1
It is in our interests to continue supporting Ukraine for many reasons. Inaction at a critical time could lead once again to a vicious, regenerating, and overconfident Kremlin in the years ahead and would be a political and military catastrophe for all. /end
In sum, the numbers of Russian casualties are severe enough -- but the damage that will ricochet around inside those service branches after this war is over, will be worse.
Sharing some overdue thoughts today.
First up: appraisal of the operation under Surovikin’s command, Russia’s transition to the defensive, and the strategy underpinning their strikes on Ukraine’s electrical grid. (/1)
Shoigu is out as Defense Minister, moving into head of Security Council. Andrei Belousov , an economist, is taking over. My quick thoughts on what it means for MOD, and what to look about changes possible in the near term. /1
If Russia were to conclude that their repetitive brute force methods and DIB can overcome western aid to Ukraine and outlast NATO political will and types of support- the outcome would be very dangerous, and it must not be allowed to happen. It could upend deterrence./6
Looks like Russian forces made efforts to destroy their equipment in Kherson as part of a controlled retreat. Especially types that couldn’t make it across the river for whatever reason, or advanced kit. Thread below that I’ll add to as I see examples (/1)
Prior to 2022, the Russians believed they had several economic, political, and military disadvantages vis-à-vis NATO. If they snatch a type of victory in Ukraine by exhausting and outlasting Ukraine and the West, I believe they will downgrade their assessments about NATO power./7
I’m not an Iran expert. But I am a military analyst. When I see the impact points of Iran’s strike on Asad air base, I don’t see purely symbolic strikes designed to avoid casualties, as some have speculated. The strikes appear to target the base’s military capability.
Have a look at these demands from the Russian MFA. They want the west to give up, and for Ukraine to give up and live in subjugation. It is not subtle. /9
🧵MFA spox Maria Zakharova states Russian conditions for ‘peace’ in Ukraine:
- West stops military support to Ukraine
- West & Ukraine accepts ‘new territorial realities’
- Ukraine ceases all military activities
- Ukraine is fully ‘demilitarised’ and ‘de-nazified’
…
Much commentary about Gen Gerasimov’s presence in Ukraine & Russian military command. I wanted to open up the vault about his previous experience as a field commander and how that’s relevant too. (Below in Chechnya). /1
Another general is allegedly relieved, the commander of the 106th division (VDV), Maj-Gen Seliverstov. Like Popov, it’s going over poorly in Russian mil channels as part of shoigu/gerasimov purging ranks. One of them wrote “vae victus” (woe to the vanquished) 1/2
The Russian military's problems go beyond casualties and equipment losses. It faces two looming crises in retention and veteran PTSD and other disorders, when its soldiers are allowed to leave Ukraine. I explore this topic in my piece for
@TheEconomist
, linked in tweet below. /1
It’s hard to for me to fit 18 years of work on Russian military reforms in a few tweets. Shoygu’s announcements since December have been a little surreal to see. In most cases, the posture changes are returning to the past (pre-2010 era), not a step forward. /1
Observations on the counteroffensive this week. As anticipated, when the UAF close on Russian trenches, they clear them. UAF are making deep cuts on logistics in the south. Strong dissonance (again) between hard realities on the battlefield and what’s happening in Moscow. /1
I write often on Russian military personnel problems because I think it's a central issue. I will be the first to tell you that their military morale is poor in Ukraine. I still would not recommend any plan that rests on 'bad Russian morale will trigger a collapse in the front'/1
....those who survived in Ukraine, bringing back combat stress/trauma/criminality with them, right back into the barracks. This will be a toxic brew for incoming conscripts for years to come. Without significant oversight the conditions hazing could get out of control /4
Heavy losses to what professional NCOs RS had, junior + field-grade officers means that the group of people who signed up in the last 10-15 years, when the military tried to reform and who knew something even a little different than 90s or Soviet military life, are gone /2
Then, add in the mass casualty events that the Russian military has not coped with since WW2, being sent in unprepared for the Kremlin's war of choice, the lies, the war crimes, atrocities, the list goes on and on. /5
Russia’s struggles in Ukraine cannot be explained only as endemic military issues. Kremlin interference undercut performance in critical ways.Their mistakes collided with fierce Ukrainian resistance, western intel and weapons.Will they learn? My latest,👇
It is appropriate to talk about strategy for 2024 and matching ends, ways, and means - that is a good idea and it's time to do it. Open door offer to talk. But stopping aid now would mean giving up on Ukrainian soldiers in the field./11
When this is over, the parts of those service branches left unscathed are conscripts, those officers or NCOs they didn't trust to go in the first place (who are back at home garrisons), senior officers who received commissions as Soviet officers (50/60 year olds) and/3
It appears that Moscow’s illegal annexation of 4 Ukrainian territories will happen very soon – possibly tomorrow. There's a great deal of uncertainty for what comes next, but I'll share my thoughts on next steps and how mobilized forces aid the Kremlin's goals (or not).
I’ve been comparing Russian missile strikes against Ukraine over the last few months with what is known about their doctrine and launch capacity. I’d like to share a little about recent trends below. /1
I continue to look for signs of long-term stability or problems in Russian military personnel recruitment and retention for 2023+ as a result of their war on Ukraine. Some preliminary thoughts from about the Russian spring draft. Conscript intake numbers are low so far (/1).
Although it appears quiet in Russia today, things are not back to 'normal.' The coming days or weeks will tell more. Until then, its wise to consider that “nothing is true and everything is possible” – even the things we see. A few reflections for today:
We've done research on Russian coercive signaling, which today's MQ-9/SU-27 incident was. It's a close pass that went bad. There are patterns of how Russian platforms intercept U.S. or NATO platforms operating near Russia but in international airspace/waters. Context below.
BREAKING: This morning, a Russian Su-27 aircraft struck the propeller of a U.S. MQ-9 drone, causing U.S. forces to have to bring the MQ-9 down in international waters, according to
@US_EUCOM
.
Now that more Russian military personnel are moving into position near Ukraine, the Kremlin and military’s continued silence & disregard to their own troops and families is unsustainable and may backfire. Signs of early cracks and other considerations below: 👇(/1)
So, checking my notes here on Russian Air Force performance while I was away:
❌ Effective CAS, SEAD, evasive maneuvers, and telling their pilots they were going to war
✔️ Planning to fly a giant ‘Z’ for May’s victory day parade
I want to add context to Russian announcements of new units. Shoigu has periodically announced these types of changes in peacetime and then not staffed them (like in 2016). This is wartime, so it’s different. Keep an eye on it, but don’t take it at face value. A few thoughts 1/
Here's Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announcing the creation of 2 new ground armies, along with 16 new brigades and 14 new divisions. Very unclear where the new numbers will come from, though there are fears of a new, post-election mobilization.
Russia has declared its defense operation to be a "counter-terrorist operation" (KTO in Russian). This is a domestic operation and the FSB and Rosgvardia have roles along with the military. This is what the war in Chechnya was called from 1999 until it ended./2
This war has left Russia's borders weak, the army engaged in Ukraine and not immediately available to defend border regions, and FSB border troops not supported. The Russian system's instinct will be to overcorrect and swing harshly at Kursk. /end
Russian leaders declare mobilization complete as of 10/31. Below, some thoughts on the stark disconnect between Putin/Shoygu's assurances and actual field conditions for Russian soldiers through the winter. This thread also comes with a very specific soundtrack. /1
Images from Lyman, abandoned Russian positions. 4th picture, red bag, stolen women’s tights and an immersion blender. These troops were really out there, slowly getting encircled, yet had mental energy to lug back a stolen immersion blender for the fam back home.
Лиман Донецької області: наслідки "відведення" військ РФ - спалена техніка та покинуті російськими військами речі, в тому числі жіночий гребінець для волосся та Житомирські шкарпетки
Фото Радіо Свобода передали українські військові, які вчора та сьогодні звільняли місто
Someone in Ukraine knew where to press. The AFU attacked a weak spot (Kursk) of the weakest Op Group. A C2 scramble between FSB border guards, Akhmat fighters, and any MOD forces that could rally ensued in week 1. /8
Putin has instructed the FSB (+ its border troops) and Rosgvardia to defend the borders and assist this operation. He also told the military today that their main task is driving out Ukrainian forces from Russian territory and countering Ukrainian recon and sabotage groups /3
A quick thread on the wartime pettiness of Russia’s senior military leadership – Defense Minister Shoygu, and possibly CGS Gerasimov. As I noted before, they continue to find the time for petty personnel squabbles amid catastrophic losses for their military. /1
The U.S. supplemental has passed and aid is on the way to Ukrainian frontlines. But months of delay for ammo and manpower have come at a cost. Problems cannot easily be undone, especially in Donetsk. A brief thread on what Russian decisions say about their summer plans. 🧵
Shoigu calls Turkish and French counterparts today to discuss possible uncontrolled escalation in Ukraine and claims Ukraine has a “dirty bomb.” This reads like Russian false flag groundwork. Troubling that it’s happening at the defense minister level.
Who is responsible for what in Kursk? FSB Border troops and Rosgvardia have responsibility for the border and ensuring its defense. For the military: Kursk is located in Moscow Military District, but the troops forward deployed IVO Ukraine belong to the Leningrad MD. /4
Based on conscription cycles, the Russian military has 3-4 months to convince conscripts in units right now to convert to contract service, so they can legally fight in Ukraine. Fall conscripts will be discharged on a rolling basis starting in September. (1/3)
Russia launched missiles from the DPRK up to 460km inside Ukraine, according to declassified intelligence (assessments for other launches are ongoing). A few thoughts. /1
On Thursday, White House spokesman John Kirby unveiled a map showing where Russia launched the North Korean missiles into Ukraine (near Zaporizhzhia). "We anticipate that Russia will use additional North Korean missiles to target Ukraine civilian infrastructure," Kirby said
Ukraine recently hit a Russian training site with ATACMs. Russia says it destroyed HIMARs launchers that were moving into concealed positions. Russian recon-strike has been getting faster & more lethal in the last few months & will require TTP changes. I'll show you what I see./1
ATACMS Volley Strikes Mass Of Russian Troops Training In Eastern Ukraine
In a little more than 90 seconds, four ATACMS hit a concentration of Russian troops reportedly preparing to attack in the Kharkiv area.
Story:
A thread about the Russian military and what to watch for in the days ahead. Developments are highly contingent, but there are a few big movements to look out for. /1
Below, I discuss the critical period ahead for the war in Ukraine. Russia lays ground for annexing parts of Ukraine. However, there is, again, a mismatch between the Kremlin's goals and the exhausted forces it has remaining to deliver those goals (1/).
If Ukrainian ammunition and manpower needs are not met, its battlefield position will continue to worsen before reaching a tipping point, possibly by this summer. This is no time for despair; it’s time for urgent action. My latest below and a brief 🧵
Today, Putin increased the military’s size for the 3rd time since 2022. Can they sustain 1.5M postwar, at a time when the budget will be under pressure to procure equipment? Not without tradeoffs. See my new report for more on this and other tradeoffs👇
..that this Russian Op Group was much weaker than the others: from May - Aug it had a major reorganization, a new commander, and attacked Kharkiv early. It's MOD units are now bogged down in Kharkiv and that offensive is not making progress. / 7
The entirety of the area was formerly the Western Military District (2010-24). Russia decided to split it up in March-April 2024 to cope with NATO expansion. It named two commanders: Lapin (LEMD) and Kozovlev (MOMD). / 5
🇷🇺
#Russia
: Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin was appointed as the commander of the Leningrad Military District, while Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev will become the commander of the Moscow Military District.
The two military districts were reestablished in March 2024 by decree
The Operational Group of Forces North received a name change and upgrade about 1-2 weeks before it attacked Kharkiv in May. Prior to May it was a territorial defense group. So for the past 3 months it's been transitioning from a defensive to offensive orientation, meaning /6
How will Russian forces fare on the defensive? There are many factors in play. Even though they've constructed many layers of defensive positions and there are forces unaccounted for in recent weeks, the morale of Russian soldiers is variable, from tired to bad -it matters. 1/11
I raise this because Bortnikov and Gerasimov worked with this specific C2 arrangement in Chechnya. While today's situation is much different, they remember how to work together. Implementation is a different matter of course, but I note the experience. /10
FSB assets will be doing recon and trying to sweep up AFU teams, and interrogation. Russian forces are already taking small numbers of AFU teams as prisoner. Here I worry about what comes next because the FSB uses horrible torture methods. /14
Russia has experience in creating a combined C2 structure that involves internal security agencies and the military from its experience in the second Chechen war. In the 90s, a joint command was established in what was then the North Caucasus MD HQ. /9
AFU invaded Russia despite 2 years of partial mobilization in Kursk, 10 years of legislation to make power ministries coordinate better, and a 2023 offer from Prigozhin to help guard the border (Shoigu rejected it). Bardak as usual. Now the reaction begins. /17
As I said for months, Kremlin announces a mobilization and immediately rattles the nuclear threat. 300k to be mobilized over time. They will not be able to do this well. The system structurally cannot. (1/2)
The piece to read on mobilisation, by
@MassDara
. "Even in a best-case scenario...mobilization would take at least several months to a year to confer an operational benefit."
This AFU operation has successfully exploited seams of responsibility between the FSB, Rosgvardia and MOD. I suspect targeted leaks will emerge between MOD/GRU and FSB over who is responsible for intel and defense failures. /16
A few observations about Russian forces in recent weeks that I'm watching: improvements to targeting, continued assaults on Avdiivka, possible missile hoarding, and new loitering munitions. /1
In sum, his purpose for traveling to Ukraine and what was said and done on that trip is unknown. That the Russians took the risk of him being targeted suggests things aren’t going to plan to the point where it needed his correction or at least supervision for next steps. /end
Rosgvardia's tasks will be to set up cordons, roadblocks, and other barriers. FSB border guards in the area have been taken prisoner already, to include conscripts , a very politically sensitive issue for Putin. /13
By now it should be clear to Belousov that not only were Shoigu's MOD financial books cooked, but the new laws, reorgs, and national defense plans on his 12-year watch to help security services to coordinate better w/the military remained stuck mostly at the conceptual stage. /1
The Russians continue to experiment with their missile launches. Today’s strikes on Ukraine feature something new: missiles fired on a looping ballistic trajectory from the north. Likely a tactic to defeat air defenses; only a few systems can do this. /1.From Reuters
Delays in U.S. lethal aid have already negatively impacted the battlefield in Ukraine. These new graphics outline signposts of degrading combat conditions— where things stand now and what may come next. These will be updated as conditions change.
@CarnegieEndow
1/4
I haven't seen a KTO headquarters established yet. Who could lead it? All military district commanders are dual hatted as operational group commanders and their forces are engaged. MOD options could be: Lapin, Kozovlev, Nikiforov, Gerasimov. /11
To put this number in perspective, Wagner lost more in Bakhmut than the Soviet Union did in a decade in Afghanistan. Yet I don’t think this makes a real ripple in Russian society; many view them as prisoners and soldiers of fortune,or can say they went there by their own choice.
BBC and Mediazona have obtained and verified personal data of 19,547 Wagner mercenaries who died at Bakhmut. It allowed us to trace the entire history of the battle and the transformation of recruited prisoners from valuable personnel into “disposable material”
Also: the remnants of Russia’s VDV were on the west bank. If that group is captured or KIA, it would be a blow to Russian capabilities, and a major achievement and psychological victory for UAF. If Russia’s most famous units were destroyed the news would spread fast (/8)
Russia's MChS (Ministry of Emergency Situations) is also now engaging with evacuations of towns. Russia is showing videos of some armor moving and eventually I would anticipate more helicopter, VKS assets. They will probably use artillery especially if the towns are emptied. /15
It's Lapin's AOR, but Op Group North is weak. The territory is Moscow MD, but Kozovlev and many of his forces are in eastern Ukraine. Nikiforov is Ground Forces commander and former op group commander, his name is circulating online. Gerasimov also given the stakes/12
First, Shoigu is moving into a respectable and powerful position because he is loyal, and he and Putin are friends. it’s a signal that Putin listens to chatter and understands that Shoigu needed to leave the MOD, where he was just tolerated by his ministry and other agencies. /2
One year ago today Gerasimov took back command. As an experiment, what specifically has he done well? Shoygu+ Kremlin secured foreign weapons. Surovikin's C2 structure + defense lines held, Teplinsky tightened them up. Chemezov turned crank on industry.... And Gerasimov? /1
Today Shoygu and Gerasimov demoted Surovikin, and put Gerasimov in charge of the operation in Ukraine, demoting their most competent senior commander and replacing him with an incompetent one. This is a story that has it all: infighting, power struggles, jealousy /1
The Kherson retreat was different with more time to destroy kit on the way out rather than let it be a trophy. Some equipment/munitions were left behind in a functional state. Days ahead will reveal more but so far it does not seem like Kharkiv. (/4)
Why is Russia leaving? Once Ukrainian forces damaged main routes to the west bank using HIMARs this summer, (for example the Antonovsky bridge) and Russian forces could not repair it, the west bank became an untenable military position to hold. (/7)
In sum, Surovikin is shoring up Russia’s defensive positions with resources he has. Under his command the precision strike campaign is harmful to Ukraine. He may be relaying news accurately to Putin. Relaying disappointing news can be dangerous over there./end
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate says“the most trained and most capable Russian units are currently in Kherson. A large share of them are from airborne troops of the Russian Federation, Russian special operation forces and the naval infantry”
TL:DR: Russians demoted their "fixer" commander in favor of Gerasimov, who last year agreed to and oversaw a debacle invasion plan that resulted in the partial destruction of their army. What? /END
I haven’t seen a huge spin-up yet, to explain the retreat in full detail. I imagine that the roll out will be coming to explain the loss of the city and perhaps holding now the eastern bank. I think they are doling out bad news in small doses. (/end)
How does this pertain to him visiting Ukraine? Suggests he probably needed to straighten things out and get a clear picture for himself. It doesn’t speak highly of trust and clear coms up and down the chain and that’s a larger discussion /5
By accounts of local Ukrainian soldiers in the area, the Russian grouping on the west bank has not been considered a motley crew. It was considered an experienced and exhausted force with prepared positions (/3)
Thanks
@OAJonsson
— big Russian decree just dropped. To put this number into context— the Kremlin is authorizing adding an entire extra draft cycle’s worth of conscripts here— OR roughly half of their pre-war contractniki…(1/4)
A photo of Surovikin and his wife has emerged. A thread on the choppy information about him, which is more telling, and some implications for the state of Russian military leadership and the war effort. /1
Russian forces have been slowly leaving over the last few weeks by ferry and across pontoon bridges to the east side of the Dnipro river. UAF is targeting them for example here near the Antonovsky bridge (/10)
Belousov has no military experience at all or background in the military. He’s an economist. This will raise questions within the military who will fear a repeat of serdyukov. So I anticipate some unformed officer favorites appointed to leadership positions to balance this. /3
Watching this announcement, having watched these men for many years, I was left with the thought that, sometimes an organization is so broken that it cannot fix itself. It’s turning away from the solutions and resolutions that it previously identified and is looking backward.
One member of Ukraine’s territorial defense noted Russian forces on the west bank had prepared dense defensive positions, and noting “The paratroopers fight honestly. They fight well,” (/5)
But also he is a field commander by experience - he prefers to see the terrain and how things look for himself for this operation given the forces committed. He reportedly visited troops before this stated. He’s there because it’s his style AND because things aren’t going well /6
So Russia's choices were to stay on the west bank and be possibly encircled or destroyed, or try to conduct a controlled withdrawal.
@WarintheFuture
has an excellent thread about how difficult an egress under fire is, here:
In the last 48 hours, reports have emerged of a potential Russian withdrawal from its Dnipro west bank defensive positions. While this may fit General Surovikin’s overall strategy for
#Ukraine
, it will be difficult to execute successfully. 1/24 🧵